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Key-Versatile Signatures and Applications: RKA, KDM and Joint Enc/Sig

MIHIR BELLARE¹

SARAH MEIKLEJOHN²

SUSAN THOMSON³

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Abstract

This paper introduces key-versatile signatures. Key-versatile signatures allow us to sign with keys already in use for another purpose, without changing the keys and without impacting the security of the original purpose. This allows us to obtain advances across a collection of challenging domains including joint Enc/Sig, security against related-key attack (RKA) and security for key-dependent messages (KDM). Specifically we can (1) Add signing capability to existing encryption capability with zero overhead in the size of the public key (2) Obtain RKA-secure signatures from any RKA-secure one-way function, yielding new RKA-secure signature schemes (3) Add integrity to encryption while maintaining KDM-security.

¹ Department of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093, USA. Email: mihir@eng.ucsd.edu. URL: cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/. Supported in part by NSF grants CNS-0904380, CCF-0915675, CNS-1116800 and CNS-1228890.

² Department of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093, USA. Email: smeiklej@eng.ucsd.edu. URL: cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/. Supported in part by NSF grant NSF-1237264.

³ Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB, UK. Email: susan.thomson@bristol.ac.uk. URL: sthomson.co.uk. Supported by EPSRC Leadership Fellowship EP/H005455/1.

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1 Introduction

One of the recommended principles of sound cryptographic design is key separation, meaning that keys used for one purpose (e.g. encryption) should not be used for another purpose (e.g. signing). The reason is that, even if the individual uses are secure, the joint usage could be insecure [42]. This paper shows, to the contrary, that there are important applications where key reuse is not only desirable but crucial to maintain security, and that when done “right” it works. We offer key-versatile signatures as a general tool to enable signing with existing keys already in use for another purpose, without adding key material and while maintaining security of both the new and the old usage of the keys. Our applications include: (1) adding signing capability to existing encryption capability with zero overhead in the size of the public key (2) obtaining RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure one-way functions (3) adding integrity to encryption while preserving KDM security.

CLOSER LOOK. Key-versatility refers to the ability to take an arbitrary one-way function F and return a signature scheme where the secret signing key is a random domain point x for F and the public verification key is its image $y = F(x)$. By requiring strong simulatability and key-extractability security conditions [35] from these “ F -keyed” signatures, and then defining F based on keys already existing for another purpose, we will be able to add signing capability while maintaining existing keys and security.

The most compelling motivation comes from security against related-key attack (RKA) and security for key-dependent messages (KDM), technically challenging areas where solutions create, and depend on, very specific key structures. We would like to expand the set of primitives for which we can provide these forms of security. Rather than start from scratch, we would like to leverage the existing, hard-won advances in these areas by modular design, transforming a primitive \mathbf{X} into a primitive \mathbf{Y} while preserving RKA or KDM security. Since security is relative to a set of functions (either key or message deriving) on the space of keys, the transform must preserve the existing keys. Key-versatile signatures will thus allow us to create new RKA and KDM secure primitives in a modular way.

We warn that our results are theoretical feasibility ones. They demonstrate that certain practical goals can in principle be reached, but the solutions are not efficient. Below we begin with a more direct application of key versatile signatures to Joint Enc/Sig and then go on to our RKA and KDM results.

JOINING SIGNATURES TO ENCRYPTION WITH ZERO PUBLIC-KEY OVERHEAD. Suppose Alice has keys (sk_e, pk_e) for a public-key encryption scheme and wants to also have signing capability. Certainly, she could pick new and separate keys (sk_s, pk_s) enabling her to use her favorite signature scheme. However, it means that Alice’s public key, now $pk = (pk_e, pk_s)$, has doubled in size. Practitioners ask if one can do better. We want a joint encryption and signature (JES) scheme [53, 61], where there is a single key-pair (sk, pk) used for both encryption and signing. We aim to minimize the public-key overhead, (loosely) defined as the size of pk minus the size of the public key pk_e of the underlying encryption scheme.

Haber and Pinkas [53] initiated an investigation of JES. They note that the key re-use requires defining and achieving new notions of security particular to JES: signatures should remain unforgeable even in the presence of a decryption oracle, and encryption should retain IND-CCA privacy even in the presence of a signing oracle. In the random oracle model [17], *specific* IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes have been presented where signing can be added with no public-key overhead [53, 36, 57]. In the standard model, encryption schemes have been presented that allow signing with a public-key overhead lower than that of the “Cartesian product” solution of just adding a separate signing key [53, 61], with the best results, from [61], using IBE or combining encryption and signature schemes of [29, 25].

All these results, however, pertain to *specific* encryption schemes. We step back to ask a general theoretical question. Namely, suppose we are given an *arbitrary* IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. We wish to add signing capability to form a JES scheme. How low can the public-key overhead go? The (perhaps surprising) answer we provide is that we can achieve a public-key overhead of *zero*. The public key for our JES scheme remains *exactly* that of the given encryption scheme, meaning we add signing capability without changing the public key. (Zero public-key overhead has a particular advantage besides space savings, namely that, in adding signing, no new certificates are needed. This makes key management significantly easier for the potentially large number of entities already using Alice’s public

key. This advantage is absent if the public key is at all modified.) We emphasize again that this is for *any* starting encryption scheme.

To do this, we let F be the function that maps the secret key of the given encryption scheme to the public key. (Not all encryption schemes will directly derive the public key as a deterministic function of the secret key, although many, including Cramer-Shoup [38], do. However, we can modify any encryption scheme to have this property, *without changing the public key*, by using the coins of the key-generation algorithm as the secret key.) The assumed security of the encryption scheme means this function is one-way. Now, we simply use an F -keyed signature scheme, with the keys remaining those of the encryption scheme. No new keys are introduced. We need however to ensure that the joint use of the keys does not result in bad interactions that make either the encryption or the signature insecure. This amounts to showing that the JES security conditions, namely that encryption remains secure even given a signing oracle and signing remains secure even given a decryption oracle, are met. This will follow from the simulatability and key-extractability requirements we impose on our F -keyed signatures. See Section 4.

NEW RKA-SECURE SIGNATURES. In a related-key attack (RKA) [56, 19, 14, 9] an adversary can modify a stored secret key and observe outcomes of the cryptographic primitive under the modified key. Such attacks may be mounted by tampering [27, 20, 48], so RKA security improves resistance to side-channel attacks. Achieving proven security against RKAs, however, is broadly recognized as very challenging. This has lead several authors [49, 9] to suggest that we “bootstrap,” building higher-level Φ -RKA-secure primitives from lower-level Φ -RKA-secure primitives. (As per the framework of [14, 9], security is parameterized by the class of functions Φ that the adversary is allowed to apply to the key. Security is never possible for the class of all functions [14], so we seek results for specific Φ .) In this vein, [9] show how to build Φ -RKA signatures from Φ -RKA PRFs. Building Φ -RKA PRFs remains difficult, however, and we really have only one construction [8]. This has lead to direct (non-bootstrapping) constructions of Φ -RKA signatures for classes Φ of polynomials over certain specific pairing groups [16].

We return to bootstrapping and provide a much stronger result, building Φ -RKA signatures from Φ -RKA one-way functions rather than from Φ -RKA PRFs. (For a one-way function, the input is the “key.” In attempting to recover x from $F(x)$, the adversary may also obtain $F(x')$ where x' is created by applying to x some modification function from Φ . The definition is from [49].) The difference is significant because building Φ -RKA one-way functions under standard assumptions is easy. Adapting the key-malleability technique of [8], we show that many natural one-way functions are Φ -RKA secure *assuming nothing more than their standard one-wayness*. In particular this is true for discrete exponentiation over an arbitrary group and for the one-way functions underlying the LWE and LPN problems. In this way we obtain Φ -RKA signatures for many new and natural classes Φ .

The central challenge in our bootstrapping is to preserve the keyspace, meaning that the space of secret keys of the constructed signature scheme must be the domain of the given Φ -RKA one-way function F . (Without this, it is not even meaningful to talk of preserving Φ -RKA security, let alone to show that it happens.) This is exactly what an F -keyed signature scheme allows us to do. The proof that Φ -RKA security is preserved exploits strong features built into our definitions of simulatability and key-extractability for F -keyed signatures, in particular that these conditions hold even under secret keys selected by the adversary. See Section 5.

KDM-SECURE STORAGE. Over the last few years we have seen a large number of sophisticated schemes to address the (challenging) problem of encryption of key-dependent data (e.g., [22, 28, 5, 4, 32, 33, 21, 7, 59, 3, 30, 31, 13, 46, 55]). The most touted application is secure outsourced storage, where Alice’s decryption key, or some function thereof, is in a file she is encrypting and uploading to the cloud. But in this setting integrity is just as important as privacy. To this end, we would like to add signatures, thus enabling the server, based on Alice’s public key, to validate her uploads, and enabling Alice herself to validate her downloads, all *while preserving KDM security*.

What emerges is a new goal that we call KDM-secure (encrypted and authenticated) storage. In Section 6 we formalize the corresponding primitive, providing both syntax and notions of security for key-dependent messages. Briefly, Alice uses a secret key sk to turn her message M into an encrypted and authenticated “data” object that she stores on the server. The server is able to check integrity based on

Alice’s public key. When Alice retrieves data, she can check integrity and decrypt based on her secret key. Security requires both privacy and integrity even when M depends on sk . (As we explain in more depth below, this goal is different from signcryption [66], authenticated public-key encryption [2] and authenticated symmetric encryption [15, 62], even in the absence of KDM considerations.)

