



Authentication, Access Control, Auditing and Non-Repudiation

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Principals

- ***Humans or system components that are registered in and authentic to a distributed system.***
- ***Principal has an identity used for:***
 - ***Making principal accountable for its actions***
 - ***Obtaining access to a protected component***
 - ***Identifying the originator of a message***
 - ***Identifying who to charge for service provision.***


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Credentials

- **Information the system has about principals:**




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Secure Requests

- **Principals (or objects acting on their behalf) make requests**



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What's needed for secure requests?

- ***Establishing security association between client & server (authentication)***
- ***Deciding whether principal may perform this operation (access control)***
- ***Making the principal accountable for having requested the operation (auditing)***
- ***Protecting request and response from eavesdropping in transit (encryption)***



Establishing Security Association

- ***Involves***
 - ***Establishing trust in one another's identities***
 - *Client authenticating server's identity*
 - *Server authenticating client's identity*
 - ***Making client credentials available to server***
 - ***Establishing the security context used for protecting requests and replies in transit (e.g. distributing private keys)***



What is Authentication?


- **Authentication: Proving you are who you claim to be.**
- **In centralised systems: Password check at session start.**
- **In distributed systems:**
 - **Use of authentication server**
 - **Usually based on ability to encrypt/decrypt a message (c.f. Needham/Schroeder Protocol)**

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Message Protection




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Access Control

- **Object invocation access control**
- **Application level access control**



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Object Invocation Access Policies

- **Access decision functions enforce object invocation access policies:**
 - *client-side access decision functions and/or*
 - *server-side access decision functions*
- **Decisions are based on**
 - *operation to be performed*
 - *privilege attributes of principal*
 - *control on principal's privilege attributes (e.g. time valid)*
 - *server control attributes*

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Application Access Policies

- ***In previous case access control is transparent to client and server objects***
- ***In this case client and/or server objects implement access control themselves***
- ***Application access policies***
 - ***can take into account the particular data being accessed***
 - ***can take into account the semantics of request parameters***



Access Control Privilege Attributes

- ***Privilege attributes of principals for access control include:***
 - ***principal's identity***
 - ***roles (related to the principal's job functions)***
 - ***groups (related to organizational structure in which principal is embedded)***
 - ***security clearance***
 - ***capabilities of server objects that the principal is allowed to use***
 - ***others...***



Server Control Attributes

- ***Access Control Lists (ACLs) identifying permitted users by***
 - *name or*
 - *privilege attributes*
- ***Information for label-based schemes***
- ***Control attributes are generally shared by groups of operations of an object or even by groups of objects***

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Auditing


- ***Assists in detection of attempted or actual security breaches***
- ***By recording details of security relevant events***
 - *Writing event details into a log file*
 - *Generating a security alert*
 - *Taking other actions*
- ***Two levels of auditing***
 - *system-level*
 - *application-level*

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Auditing Model



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Security Auditing Policies

- **Potentially a large number of events could be recorded**
- **Security auditing policies restrict the set of events to those that are critical for the particular environment**
- **System auditing policies log all security relevant events, even from security unaware applications**

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Non-Repudiation

- ***Makes principals accountable for their actions***
- ***Irrefutable evidence about events/actions is generated***
- ***Used to settle disputes about the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event***
- ***Example: Electronic commerce***



Components of Evidence

- ***Depend on non-repudiation policy.***
- ***Examples include:***
 - ***Type of action or event***
 - ***A timestamp obtained from a trusted authority***
 - ***Parameters related to action or event***
 - ***Proof of origin of parameters***



Common Types of Evidence

- **Proof of creation of a message**
 - *Protects against originator's false denial of having created a message*
- **Proof of receipt of a message**
 - *Protects against receiver's false denial of having received a message*

