



Distributed Systems

Prof. Steve Wilbur
Department of Computer Science
University College London

© University College London, 1998

1



Distributed Systems

***... “use of more than one computer
connected by communications links to
carry out a computational task”***

... includes “parallel” computing

... most contemporary professional systems

© University College London, 1998

2



Course Objectives

- ***to identify special characteristics of distributed systems***
- ***to identify ways user/programmer view can be simplified***
- ***to identify protocols, techniques and algorithms which address DS issues***



Why Distribute?

- ***resource sharing***
- ***physical separation***
- ***robustness***
- ***performance***
- ***cost-effective system evolution***



Examples

- ***file server, print server, etc.***
- ***networked management***
- ***directory and naming services***
- ***desktop (multimedia) conferences***
- ***large-scale computation***
- ***etc.***

© University College London, 1998

5



Why are DSs Different?

- ***non-zero (and variable) message transmission time***
- ***probability of partial failure of collaborating components***
- ***large scale***
- ***environment is not totally secure***

© University College London, 1998

6



Message Transmission Time

- ***processors executing in parallel***
- ***multi-path links between them***
- ***same message may arrive at different times at different processors***
- ***possibility of “race” situations, i.e. non-determinism in algorithm execution (or bugs)***
- ***consistency of data at different sites***

© University College London, 1998

7



Partial Failures - 1

- ***not a concept found in single processor programs***
- ***recovery from failures***
 - ***use of alternative processor***
 - ***migration of services***
 - ***update and propagation of naming/routing information***

© University College London, 1998

8



Partial Failures - 2

- ***Fault tolerant algorithms***
 - *leadership elections*
 - *distributed synchronisation*



Scaling

- ***Abstraction***
- ***Inheritance/object orientation***



Security

- ***computer hosts may be protectable via architecture and OS etc.***
- ***... but link is very vulnerable to***
 - *tapping/message reply*
 - *hosts faking addresses*
- ***... and hosts vulnerable to***
 - *deliberate message overload*
 - *faked services*

© University College London, 1998

11



Distributed Programming

- ***Can we arrange for programmer's view of DS to be identical to that for single-processor system?***

- ***Simple answer is "no", but we can do quite a lot***

© University College London, 1998

12



Remote Procedure Call - 1

- ***common approach***
- ***client-server model***
- ***caller's arguments are marshalled by "stubs", put in a packet and sent to remote proc.***
- ***problems with memory addresses - need args to be sent by "value"***



Remote Procedure Call - 2

- ***execution semantics when failure***
 - ***at-least-once (cheap and easy but ...)***
 - ***at-most-once (relatively easy)***
 - ***exactly once (expensive protocol)***
- ***how is server located?***
 - ***name server based on type matching***
 - ***trader includes other attributes e.g. location of device, options, etc.***
 - ***version management too***



Remote Procedure Call - 3

- **parameter security**
 - *may need to pass encryption keys or other security tokens as parameters*
- **Interface Definition Language (IDL)**
 - *indicates type and order of parameters*
 - *signature for matching in name server*
 - *possibly security indication for stubs*



Real World

- **often termed “Middleware”**
- **support by environments such as DCE, CORBA etc.**



Transparency

- ***... is desirable, but may not be achievable:***
 - ***distribution - effects of distribution (delays etc.) should be invisible to user***
 - ***location - location of components should be irrelevant***
 - ***migration - remote objects may relocate during use***
 - ***failure - recovery from faults***

© University College London, 1998

17



Security

Use of cryptographic techniques to deal with:

- ***secrecy***
- ***authentication of individuals and messages***
- ***replay and faking attacks***
- ***can also provide access control to object methods***

© University College London, 1998

18