A natural approach to achieve our goal is for Alice to encrypt under a symmetric, KDM-secure scheme and sign the ciphertexts under a conventional signature scheme. But it is not clear how to prove the resulting storage scheme is KDM-secure. The difficulty is that sk would include the signing key in addition to the encryption (and decryption) key K , so that messages depend on both these keys while the KDM security of the encryption only covers messages depending on K . We could attempt to start from scratch and design a secure storage scheme meeting our notions. But key-versatile signatures offer a simpler and more modular solution. Briefly, we take a KDM-secure *public-key* encryption scheme and let F be the one-way function that maps a secret key to a public key. Alice holds (only) a secret key sk and the server holds $pk = F(sk)$. To upload M , Alice re-computes pk from sk , encrypts M under it using the KDM scheme, and signs the ciphertext with an F -keyed signature scheme using the *same* key sk . The server verifies signatures under pk .

In Section 6 we present in full the construction outlined above, and prove that it meets our notion of KDM security. The crux, as for our RKA-secure constructions, is that adding signing capability without changing the keys puts us in a position to exploit the assumed KDM security of the underlying encryption scheme. The strong simulatability and key-extractability properties of our signatures do the rest. We note that as an added bonus, we assume only CPA KDM security of the base encryption scheme, yet our storage scheme achieves CCA KDM security.

GETTING F -KEYED SIGNATURES. In Section 3 we define F -keyed signature schemes and show how to construct them for arbitrary one-way F . This enables us to realize the above applications.

Our simulatability condition, adapting [35, 1, 34], asks for a trapdoor allowing the creation of simulated signatures given only the message and public key, even when the secret key underlying this public key is adversarially chosen. Our key-extractability condition, adapting [35], asks that, using the same trapdoor, one can extract from a valid signature the corresponding secret key, even when the public key is adversarially chosen. Theorem 3.1, showing these conditions imply not just standard but strong unforgeability, functions not just as a sanity check but as a way to introduce, in a simple form, a proof template that we will extend for our applications.

Our construction of an F -keyed signature scheme is a minor adaptation of a NIZK-based signature scheme of Dodis, Haralambiev, López-Alt and Wichs (DHLW) [43]. While DHLW [43] prove leakage-resilience of their scheme, we prove simulatability and key-extractability. The underlying SE NIZKs are a variant of simulation-sound extractable NIZKs [39, 51, 52] introduced by [43] under the name tSE NIZKs and shown by [43, 54] to be achievable for all of **NP** under standard assumptions.

DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK. F -keyed signatures can be viewed as a special case of signatures of knowledge as introduced by Chase and Lysyanskaya [35]. The main novelty of our work is in the notion of key-versatility, namely that F -keyed signatures can add signing capability without changing keys, and the ensuing applications to Joint Enc/Sig, RKA and KDM. In particular our work shows that signatures of knowledge have applications beyond those envisaged in [35].

The first NIZK-based signature scheme was that of [11]. It achieved only unforgeability. Simulatability and extractability were achieved in [35] using dense cryptosystems [41, 40] and simulation-sound NIZKs [64, 39]. The DHLW construction we use can be viewed as a simplification and strengthening made possible by the significant advances in NIZK technology since then.

F -keyed signatures, and, more generally, signatures of knowledge [35] can be seen as a signing analogue of Witness encryption [47, 12], and we might have named them Witness Signatures. GGSW [47] show how witness encryption allows encryption with a flexible choice of keys, just as we show that F -keyed signatures allow signing with a flexible choice of keys.

Signcryption [66], authenticated public-key encryption [2], JES [53, 61] and our secure storage goal all have in common that both encryption and signature are involved. However, in signcryption and authenticated public-key encryption, there are two parties and thus two sets of keys, Alice encrypting under Bob’s

public key and signing under her own secret key. In JES and secure storage, there is one set of keys, namely Alice’s. Thus for signcryption and authenticated public-key encryption, the question of using the same keys for the two purposes, which is at the core of our goals and methods, does not arise. Self-signcryption [45] is however similar to secure storage, minus the key-dependent message aspect. Authenticated symmetric encryption [15, 62] also involves both encryption and authentication, but under a shared key, while JES and secure storage involve public keys. KDM-secure authenticated symmetric encryption was studied in [13, 6].

KDM-secure signatures were studied in [60], who show limitations on the security achievable. Our secure storage scheme bypasses these limitations by signing ciphertexts rather than plaintexts and by avoiding KDM-secure signatures altogether: we use F -keyed signatures and are making no standalone claims or assumptions regarding their KDM security. Combining KDM encryption and KDM signatures would not give us KDM-secure storage because the keys for the two primitives would be different and we want joint KDM security.

Secure storage is an amalgam of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, encryption being of the former kind and authentication of the latter. With secure storage, we are directly modeling a goal of practical interest rather than trying to create a general-purpose tool like many of the other works just mentioned. The difference between JES and secure storage is that in the former, arbitrary messages may be signed, while in the latter only ciphertexts may be signed. The difference is crucial for KDM security, which for JES would inherit the limitations of KDM-secure signatures just mentioned, but is not so limited for secure storage.

2 Notation

The empty string is denoted by ε . If x is a (binary) string then $|x|$ is its length. If S is a finite set then $|S|$ denotes its size and $s \leftarrow S$ denotes picking an element uniformly from S and assigning it to s . We denote by $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter and by 1^λ its unary representation.

Algorithms are randomized unless otherwise indicated. “PT” stands for “polynomial time,” whether for randomized algorithms or deterministic. By $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \dots; R)$, we denote the operation of running algorithm A on inputs x_1, \dots and coins R and letting y denote the output. By $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \dots)$, we denote the operation of letting $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \dots; R)$ for random R . We denote by $[A(x_1, \dots)]$ the set of points that have positive probability of being output by A on inputs x_1, \dots . Adversaries are algorithms.

We use games in definitions of security and in proofs. A game G (e.g. Figure 1) has a MAIN procedure whose output (what it returns) is the output of the game. We let $\Pr[G]$ denote the probability that this output is the boolean true. The boolean flag `bad`, if used in a game, is assumed initialized to `false`.

3 Key-versatile signatures

We define F -keyed signature schemes, for F a family of functions rather than the single function F used for simplicity in Section 1. The requirement is that the secret key sk is an input for an instance fp of the family and the public key $pk = F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$ is the corresponding image under this instance, the instance fp itself specified in public parameters. We intend to use these schemes to add authenticity in a setting where keys (sk, pk) may already be in use for another purpose (such as encryption). We need to ensure that signing will neither lessen the security of the existing usage of the keys nor have its own security be lessened by it. To ensure this strong form of composability, we define simulatability and key-extractability requirements for our F -keyed schemes. The fact that the keys will already be in use for another purpose also means that we do not have the luxury of picking the family F , but must work with an arbitrary family emerging from another setting. The only assumption we will make on F is thus that it is one-way. (This is necessary, else security is clearly impossible.) With the definitions in place, we go on to indicate how to build F -keyed signature schemes for arbitrary, one-way F .

We clarify that being F -keyed under an F assumed to be one-way does not mean that security (simulatability and key-extractability) of the signature scheme is based *solely* on the assumption that F is one-way. The additional assumption is a SE-secure NIZK. (But this itself can be built under standard assumptions.) It is possible to build a signature scheme that is unforgeable assuming only that a given F is one-way [63], but this scheme will not be F -keyed relative to the same F underlying its security, and it will not be simulatable or key-extractable.

<p>MAIN $\text{SIM}_{\text{DS},\text{F}}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$b \leftarrow_{\\$} \{0, 1\}$</p> <p>$(fp, ap_1) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>$pp_1 \leftarrow (fp, ap_1)$</p> <p>$(ap_0, std, xtd) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>$pp_0 \leftarrow (fp, ap_0)$</p> <p>$b' \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp_b)$; Ret $(b = b')$</p> <p><u>SIGN(sk, M)</u></p> <p>If $sk \notin \text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>$pk \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$</p> <p>If $b = 1$ then $\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Sig}(1^\lambda, pp_1, sk, M)$</p> <p>Else $\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp_0, std, pk, M)$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>	<p>MAIN $\text{EXT}_{\text{DS},\text{F}}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>$pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$; $(pk, M, \sigma) \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>If $pk \notin \text{F.Rng}(1^\lambda, fp)$ then Ret false</p> <p>If not $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma)$ then Ret false</p> <p>If $(pk, M, \sigma) \in Q$ then Ret false</p> <p>$sk \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma)$</p> <p>Ret $(\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk) \neq pk)$</p> <p><u>SIGN($sk, M$)</u></p> <p>If $sk \notin \text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>$pk \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, pk, M)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(pk, M, \sigma)\}$; Ret σ</p>
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Figure 1: **Games defining security of F-keyed signature scheme DS.** Left: Game defining simulatability. Right: Game defining key-extractability.

SIGNATURE SCHEMES. A signature scheme DS specifies the following PT algorithms: via $pp \leftarrow_{\$} \text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ one generates public parameters pp common to all users; via $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ a user can generate a secret signing key sk and corresponding public verification key pk ; via $\sigma \leftarrow_{\$} \text{DS.Sig}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, M)$ the signer can generate a signature σ on a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$; via $d \leftarrow \text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma)$ a verifier can deterministically produce a decision $d \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ regarding whether σ is a valid signature of M under pk . Correctness requires that $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \text{DS.Sig}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, M)) = \text{true}$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $pp \in [\text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)]$, all $(sk, pk) \in [\text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)]$, and all M .

