



Distributed Systems Security

Authentication Practice - 3

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Lecture Objectives

- u Examine reliance placed on user and system authentication
- u Review password-based approaches

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Problems

- u How does user protect their secret keys?

- u What threats are there?

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Key Rings

- u User will probably have several secret keys
 - o signing keys
 - o encryption keys
 - o role-based keys
 - o different key lengths (512-bit, 1024-bit, DES etc.)
 - o etc.
- u Need to store encrypted keys on **key ring**
 - o or on encrypted file store
- u May also include public keys of correspondents but here need for security not so great
- u Need key to secure key ring or encrypted file store from loss, hacking etc.

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Key Ring Keys

- u Key ring key needs to be stored securely
 - o On magnetic card? With PIN number?
 - o On smart card?
 - o Use of password?
 - o Use of pass-phrase?
- u Security is only as good as the weakest link
- u So, how secure are passwords/pass-phrases?

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Password Security

- u How secure are passwords?
- u System Storage
 - o Should never be stored in clear text, although many applications and operating systems may still use ineffective password encryption
 - o Login process may indicate to hackers legitimate user names by form of response or time taken checking password
 - o Storage and visibility of encrypted passwords may allow users with same password to recognise this
 - o Concatenate *salt* with password - usually date and time to disguise this

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Password Security - 2 Attacks

- u Brute force - try “all” possible passwords
- u Try probable passwords
- u Try probable passwords for user
- u Attack system password file
- u Ask the user

[Pfleeger, p. 256]

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Password Security - 3 Brute Force Attack

- u Assumes all possible passwords are equally likely
- u Since humans are involved this is pessimistic assumption
- u However, for passwords from 26 character set up to 8 characters in length there are $26^9 - 1 \approx 5 \cdot 10^{12}$ possibilities

Each Attempt	Time Taken
1millisecond	150 years
1microsecond	2 months

- u Probably only takes half this time on average

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Password Security - 4 Probable Passwords

- u Many people choose short, easy to pronounce, common words
- u At 1 attempt per millisecond [from Pfleeger]:

Word Length	Time Taken
3 characters	18 secs
4 characters	8 minutes
5 characters	3.5 hours

- u But, “apgw~~x~~” is much more unlikely than “relax”
- u Use of dictionary of 80,000 words reduces search time for all English words to 80 seconds

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Password Security - 5 User Related Weaknesses

- u Many people choose strings related to themselves:
 - o Phone number
 - o Car registration
 - o Spouse name, cat name, etc.
- u May be only a few hundred possibilities
- u “Ask the User”
 - o Large number of passwords means need to write them down
 - o In drawer, etc.

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Password Security - 6 Published Analyses

u Morris & Thompson 1979:

1 ASCII char	0.5%
2 ASCII chars	2%
3 ASCII chars	14%
4 alpha chars	14%
5 alpha, same case	21%
6 lowercase alpha	18%
Dictionary words	15%
Total of above	86%

u Klein 1990: 2.7% guessed in 15 minutes, 21% in less than a week of machine time

u Spafford 1992: average password length 6.8 chars and 28.9% were only lowercase alpha

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Password Security - 7 Guidelines

- u Use wider range than a-z, including punctuation and control characters
- u Use long passwords - some systems now insist on at least 8 characters
- u Avoid names and words - 300 million 6 character alpha combinations, but only 150,000 in dictionary
- u Choose unlikely password that you can remember - 2Brn2B
- u Change password regularly even if not suspicious
- u Don't write it down
- u Don't tell anyone else, ever!

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Password Security - 8 Challenge-Response Authentication

- u Password system for login uses a static protocol which might be replayed if captured
- u Might use **challenge-response dialogue** as only or additional measure
- u Users are each assigned unique mathematical functions
- u Machine issues challenge (number) to which function is applied and response keyed in
- u Special calculator may be provided for purpose
- u (Compare with telephone banking and set of personal info provided by you which can be used as a challenge)

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Authentication Summary

- u Users can be authenticated by:
 - o Something they know (Password)
 - o Something they possess (Card)
 - o Something they are (Biometrics)
- u All have weaknesses
 - o Passwords - see earlier
 - o Cards - loss - use of PIN to reduce vulnerability
 - o Calculator - loss, failure
 - o Biometrics - false positives and false negatives, damage to fingerprint in accidents, stress affecting signatures and keyboard timing and accuracy, etc

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Further Reading

- u Pfleeger C, "Security in Computing", 2ed, Prentice Hall, 1997, 0-13-185794-0
 - o **Access control:** pp 242-254
 - o **User Authentication:** pp 254-265

- u Morris R and Thompson K, "Password Security: A Case History", Comm. ACM, Nov 1979

- u Klein D, "Foiling the Cracker: Survey and Improvements of Password Security" Proc. Usenix Unix Security II Workshop, pp. 5-14, 1990

- u Spafford E, "Observing Reusable Password Choices" Proc. Usenix Unix Security III Workshop, pp. 299-312, 1992

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