FUNCTION FAMILIES. A function family F specifies the following. Via $fp \leftarrow_{\$} \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ one can in PT generate a description fp of a function $\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, \cdot)$: $\text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp) \rightarrow \text{F.Rng}(1^\lambda, fp)$. We assume that membership of x in the non-empty domain $\text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$ can be tested in time polynomial in $1^\lambda, fp, x$ and one can in time polynomial in $1^\lambda, fp$ sample a point $x \leftarrow_{\$} \text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$ from the domain $\text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$. The deterministic evaluation algorithm F.Ev is PT. The range is defined by $\text{F.Rng}(1^\lambda, fp) = \{\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x) : x \in \text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)\}$. Testing membership in the range is not required to be PT. (But is in many examples.) We say that F is one-way or F is a OWF if $\text{Adv}_{\text{F}, I}^{\text{ow}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT I , where $\text{Adv}_{\text{F}, I}^{\text{ow}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x') = y]$ under the experiment $fp \leftarrow_{\$} \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $x \leftarrow_{\$} \text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$; $y \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x)$; $x' \leftarrow_{\$} I(1^\lambda, fp, y)$.

F-KEYED SIGNATURE SCHEMES. Let F be a function family. We say that a signature scheme DS is *F-keyed* if the following are true:

- **Parameter compatibility:** Parameters pp for DS are a pair $pp = (fp, ap)$ consisting of parameters fp for F and auxiliary parameters ap , these independently generated. Formally, there is a PT *auxiliary parameter generation* algorithm APg such that $\text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ picks $fp \leftarrow_{\$} \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $ap \leftarrow_{\$} \text{APg}(1^\lambda)$ and returns (fp, ap) .
- **Key compatibility:** The signing key sk is a random point in the domain of F.Ev and the verifying key pk its image under F.Ev . Formally, $\text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, (fp, ap))$ picks $sk \leftarrow_{\$} \text{F.Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$, lets $pk \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$ and returns (sk, pk) . (DS.Kg ignores the auxiliary parameters ap , meaning the keys do not depend on it.)

SECURITY OF F-KEYED SIGNATURE SCHEMES. We require two (strong) security properties of an F-keyed signature scheme DS:

- **Simulatable:** Under simulated auxiliary parameters and an associated simulation trapdoor std , a simulator, given $pk = \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$ and M , can produce a signature σ indistinguishable from the real one produced under sk , when not just M , but even the secret key sk , is adaptively chosen by the adversary.

Formally, DS is *simulatable* if it specifies additional PT algorithms DS.SimPg (the auxiliary parameter simulator) and DS.SimSig (the signature simulator) such that $\text{Adv}_{\text{DS},\text{F},A}^{\text{sim}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\text{Adv}_{\text{DS},\text{F},A}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) = 2 \Pr[\text{SIM}_{\text{DS},\text{F}}^A(\lambda)] - 1$ and game SIM is specified on the left-hand side of Figure 1.

- **Key-extractable:** Under the same simulated auxiliary parameters and an associated extraction trapdoor xtd , an extractor can extract from any valid forgery relative to pk an underlying secret key sk , even when pk is chosen by the adversary and the adversary can adaptively obtain simulated signatures under secret keys of its choice. Formally, DS is *key-extractable* if it specifies another PT algorithm DS.Ext (the extractor) such that $\text{Adv}_{\text{DS},\text{F},A}^{\text{ext}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\text{Adv}_{\text{DS},\text{F},A}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{EXT}_{\text{DS},\text{F}}^A(\lambda)]$ and game EXT is specified on the right-hand side of Figure 1.

The EXT game includes a possibly non-PT test of membership in the range of the family, but we will ensure that adversaries (who must remain PT) do not perform this test. Our definition of simulatability follows [35, 1, 34]. Those definitions were for general signatures, not F -keyed ones, and one difference is that our simulator can set only the auxiliary parameters, not the full parameters, meaning it does not set fp .

$\text{SIM} + \text{EXT}$ IMPLIES UNFORGEABILITY. The simulatability and key-extractability notions we have defined may seem quite unrelated to the standard unforgeability requirement for signature schemes [50]. As a warm-up towards applying these new conditions, we show that in fact they imply not just the standard unforgeability but strong unforgeability, under the minimal assumption that F is one-way.

Theorem 3.1 *Let DS be an F -keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. If F is one-way then DS is strongly unforgeable.*

In Appendix A we recall the definition of strong unforgeability and formally prove the above. Here we sketch the intuition. Given an adversary A against unforgeability, we build an inverter I for F . On input $1^\lambda, fp, pk$, adversary I generates simulated auxiliary parameters ap together with simulation and extraction trapdoors. It now runs A with parameters (fp, ap) , answering signing queries via the signature simulator. (Note the latter only needs the simulation trapdoor and the public key, not the secret key.) When A produces its forgery M, σ , the inverter I runs the extractor to obtain sk , a pre-image of pk under $\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, \cdot)$. The simulation and key-extractability conditions are invoked to show that I succeeds with almost the same probability as A . This involves the construction of adversaries A_1, A_2 for the two conditions. A question here is that these adversaries can only make signing queries under secret keys that they know, so how do they proceed not knowing sk ? The answer is that they will themselves run key-generation to get (sk, pk) and then run A on the latter. Now, when A makes a signing query M , adversaries A_1, A_2 can answer by invoking their own signing oracles on sk, M .

A reader may note that the above theorem would hold under weaker simulatability and extractability conditions where the adversaries do not choose secret and public keys. This is true, but the stronger conditions are crucial to other upcoming applications in this paper.

CONSTRUCTION. A *key-versatile signing schema* is a transform \mathbf{KvS} that given an arbitrary family of functions F returns an F -keyed signature scheme $\text{DS} = \mathbf{KvS}[\text{F}]$. We want the constructed signature scheme to be simulatable and key-extractable. We now show that this is possible with the aid of appropriate NIZK systems which are themselves known to be possible under standard assumptions.

Theorem 3.2 *Assume there exist SE NIZK systems for all of \mathbf{NP} . Then there is a key-versatile signing schema \mathbf{KvS} such that if F is any family of functions then the signature scheme $\text{DS} = \mathbf{KvS}[\text{F}]$ is simulatable and key-extractable.*

In Appendix B we recall the definition of a SE (Simulation Extractable) NIZK system. SE was called tSE in [43] and is a variant of NIZK-security notions from [51, 39, 64]. We then specify the construction and prove it has the claimed properties. Here we sketch the construction and its history.

The scheme is simple. We define the relation $\text{R}((1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), sk)$ to return true iff $\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk) = pk$. A signature of M under sk is then a SE-secure NIZK proof for this relation in which the witness is sk and the instance (input) is $(1^\lambda, fp, pk, M)$. The interesting aspect of this construction is that it at first sounds

blatantly insecure, since the relation R ignores the message M . Does this not mean that a signature is independent of the message, in which case an adversary could violate unforgeability by requesting a signature σ of a message M under pk and then outputting (M', σ) as a forgery for some $M' \neq M$? What prevents this is the strength of the SE notion of NIZKs. The message M is present in the instance $(1^\lambda, fp, pk, M)$, even if it is ignored by the relation; the proof in turn depends on the instance, making the signature depend on M . Intuitively the SE-secure NIZK guarantees a form of non-malleability, so signatures (proofs) for one message (instance) cannot be transferred to another. The formal proof of Theorem 3.2 in Appendix B shows simulatability of the F-keyed signature scheme based on the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK and key-extractability of the F-keyed signature scheme based on extractability of the NIZK, both in a natural and simple way.

A similar construction of signatures was given in [43] starting from a leakage-resilient hard relation rather than (as in our case) a relation arising from a one-way function. Our construction could be considered a special case of theirs, with the added difference that they use labeled NIZKs with the message as the label while we avoid labels and put the message in the input. The claims established about the construction are however different, with [43] establishing leakage resilience and unforgeability of the signature and our work showing simulatability and key-extractability. The technique of [43] was also used by [34] to construct malleable signatures. Going back further, the first NIZK-based signature scheme was that of [11]. This used PRFs and commitment, but only regular (as opposed to SE) NIZKs, these being all that was available at the time. One might see the simpler and more elegant modern NIZK-based signatures as being made possible by the arrival of the stronger NIZK systems of works like [39, 51, 52, 43].

4 Joining signature to encryption with no public-key overhead

Let PKE be an arbitrary IND-CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme. As an example, it could be the Cramer-Shoup scheme [38], the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [58], or the DDN scheme [44], but it could be any other IND-CCA-secure scheme as well. Alice has already established a key-pair (sk_e, pk_e) for this scheme, allowing anyone to send her ciphertexts computed under pk_e that she can decrypt under sk_e . She wants now to add signature capability. This is easily done. She can create a key-pair (sk_s, pk_s) for her favorite signature scheme and sign an arbitrary message M under sk_s , verification being possible given pk_s . The difficulty is that her public key is now $pk = (pk_e, pk_s)$. It is not just larger but will require a new certificate. The question we ask is whether we can add signing capability in a way that is more parsimonious with regard to public key size. Technically, we seek a joint encryption and signature (JES) scheme where Alice has a single key-pair (sk, pk) , with sk used to decrypt and sign, and pk used to encrypt and verify, each usage secure in the face of the other, and we want pk smaller than that of the trivial solution $pk = (pk_e, pk_s)$. Perhaps surprisingly, we show how to construct a JES scheme with pk-overhead zero, meaning pk is unchanged, remaining pk_e . We not only manage to use sk_e to sign and pk_e to verify, but do so in such a way that the security of the encryption is not affected by the presence of the signature, and vice versa. Previous standard model JES schemes had been able to reduce the pk-overhead only for *specific* starting encryption schemes [53, 61] while our result says the overhead can be zero regardless of the starting encryption scheme. The result is obtained by defining F as the function mapping sk_e to pk_e and using a simulatable and key-extractable F-keyed signature scheme with the keys remaining (sk_e, pk_e) .

JES SCHEMES. A joint encryption and signature (JES) scheme JES specifies the following PT algorithms: via $jp \leftarrow_s JES.Pg(1^\lambda)$ one generates public parameters jp common to all users; via $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s JES.Kg(1^\lambda, jp)$ a user can generate a secret (signing and decryption) key sk and corresponding public (verification and encryption) key pk ; via $\sigma \leftarrow_s JES.Sig(1^\lambda, jp, sk, M)$ the user can generate a signature σ on a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$; via $d \leftarrow JES.Ver(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M, \sigma)$ a verifier can deterministically produce a decision $d \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ regarding whether σ is a valid signature of M under pk ; via $C \leftarrow_s JES.Enc(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M)$ anyone can generate a ciphertext C encrypting message M under pk ; via $M \leftarrow JES.Dec(1^\lambda, jp, sk, C)$ the user can deterministically decrypt ciphertext C to get a value $M \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$. Correctness requires that $JES.Ver(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M, JES.Sig(1^\lambda, jp, sk, M)) = \text{true}$ and that $JES.Dec(1^\lambda, jp, sk, JES.Enc(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M)) = M$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $jp \in [JES.Pg(1^\lambda)]$, all $(sk, pk) \in [JES.Kg(1^\lambda, jp)]$, and all $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$. We say that JES is IND-secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{JES, A}^{\text{ind}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT adversaries A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{JES, A}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) = 2 \Pr[\text{IND}_{JES}^A(\lambda)] - 1$

<p>MAIN $\text{IND}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$b \leftarrow_{\\$} \{0, 1\}; C^* \leftarrow_{\perp}; jp \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Pg}(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>$(pk, sk) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Kg}(1^\lambda, jp)$</p> <p>$b' \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{DEC, SIGN, LR}}(1^\lambda, jp, pk)$</p> <p>Ret $(b = b')$</p> <p><u>proc DEC(C)</u></p> <p>If $(C = C^*)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>Else Ret $M \leftarrow \text{JES.Dec}(1^\lambda, jp, sk, C)$</p> <p><u>proc SIGN($M$)</u></p> <p>Ret $\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Sig}(1^\lambda, jp, sk, M)$</p> <p><u>proc LR($M_0, M_1$)</u></p> <p>If $(M_0 \neq M_1)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>Else Ret $C^* \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Enc}(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M_b)$</p>	<p>MAIN $\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$</p> <p>$jp \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Pg}(1^\lambda); (pk, sk) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Kg}(1^\lambda, jp)$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{SIGN, DEC}}(1^\lambda, jp, pk)$</p> <p>Ret $(\text{JES.Ver}(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M, \sigma) \text{ and } (M, \sigma) \notin Q)$</p> <p><u>proc SIGN($M$)</u></p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{JES.Sig}(1^\lambda, jp, sk, M)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(M, \sigma)\};$ Ret σ</p> <p><u>proc DEC(C)</u></p> <p>Ret $M \leftarrow \text{JES.Dec}(1^\lambda, jp, sk, C)$</p>
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Figure 2: **Games defining security of joint encryption and signature scheme JES.** Left: Game IND defining privacy against chosen-ciphertext attack in the presence of a signing oracle. Right: Game SUF defining strong unforgeability in the presence of a decryption oracle.

and game IND is on the left-hand side of Figure 2. Here the adversary is allowed only one query to LR. This represents privacy under chosen-ciphertext attack in the presence of a signing oracle. We say that JES is SUF-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{JES}, A}^{\text{SUF}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT adversaries A , where $\text{Adv}_{\text{JES}, A}^{\text{SUF}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)]$ and game SUF is on the right-hand side of Figure 2. This represents (strong) unforgeability of the signature in the presence of a decryption oracle. These definitions are from [53, 61].

THE BASE PKE SCHEME. We are given a public-key encryption scheme PKE, specifying the following PT algorithms: via $fp \leftarrow_{\$} \text{PKE.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ one generates public parameters; via $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{PKE.Kg}(1^\lambda, fp)$ a user generates a decryption key sk and encryption key pk ; via $C \leftarrow_{\$} \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, pk, M)$ anyone can generate a ciphertext C encrypting a message M under pk ; and via $M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk, C)$ a user can deterministically decrypt a ciphertext C to get a value $M \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$. Correctness requires that $\text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk, \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, pk, M)) = M$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $fp \in [\text{PKE.Pg}(1^\lambda)]$, all $(sk, pk) \in [\text{PKE.Kg}(1^\lambda, fp)]$, and all $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$. We assume that PKE meets the usual notion of IND-CCA security.

Let us say that PKE is *canonical* if the operation $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{PKE.Kg}(1^\lambda, fp)$ picks sk at random from a finite, non-empty set we denote $\text{PKE.SK}(1^\lambda, fp)$, and then applies to $(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$ a PT deterministic *public-key derivation function* we denote PKE.PK to get pk . Canonicity may seem like an extra assumption, but isn't. First, many (most) schemes are already canonical. This is true for the Cramer-Shoup scheme [38], the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [58] and for schemes obtained via the BCHK transform [26] applied to the identity-based encryption schemes of Boneh-Boyen [24] or Waters [65]. Second, if by chance a scheme is not canonical, we can modify it be so. Crucially (for our purposes), the modification *does not change the public key*. (But it might change the secret key.) Briefly, the modification, which is standard, is to use the random coins of the key generation algorithm as the secret key. In some more detail, given PKE, the new key-generation algorithm, on inputs $1^\lambda, fp$, picks random coins ω , lets $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{PKE.Kg}(1^\lambda, fp; \omega)$, and returns (ω, pk) , so that the new secret key is ω and the public key is still pk . Encryption is unchanged. The modified decryption algorithm, given $1^\lambda, fp, \omega, C$, lets $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{PKE.Kg}(1^\lambda, fp; \omega)$ and outputs $M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk, C)$. It is easy to see that the modified scheme is canonical and also inherits both the correctness and the IND-CCA security of the original scheme.

CONSTRUCTION. Given canonical PKE as above, we construct a JES scheme JES. The first step is to construct from PKE a function family F as follows: let $F.\text{Pg} = \text{PKE.Pg}$, so the parameters of F are the same those of PKE; let $F.\text{Dom} = \text{PKE.SK}$, so the domain of F is the space of secret keys of PKE; and let $F.\text{Ev} = \text{PKE.PK}$, so the function defined by fp maps a secret key to a corresponding public key. Now

<p>MAIN RKAOWF$_{F,\Phi}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_s F.Pg(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>$x \leftarrow_s F.Dom(1^\lambda, fp) ; y \leftarrow F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, x)$</p> <p>$x' \leftarrow_s A^{EVAL}(1^\lambda, fp, y)$</p> <p>Ret $(F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, x') = y)$</p> <hr/> <p>EVAL($\phi$)</p> <p>$x' \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, x) ; y' \leftarrow F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, x')$</p> <p>Ret y'</p>	<p>MAIN RKASIG$_{DS,F,\Phi}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset ; (fp, ap) \leftarrow_s DS.Pg(1^\lambda) ; pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$</p> <p>$(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s DS.Kg(1^\lambda, pp) ; (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{SIGN}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$</p> <p>Ret $(DS.Ver(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma) \text{ and } (pk, M, \sigma) \notin Q)$</p> <hr/> <p>SIGN($\phi, M$)</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, sk) ; pk' \leftarrow F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s DS.Sig(1^\lambda, pp, sk', M) ; Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(pk', M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ'</p>
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Figure 3: Games defining Φ -RKA security of a function family F (left) and an F -keyed signature scheme DS (right).

let DS be an F -keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. (We can obtain DS via Theorem 3.2.) Now we define our JES scheme JES . Let $JES.Pg = DS.Pg$, so parameters for JES have the form $jp = (fp, ap)$, where fp are parameters for F , which by definition of F are also parameters for PKE . Let $JES.Kg = DS.Kg$. (Keys are those of PKE which are also those of DS .) Let $JES.Sig = DS.Sig$ and $JES.Ver = DS.Ver$, so the signing and verifying algorithms of the joint scheme JES are inherited from the signature scheme DS . Let $JES.Enc(1^\lambda, (fp, ap), pk, M)$ return $PKE.Enc(1^\lambda, fp, pk, M)$ and let $JES.Dec(1^\lambda, (fp, ap), sk, C)$ return $PKE.Dec(1^\lambda, fp, sk, C)$, so the encryption and decryption algorithms of the joint scheme JES are inherited from the PKE scheme PKE . Note that the public key of the joint scheme JES is exactly that of PKE , so there is zero public-key overhead. (If PKE had been born canonical, there is also zero secret-key overhead. Had it undergone the transformation described above to make it canonical, the secret-key overhead would be non-zero but the public-key overhead would still be zero because the transformation did not change the public key.) The following says that JES is both IND and SUF secure.

Theorem 4.1 *Let PKE be a canonical public-key encryption scheme. Let F be defined from it as above. Let DS be an F -keyed signature scheme, and let JES be the corresponding joint encryption and signature scheme constructed above. Assume PKE is IND-CCA secure. Assume DS is simulatable and key-extractable. Then (1) JES is IND secure, and (2) JES is SUF secure.*

A full proof of this theorem is in Appendix C. Here we sketch the main ideas. For (1), given an adversary A against the IND security of JES , we build an adversary D against the IND-CCA security of PKE . D will simply run A on simulated auxiliary parameters, using the simulator to answer A 's SIGN queries and using its own DEC oracle to answer A 's DEC queries. A simulation adversary is built alongside, but key extraction is not needed. For (2), given an adversary A against the SUF security of JES , we again build an adversary D against the IND-CCA security of PKE . It will run A with simulated auxiliary parameters, replying to A 's oracle queries as before. From a forgery it extracts the secret key, using this to defeat IND-CCA security. Adversaries A_1 and A_2 against simulatability and key-extractability of DS are built alongside to show that D succeeds.

5 RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure OWFs

RKA security is notoriously hard to provably achieve. Recognizing this, several authors [49, 9] have suggested a bootstrapping approach in which we build higher-level RKA-secure primitives from lower-level RKA-secure primitives. In this vein, a construction of RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure PRFs was given in [9]. We improve on this via a construction of RKA-secure signatures from RKA-secure one-way functions. The result is simple: If F is a Φ -RKA-secure OWF then any F -keyed simulatable and key-extractable signature scheme is also Φ -RKA secure. The benefit is that (as we will show) many popular OWFs are already RKA secure and we immediately get new RKA-secure signatures.

RKA SECURITY. Let F be a function family. A class of RKD (related-key deriving) functions Φ for F is a PT-computable function that specifies for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, each $fp \in [F.Pg(1^\lambda)]$ and each $\phi \in \{0, 1\}^*$ a map $\Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, \cdot) : F.Dom(1^\lambda, fp) \rightarrow F.Dom(1^\lambda, fp)$ called the RKD function described by ϕ . We say

that F is Φ -RKA secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{F,A,\Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{F,A,\Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{RKAOWF}_{F,\Phi}^A(\lambda)]$ and game RKAOWF is on the left-hand side of Figure 3. In this game, A , like in the basic one-wayness notion, is given $y = F.\text{Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x)$ and attempts to find x' such that $F.\text{Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x') = y$. Now, however, it has help. It can request that the hidden challenge input x be modified to $x' = \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, x)$ for any description ϕ of its choice, and obtain $y' = F.\text{Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x')$. This should not help it in its inversion task. The definition is from Goldenberg and Liskov [49], adapted to our notation, and represents a particularly simple and basic form of RKA security.

Let DS be an F -keyed signature scheme and let Φ be as above. We say that DS is Φ -RKA secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A,\Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A,\Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{RKASIG}_{\text{DS},F,\Phi}^A(\lambda)]$ and game RKASIG is on the right-hand side of Figure 3. In this game, A , like in the basic (strong) unforgeability notion, is given public key pk and is attempting to forge a signature under it. Now, however, it has help beyond its usual signing oracle. It can request that the hidden secret key sk be modified to $sk' = \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, sk)$ for any description ϕ of its choice, and obtain a signature under sk' of any message of its choice. This should not help it in its forgery task. Our definition adapts the one of Bellare, Cash and Miller [9] for Φ -RKA security of arbitrary signature schemes to the special case of F -keyed signature schemes.¹

CONSTRUCTION. Suppose we are given a Φ -RKA-secure OWF F and want to build a Φ -RKA-secure signature scheme. For the question to even make sense, RKD functions specified by Φ must apply to the secret signing key. Thus, the secret key needs to be an input for the OWF and the public key needs to be the image of the secret key under the OWF. The main technical difficulty is, given F , finding a signature scheme with this property. But this is exactly what a key-versatile signing schema gives us. The following says that if the signature scheme produced by this schema is simulatable and key-extractable then it inherits the Φ -RKA security of the OWF.

Theorem 5.1 *Let DS be an F -keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. Let Φ be a class of RKD functions. If F is Φ -RKA secure then DS is also Φ -RKA secure.*

A formal proof of this theorem is in Appendix E. The proof extends that of Theorem 3.1. The adversary I that we build uses its EVAL oracle to simulate the SIGN oracle of the given adversary A . In applying the simulation and key-extractability, we make crucial use of the fact that the adversaries can obtain signatures under secret keys of their choice.

FINDING Φ -RKA OWFS. Theorem 5.1 motivates finding Φ -RKA-secure function families F . The merit of our approach is that there are many such families. To enable systematically identifying them, we adapt the definition of key-malleable PRFs of [8] to OWFs. We say that a function family F is Φ -key-malleable if there is a PT algorithm M , called a Φ -key-simulator, such that $M(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, F.\text{Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, x)) = F.\text{Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, x))$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $fp \in [F.\text{Pg}(1^\lambda)]$, all $\phi \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and all $x \in F.\text{Dom}(1^\lambda, fp)$. The proof of the following is in Appendix D.

Proposition 5.2 *Let F be a function family and Φ a class of RKD functions. If F is Φ -key-malleable and one-way then F is Φ -RKA secure.*

Previous uses of key-malleability [8, 16] for RKA security required additional conditions on the primitives, such as key-fingerprints in the first case and some form of collision-resistance in the second. For OWFs, it is considerably easier, key-malleability alone sufficing. We now exemplify how to leverage Proposition 5.2 to find Φ -RKA OWFs and thence, via Theorem 5.1, Φ -RKA signature schemes. Table 1 examines three popular one-way functions: discrete exponentiation in a cyclic group, RSA, and the LWE one-way function. It succinctly describes F , Φ , and the Φ -key-simulator M showing Φ -key-malleability. Briefly:

¹ One change (strengthening the definition) is that we use a strong unforgeability formulation rather than an unforgeability one. On the other hand while [9] disallow A a victory from forgery M, σ when M was previously signed under $sk' = sk$, we disallow it when M was previously signed under $pk' = pk$ even if $sk' \neq sk$. In our setting this is more natural since the secret key determines the public key. In any case Theorem 5.1 extends to the definition of [9] assuming F is additionally injective or collision-resistant, which is true in most examples.

F	fp	x	$F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, x)$	ϕ	$\Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, x)$	$M(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, y)$
EXP	$(\langle \mathbb{G} \rangle, g, m)$	$\in \mathbb{Z}_m$	g^x	$(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_m \times \mathbb{Z}_m$	$(ax+b) \bmod m$	$y^a g^b$
RSA	(N, e)	$\in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$	$x^e \bmod N$	$a \in \mathbb{N}$	$x^a \bmod N$	$y^a \bmod N$
LWE	(A, n, m, q)	$(s, e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n$	$(As+e) \bmod q$	$(s', e') \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n$	$(s+s', e+e') \bmod q$	$(y+As'+e') \bmod q$

Table 1: Φ -RKA secure OWFs: We succinctly define the families and the Φ -key-simulator showing their Φ malleability and hence their Φ -RKA security.

<p>MAIN $KDM_{PKE, \Phi}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$; $pp_e \leftarrow_s PKE.Pg(1^\lambda)$</p> <p>$b' \leftarrow_s A^{MKKEY, ENC}(1^\lambda, pp_e)$; Ret $(b = b')$</p> <p>$MKKEY(1^n)$</p> <p>For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_s PKE.Kg(1^\lambda, pp_e)$</p> <p>Ret \mathbf{pk}</p>	<p>$ENC(\phi, i)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk})$</p> <p>If $(b = 1)$ then $C \leftarrow_s PKE.Enc(1^\lambda, pp_e, \mathbf{pk}[i], M)$</p> <p>Else $C \leftarrow_s PKE.Enc(1^\lambda, pp_e, \mathbf{pk}[i], 0^{ M })$</p> <p>Ret C</p>
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Figure 4: Game defining Φ -KDM security of a public-key encryption scheme PKE.

- **EXP**: The first row of Table 1 shows that exponentiation in any group with hard discrete logarithm problem is Φ -RKA secure for the class Φ of affine functions over the exponent space. Here \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of order m generated by $g \in \mathbb{G}$.
- **RSA**: The second row of Table 1 shows that the RSA function is Φ -RKA secure for the class Φ of functions raising the input to integer powers a , under the assumption that RSA is one-way. Here N is an RSA modulus and $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(N)}^*$ is an encryption exponent. Notice that in this rendition of RSA the latter has no trapdoor.
- **LWE**: The third row of Table 1 shows that the LWE function is Φ -RKA secure for the class Φ of functions shown. Here A is an n by m matrix over \mathbb{Z}_q and Φ -RKA-security relies on the standard LWE one-wayness assumption.

The summary is that standard, natural one-way functions are Φ -RKA secure, leading to Φ -RKA security over standard and natural keyspaces.

6 KDM-secure storage

Services like Dropbox, Google Drive and Amazon S3 offer outsourced storage. Users see obvious benefits but equally obvious security concerns. We would like to secure this storage, even when messages (files needing to be stored) depend on the keys securing them. If privacy is the only concern, existing KDM-secure encryption schemes (e.g., [22, 28, 5, 4, 32, 33, 21, 7, 59, 3, 30, 31, 13, 46, 55]) will do the job. However, integrity is just as much of a concern, and adding it without losing KDM security is challenging. This is because conventional ways of adding integrity introduce new keys and create new ways for messages to depend on keys. Key-versatile signing, by leaving the keys unchanged, will provide a solution.

We begin below by formalizing our goal of encrypted and authenticated outsourced storage secure for key-dependent messages. In our syntax, the user encrypts and authenticates under her secret key, and then verifies and decrypts under the same secret key, with the public key utilized by the server for verification. Our requirement for KDM security has two components: IND for privacy and SUF for integrity. With the definitions in hand, we take a base KDM-secure encryption scheme and show how, via a key-versatile signature, to obtain storage schemes meeting our goal. Our resulting storage schemes will achieve KDM security with respect to the same class of message-deriving functions Φ as the underlying encryption scheme. Also, we will assume only CPA KDM security of the base scheme, yet achieve CCA KDM privacy for the constructed storage scheme. Interestingly, our solution uses a *public-key* base encryption scheme, even though the privacy component of the goal is symmetric and nobody but the user will encrypt. This allows us to start with KDM privacy under keys permitting signatures through key-versatile signing. This represents a novel application for public-key KDM-secure encryption.

KDM SECURITY. A class of KDM (key-dependent message) functions Φ is a PT-computable function specifying for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and each $\phi \in \{0, 1\}^*$ a map $\Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \cdot)$ called the message-deriving function described by ϕ . This map takes input a vector \mathbf{sk} (of keys) and returns a string (the message) of length $\phi.m$, where $\phi.m \in \mathbb{N}$, the output length of ϕ , is computable in polynomial time given $1^\lambda, \phi$. We assume Φ always includes all constant functions. Formally, $\langle M \rangle$ describes the function defined by $\Phi(1^\lambda, \langle M \rangle, \mathbf{sk}) = M$ for all $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$. We say that public-key encryption scheme PKE is Φ -KDM secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, A, \Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, A, \Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) = 2 \Pr[\text{KDM}_{\text{PKE}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] - 1$ and game KDM is in Figure 4. We require that A make exactly one query to MKKEY and that this be its first oracle query. The argument $n \geq 1$ determines the number of keys and must be given in unary. The definition follows [22] except in parameterizing security by the class Φ of allowed message-deriving functions. The parameterization is important because many existing KDM-secure encryption schemes are for particular classes Φ , for example for encryption cycles, affine functions or cliques [28, 4, 30, 31, 55]. We aim to transfer whatever KDM security we have in the encryption to the secure storage, meaning we want to preserve Φ regardless of what it is. Of course a particularly interesting case is that of “full” security, but this is captured as the special case where Φ is all functions.

In the setting of direct practical interest, Alice arguably has just one key, corresponding to the vector \mathbf{sk} above having just one component. However, as noted above, much of the literature on KDM security concerns itself with the encryption of cycles and cliques, which represent message-deriving functions on multiple keys, and so our definitions allow the latter.

SECURE STORAGE SCHEMES. A storage scheme ST specifies the following PT algorithms: via $pp \leftarrow_s \text{ST.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ one generates public parameters pp common to all users; via $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{ST.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ a user can generate a secret key sk and corresponding public key pk ; via $D \leftarrow_s \text{ST.Store}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, M)$ a user can produce some data D based on $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ to store on the server; via $M \leftarrow \text{ST.Retrieve}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, D)$ a user can deterministically retrieve $M \in \{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$ from their stored data D ; and via $d \leftarrow \text{ST.Verify}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, D)$ the server can deterministically produce a decision $d \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ regarding the validity of D . Correctness requires that $\text{ST.Retrieve}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, \text{ST.Store}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, M)) = M$ and $\text{ST.Verify}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, \text{ST.Store}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, M)) = \text{true}$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $pp \in [\text{ST.Pg}(1^\lambda)]$, all $(sk, pk) \in [\text{ST.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)]$, and all messages $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$. Let Φ be a class of KDM functions as above. We say that ST is Φ -IND-secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST}, A, \Phi}^{\text{ind}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT adversaries A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST}, A, \Phi}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) = 2 \Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{ST}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] - 1$ and game IND is on the left-hand side of Figure 5. The presence of the RETRIEVE oracle makes this a CCA KDM notion. We say that ST is Φ -SUF-secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST}, A, \Phi}^{\text{suf}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT adversaries A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST}, A, \Phi}^{\text{suf}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{ST}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)]$ and game SUF is on the right-hand side of Figure 5. In both cases, we require that A make exactly one query to MKKEY and that this be its first oracle query, and again the argument $n \geq 1$, indicating the number of keys, must be given in unary.

CONSTRUCTION. The base scheme we take as given is a Φ -KDM secure, canonical public-key encryption scheme PKE. As in Section 4, we begin by constructing from PKE a function family F. We do not repeat this construction here, but refer the reader to Section 4. We then let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme that is simulatable and key-extractable. We construct our storage scheme ST as follows:

- ST.Pg(λ): Ret $(fp, ap) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)$. Thus, parameters for ST have the form $pp = (fp, ap)$, where fp are parameters for both F and PKE.
- ST.Kg($1^\lambda, (fp, ap)$): Ret $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, (fp, ap))$. Thus, keys are those of PKE and DS.
- ST.Store($1^\lambda, (fp, ap), sk, M$): $pk \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$; $C \leftarrow_s \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, pk, M)$; $\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Sig}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, C)$; Ret (C, σ) .
- ST.Retrieve($1^\lambda, (fp, ap), sk, (C, \sigma)$): $pk \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$. If $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, C, \sigma) = \text{false}$ then Ret \perp . Else Ret $\text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk, C)$.
- ST.Verify($1^\lambda, (fp, ap), pk, (C, \sigma)$): Ret $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, (fp, ap), pk, C, \sigma)$.

The following says that our construction provides both privacy and integrity for key-dependent messages, assuming privacy for key-dependent messages of the base encryption scheme and simulatability and key-extractability of the F-keyed signature scheme:

<p><u>MAIN IND_{ST,Φ}^A(λ)</u> $b \leftarrow_{\\$} \{0, 1\}; Q \leftarrow \emptyset; pp \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{ST.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ $b' \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{MKKEY,STORE,RETRIEVE}}(1^\lambda, pp); \text{Ret } (b = b')$</p> <p><u>MKKEY(1ⁿ)</u> For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\text{sk}[i], \text{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{ST.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ Ret pk</p> <p><u>STORE(φ, i)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp If $(b = 1)$ then $M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \text{sk})$ else $M \leftarrow 0^{\phi.m}$ $D \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{ST.Store}(1^\lambda, pp, \text{sk}[i], M)$ $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(D, i)\}; \text{Ret } D$</p> <p><u>RETRIEVE(D, i)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp If $((D, i) \in Q)$ then Ret \perp $M \leftarrow \text{ST.Retrieve}(1^\lambda, pp, \text{sk}[i], D); \text{Ret } M$</p>	<p><u>MAIN SUF_{ST,Φ}^A(λ)</u> $Q \leftarrow \emptyset; pp \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{ST.Pg}(1^\lambda)$ $(D, i) \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{MKKEY,STORE,RETRIEVE}}(1^\lambda, pp)$ If $(D, i) \in Q$ then Ret false If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret false Ret $\text{ST.Verify}(1^\lambda, pp, \text{pk}[i], D)$</p> <p><u>MKKEY(1ⁿ)</u> For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\text{sk}[i], \text{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{ST.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ Ret pk</p> <p><u>STORE(φ, i)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp $M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \text{sk}); D \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{ST.Store}(1^\lambda, pp, \text{sk}[i], M)$ $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(D, i)\}; \text{Ret } D$</p> <p><u>RETRIEVE(D, i)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp If $((D, i) \in Q)$ then Ret \perp $M \leftarrow \text{ST.Retrieve}(1^\lambda, pp, \text{sk}[i], D); \text{Ret } M$</p>
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Figure 5: **Games defining KDM-security of storage scheme ST:** Privacy (left) and unforgeability (right).

Theorem 6.1 *Let PKE be a canonical public-key encryption scheme, and let F be defined from it as above. Let DS be an F-keyed signature scheme, and let ST be the corresponding storage scheme constructed above. Let Φ be a class of message-deriving functions. Assume PKE is Φ-KDM secure. Assume DS is simulatable and key-extractable. Then (1) ST is Φ-IND secure and (2) ST is Φ-SUF secure.*

A full proof of Theorem 6.1 is in Appendix F. Here we provide sketches to highlight some of the unusual difficulties. Taking first the proof of privacy, we would like, given an adversary A breaking the Φ -IND security of ST , to build an adversary D breaking the assumed Φ -KDM security of PKE. The first problem is how D can create the signatures needed to answer STORE queries of A , since these rely on secret keys hidden from D . We solve this by switching to simulation parameters, so that D can simulate signatures without a secret key. In answering RETRIEVE queries, however, we run into another problem: the assumed KDM security of PKE is only under CPA. To solve this, we use the extractor to extract the secret key from signatures and decrypt under it. The full proof involves building simulation and extractability adversaries in addition to D .

Turning next to the proof of unforgeability, we might at first expect that it relies on nothing more than the unforgeability of the signature scheme, so that given an adversary A breaking the Φ -SUF security of ST we could build an adversary breaking the SUF security of DS . However, we run into the basic issue that, since the same keys are used for signing, encryption, and decryption, an adversary against the unforgeability of the signature scheme cannot even construct the messages (ciphertexts) on which A would forge. Instead, we will build from A an adversary D breaking the Φ -KDM security of PKE. This adversary will extract a secret key from a forgery of A and use this to break privacy. To get D to work we must first, as above, switch to simulated signatures, and then use extractability to switch to a simpler RETRIEVE oracle.

INSTANTIATION. We require our base scheme PKE to be canonical. In Section 4 we showed how to modify an encryption scheme to be canonical while preserving IND-CCA, but the transformation does not in general preserve KDM security. Instead, we would use KDM-secure schemes that are already canonical. One possibility is the scheme of [59]. The schemes of [28, 7, 4] are not canonical.

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<p>MAIN $\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $pp \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$</p> <p>Ret $(\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma) \text{ and } (M, \sigma) \notin Q)$</p> <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> <p>SIGN(M)</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Sig}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, M)$; $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>

Figure 6: **Game defining strong unforgeability of signature scheme DS.**

<p>MAIN $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $d \leftarrow \text{false}$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_s \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$; $pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$; $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$; $sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma)$</p> <p>If $(\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma) \text{ and } (M, \sigma) \notin Q)$ then</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$d \leftarrow \text{true}$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $(\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') \neq pk)$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$; $d \leftarrow \text{false}$</p> <p>Ret d</p> <hr style="border: 0; border-top: 1px solid black; margin: 5px 0;"/> <p>SIGN(M)</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, pk, M)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>

Figure 7: **Games for the proof of Theorem 3.1:** Game G_1 includes the boxed code while G_0 does not.

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A Sim+Ext implies SUF: Proof of Theorem 3.1

We say a signature scheme DS is *strongly unforgeable* if $\text{Adv}_{\text{DS}, A}^{\text{suf}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT adversaries A , where $\text{Adv}_{\text{DS}, A}^{\text{suf}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)]$ and game SUF is in Figure 6. We proceed to prove Theorem 3.1.

Proof: Let A be a PT adversary playing game SUF. We build PT adversaries I, A_1, A_2 such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DS}, A}^{\text{suf}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{F}, I}^{\text{ow}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \text{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$$

for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, from which the theorem follows. The proof uses the games in Figure 7. These games switch

to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build I, A_1, A_2 so that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \mathcal{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) \quad (1)$$

$$\Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \mathcal{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) \quad (2)$$

$$\Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}, I}^{\text{ow}}(\lambda) . \quad (3)$$

Games G_0 and G_1 are identical until **bad**, so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [18] and the above, for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, A}^{\text{sup}}(\lambda) &= \Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)] \\ &= (\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)]) + (\Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)]) + \Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)] \\ &\leq (\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)]) + \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] + \Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)] \\ &\leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \mathcal{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \mathcal{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{F}, I}^{\text{ow}}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A_1, A_2, I . Adversary A_1 behaves as follows:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \underline{A_1^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)} \\ (sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp); Q \leftarrow \emptyset \\ (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk) \\ \text{If } (\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma) \text{ and } (M, \sigma) \notin Q) \text{ then } b' \leftarrow 1 \\ \text{Else } b' \leftarrow 0 \\ \text{Return } b' \end{array} \right| \begin{array}{l} \underline{\text{SIGNSIM}(M)} \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk, M); Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(M, \sigma)\} \\ \text{Ret } \sigma \end{array}$$

When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A_1 simulates for A game G_0 , while if $b = 1$, adversary A_1 simulates game SUF. We thus have

$$\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{DS}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)] = \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) ,$$

which establishes Equation (1). Adversary A_2 behaves as follows:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \underline{A_2^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)} \\ (sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp); (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk) \\ \text{Ret } (pk, M, \sigma) \end{array} \right| \begin{array}{l} \underline{\text{SIGNSIM}(M)} \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk, M) \\ \text{Ret } \sigma \end{array}$$

We skip the simple analysis establishing Equation (2). Adversary I behaves as follows:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \underline{I(1^\lambda, fp, pk)} \\ (ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda) \\ (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, (fp, ap), pk) \\ sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma) \\ \text{Ret } sk' \end{array} \right| \begin{array}{l} \underline{\text{SIGNSIM}(M)} \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, pk, M) \\ \text{Ret } \sigma \end{array}$$

We skip the simple analysis establishing Equation (3). \blacksquare

B Construction: Proof of Theorem 3.2

NIZK SYSTEMS. Suppose $\text{R}: \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$. For $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ we let $\text{R}(x) = \{w : \text{R}(x, w) = \text{true}\}$ be the *witness set* of x . We say that R is an **NP**-relation if it is computable in time polynomial in the length of its first input and there is a function ℓ such that $\text{R}(x) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^{\ell(|x|)}$ for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$. We let $L(\text{R}) = \{x : \text{R}(x) \neq \emptyset\}$ be the *language* associated to R . The fact that R is an **NP**-relation means that $L(\text{R}) \in \text{NP}$.

<p><u>MAIN $ZK_{\Pi,R}^A(\lambda)$</u> $b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$; $crs_1 \leftarrow_s \Pi.Pg(1^\lambda)$ $(crs_0, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \Pi.SimPg(1^\lambda)$ $b' \leftarrow_s A^{PROVE}(1^\lambda, crs_b)$ Ret ($b = b'$)</p> <p><u>PROVE(x, w)</u> If not $R(x, w)$ then Ret false If $b = 1$ then $\pi \leftarrow_s \Pi.P(1^\lambda, crs_1, x, w)$ Else $\pi \leftarrow_s \Pi.SimP(1^\lambda, crs_0, std, x)$ Ret π</p>	<p><u>MAIN $SE_{\Pi,R}^A(\lambda)$</u> $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $(crs, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \Pi.SimPg(1^\lambda)$ $(x, \pi) \leftarrow_s A^{PROVE}(1^\lambda, crs)$ If $x \notin L(R)$ then Ret false If not $\Pi.V(1^\lambda, crs, x, \pi)$ then Ret false If $(x, \pi) \in Q$ then Ret false $w \leftarrow_s \Pi.Ext(1^\lambda, crs, xtd, x, \pi)$ Ret not $R(x, w)$</p> <p><u>PROVE(x, w)</u> If not $R(x, w)$ then Ret \perp $\pi \leftarrow_s \Pi.SimP(1^\lambda, crs, std, x)$; $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(x, \pi)\}$ Ret π</p>
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Figure 8: **Games defining security of NIZK system Π .** Left: Game defining zero knowledge. Right: Game defining simulation extractability.

A non-interactive (NI) system Π for R specifies the following PT algorithms: via $crs \leftarrow_s \Pi.Pg(1^\lambda)$ one generates a common reference string crs ; via $\pi \leftarrow_s \Pi.P(1^\lambda, crs, x, w)$ the prover given x and $w \in R(x)$ generates a proof π that $x \in L(R)$; via $d \leftarrow \Pi.V(1^\lambda, crs, x, \pi)$ a verifier can produce a decision $d \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ regarding whether π is a valid proof that $x \in L(R)$. We require completeness, namely $\Pi.V(1^\lambda, crs, x, \Pi.P(1^\lambda, crs, x, w)) = \text{true}$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all $crs \in [\Pi.Pg(\lambda)]$, all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and all $w \in R(x)$. We say that Π is zero-knowledge (ZK) if it specifies additional PT algorithms $\Pi.SimPg$ and $\Pi.SimP$ such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,R,A}^{zk}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,R,A}^{zk}(\lambda) = 2 \Pr[ZK_{\Pi,R}^A(\lambda)] - 1$ and game ZK is specified on the left-hand side of Figure 8. This definition is based on [23, 39]. We say that Π is simulation-extractable (SE) if it specifies an additional PT algorithm $\Pi.Ext$ such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,R,A}^{se}(\cdot)$ is negligible for every PT adversary A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,R,A}^{se}(\lambda) = \Pr[SE_{\Pi,R}^A(\lambda)]$ and game SE is specified on the right-hand side of Figure 8. This definition is based on [39, 51, 52, 43].

Before we use such proofs to construct a F -keyed signature scheme, we must know that they exist. The first construction of SE NIZKs (using a stronger notion of simulation extractability) was given in [51], but for a fairly restricted language related to sets of pairing product equations in bilinear groups. In [43] (and further formalized in [54]), the authors provide a generic construction of SE NIZKs from a (regular) NIZK, an IND-CCA encryption scheme, and a one-time signature, which establishes that SE NIZKs exist for all **NP**.

CONSTRUCTION. Let F be the function family given in the theorem statement. We associate to it the **NP**-relation R defined by $R((1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), sk) = (F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, sk) = pk)$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and all $fp, pk, M, sk \in \{0, 1\}^*$. Let Π be a NI system for R that is zero knowledge and simulation extractable. The signature scheme $DS = \mathbf{KvS}[F]$ is specified as follows:

- $DS.Pg(1^\lambda)$: $crs \leftarrow_s \Pi.Pg(1^\lambda)$; $fp \leftarrow_s F.Pg(1^\lambda)$. Return (fp, crs) .
- $DS.Kg(1^\lambda, (fp, crs))$: $sk \leftarrow_s F.Dom(1^\lambda, fp)$; $pk \leftarrow F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$; Ret (sk, pk) .
- $DS.Sig(1^\lambda, (fp, crs), sk, M)$: $pk \leftarrow F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, sk)$; Ret $\Pi.P(1^\lambda, crs, (1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), sk)$.
- $DS.Ver(1^\lambda, (fp, crs), pk, M, \sigma)$: Ret $\Pi.V(1^\lambda, crs, (1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), \sigma)$.
- $DS.SimPg(1^\lambda)$: Ret $\Pi.SimPg(1^\lambda)$.
- $DS.SimSig(1^\lambda, (fp, crs), std, pk, M)$: Ret $\Pi.SimP(1^\lambda, crs, std, (1^\lambda, fp, pk, M))$.
- $DS.Ext(1^\lambda, (fp, crs), xtd, pk, M, \sigma)$: Ret $\Pi.Ext(1^\lambda, crs, xtd, (1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), \sigma)$.

SECURITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION. Simulatability of the signature scheme follows directly from the zero knowledge property of the NIZK. Let A be a PT adversary playing game SIM. We construct a PT adversary B such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{DS,F,A}^{sim}(\lambda) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,R,B}^{zk}(\lambda)$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. B behaves as follows:

<pre> MAIN IND-CCA_{PKE}^A(λ) b ←_s {0, 1}; C* ← ⊥ fp ←_s PKE.Pg(1^λ); (pk, sk) ←_s PKE.Kg(1^λ, fp) b' ←_s A^{DEC,LR}(1^λ, fp, pk) Ret (b = b') proc DEC(C) If (C = C*) then Ret ⊥ Ret M ← PKE.Dec(1^λ, fp, sk, C) proc LR(M₀, M₁) If (M₀ ≠ M₁) then Ret ⊥ C* ←_s PKE.Enc(1^λ, fp, pk, M_b) Ret C* </pre>

Figure 9: **Game defining IND-CCA security of PKE scheme PKE.**

<pre> B^{PROVE}(1^λ, crs) fp ←_s F.Pg(1^λ); pp ← (fp, crs) b' ←_s A^{SIGNSIM}(1^λ, pp) Return b' </pre>	<pre> SIGNSIM(sk, M) If sk ∉ F.Dom(1^λ, fp) then Ret ⊥ pk ← F.Ev(1^λ, fp, sk); π ←_s PROVE((1^λ, fp, pk, M), sk) Ret π </pre>
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The key extractability of the signature scheme likewise follows from the SE security of the NIZK. Let A be a PT adversary playing game EXT. We construct a PT adversary B such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,R,B}^{\text{se}}(\lambda)$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. B behaves as follows:

<pre> B^{PROVE}(1^λ, crs) fp ←_s F.Pg(1^λ); pp ← (fp, crs) (pk, M, σ) ←_s A^{SIGNSIM}(1^λ, pp) Return ((1^λ, fp, pk, M), σ) </pre>	<pre> SIGNSIM(sk, M) If sk ∉ F.Dom(1^λ, fp) then Ret ⊥ pk ← F.Ev(1^λ, fp, sk); π ←_s PROVE((1^λ, fp, pk, M), sk) Ret π </pre>
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If $(pk, M, \sigma) \notin Q$ in game EXT then $((1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), \sigma) \notin Q$ in game SE, the sets being those defined in the games. Furthermore, by the definition of DS.Ext and R , if $sk \leftarrow \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, crs, xtd, pk, M, \sigma)$ is such that $F.Ev(1^\lambda, fp, sk) \neq pk$, then $R((1^\lambda, fp, pk, M), sk) = \text{false}$.

C Proof of Theorem 4.1

We say PKE scheme PKE is IND-CCA secure if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},A}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\cdot)$ is negligible for all PT adversaries A , where $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},A}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda) = 2 \Pr[\text{IND-CCA}_{\text{PKE}}^A(\lambda)] - 1$ and game IND-CCA is in Figure 9. The adversary is allowed only one query to LR. This definition is from [10, 37]. We proceed to prove Theorem 4.1.

Proof: Part (1): IND security

Let A be a PT adversary playing game IND. We build PT adversaries A_1, D such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{JES},A}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda) + 2\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda)$$

for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, from which part (1) of the theorem follows.

The proof uses the game in Figure 10. This game switches to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build A_1, D so that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) \tag{4}$$

$$2 \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] - 1 \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda) . \tag{5}$$

<p>MAIN $G_0^A(\lambda)$ $b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$; $C^* \leftarrow \perp$ $fp \leftarrow_s \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$; $jp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$; $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, jp)$ $b' \leftarrow_s A^{\text{DEC}, \text{SIGN}, \text{LR}}(1^\lambda, jp, pk)$ Ret $(b = b')$</p> <p>proc DEC(C) If $(C = C^*)$ then Ret \perp Ret $M \leftarrow \text{JES.Dec}(1^\lambda, jp, sk, C)$</p> <p>proc SIGN($M$) Ret $\text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, jp, std, pk, M)$</p> <p>proc LR($M_0, M_1$) If $(M_0 \neq M_1)$ then Ret \perp $C^* \leftarrow_s \text{JES.Enc}(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M_b)$ Ret C^*</p>
--

Figure 10: **Game used in the proof of part (1) of Theorem 4.1**

Using this we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{JES}, A}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) &= 2 \Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - 1 \\
&= 2 (\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] + \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]) - 1 \\
&= 2 (\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]) + 2 \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] - 1 \\
&\leq 2 \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, F, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A_1, D . Adversary A_1 behaves as follows:

<p>$A_1^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$ $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ $C^* \leftarrow \perp$; $d \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$ $d' \leftarrow_s A^{\text{DEC}, \text{SIGN}, \text{LR}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$ If $(d' = d)$ then $b' \leftarrow 1$ Else $b' \leftarrow 0$ Ret b'</p>	<p>$\text{SIGNSIM}(M)$ $\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk, M)$ Ret σ</p>	<p>$\text{DECSIM}(C)$ If $C = C^*$ then $M \leftarrow \perp$ Else $M \leftarrow \text{JES.Dec}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, C)$ Ret M</p> <p>$\text{LRSIM}(M_0, M_1)$ If $(M_0 \neq M_1)$ then Ret \perp $C^* \leftarrow \text{JES.Enc}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M_d)$ Ret C^*</p>
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When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A_1 simulates for A game G_0 , and if $b = 1$, adversary A_1 simulates game IND. We thus have

$$\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] = \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, F, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda),$$

establishing Equation (4). Adversary D behaves as follows:

<p>$D^{\text{DEC}, \text{LR}}(1^\lambda, fp, pk)$ $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$; $jp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$ $b' \leftarrow_s A^{\text{DEC}, \text{SIGN}, \text{LR}}(1^\lambda, jp, pk)$ Ret b'</p>	<p>$\text{SIGNSIM}(M)$ $\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, jp, std, pk, M)$ Ret σ</p>
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We omit the analysis establishing Equation (5).

Part (2): SUF security

<p>MAIN $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $d \leftarrow \text{false}$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_s \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$; $jp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$; $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, jp)$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGN,DEC}}(1^\lambda, jp, pk)$; $sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, jp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma)$</p> <p>If $(\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, jp, pk, M, \sigma))$ and $(M, \sigma) \notin Q$ then</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$d \leftarrow \text{true}$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $(\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') \neq pk)$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$; $\boxed{d \leftarrow \text{false}}$</p> <p>Ret d</p> <p><u>proc SIGN(M)</u></p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, jp, std, pk, M)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ</p> <p><u>proc DEC(C)</u></p> <p>Ret $M \leftarrow \text{Dec}(1^\lambda, jp, sk, C)$</p>

Figure 11: **Games used in the proof of part (2) of Theorem 4.1:** Game G_1 includes the boxed code and G_0 does not.

Let A be a PT adversary playing game SUF. We build PT adversaries A_1, A_2, D such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{JES},A}^{\text{suf}}(\lambda) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$$

for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, from which part (2) of the theorem follows.

The proof uses the games in Figure 11. These games switch to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build A_1, A_2, D so that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) \quad (6)$$

$$\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) \quad (7)$$

$$\Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda). \quad (8)$$

Games G_0 and G_1 are identical until bad , so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [18] and the above, for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{JES},A}^{\text{suf}}(\lambda) &= \Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] \\ &= (\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]) + (\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)]) + \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] \\ &\leq (\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]) + \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] + \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] \\ &\leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A_1, A_2, D . Adversary A_1 behaves as follows:

<p>$A_1^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$; $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{DECSIM,SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$</p> <p>If $(\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma))$ and $(M, \sigma) \notin Q$ then $b' \leftarrow 1$</p> <p>Else $b' \leftarrow 0$</p> <p>Return b'</p>	<p><u>DECSIM(C)</u></p> <p>$M \leftarrow \text{JES.Dec}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, C)$</p> <p>Ret M</p> <p><u>SIGNSIM(M)</u></p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk, M)$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>
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When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A_1 simulates for A game G_0 , and if $b = 1$, adversary

A_1 simulates game SUF. We thus have

$$\Pr[\text{SUF}_{\text{JES}}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)] = \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 0] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},\text{F},A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda),$$

establishing Equation (6). Adversary A_2 behaves as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} \overline{A_2^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)} \\ (sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{DECSIM}, \text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk) \\ \text{Ret } (pk, M, \sigma) \end{array} \left| \begin{array}{l} \overline{\text{DECSIM}(C)} \\ M \leftarrow \text{JES.Dec}(1^\lambda, pp, sk, C) \\ \text{Ret } M \end{array} \right| \begin{array}{l} \overline{\text{SIGNSIM}(M)} \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk, M) \\ \text{Ret } \sigma \end{array}$$

We omit the analysis establishing Equation (7). Adversary D behaves as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} \overline{D^{\text{DEC}, \text{LR}}(1^\lambda, fp, pk)} \\ (ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda); jp \leftarrow (fp, ap) \\ (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{DEC}, \text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, jp, pk) \\ sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma) \\ \text{If } (\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') \neq pk) \text{ then Ret } 0 \\ M_0 \leftarrow 0^\lambda; M_1 \leftarrow 1^\lambda \\ C^* \leftarrow_s \text{LR}(M_0, M_1); M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk', C^*) \\ \text{If } (M = M_1) \text{ then } b' \leftarrow 1 \text{ else } b' \leftarrow 0 \\ \text{Ret } b' \end{array} \left| \begin{array}{l} \overline{\text{SIGNSIM}(M)} \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, jp, std, pk, M) \\ \text{Ret } \sigma \end{array} \right.$$

When A wins G_1 we have that $\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') = pk$, so sk' is a valid secret key for pk . By correctness of PKE, we then have $\text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, pp, sk', \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M_b)) = M_b$, where b is the challenge bit in game IND-CCA, so

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, D}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\lambda) = \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 0] \geq \Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)].$$

This is because the first term in the difference above is at least $\Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)]$ and the second term is zero. This establishes Equation (8). \blacksquare

D Proof of Proposition 5.2

Let A be a PT adversary attacking the Φ -RKA security of F and let M be a Φ -key-simulator. We construct a PT adversary B against the (regular) one-wayness of F such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{F}, A}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{F}, B}^{\text{ow}}(\lambda)$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. On input $(1^\lambda, fp, y)$, adversary B runs $A(1^\lambda, fp, y)$. When A makes a EVAL query ϕ , adversary B computes $y' \leftarrow M(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, y)$ and returns y' to A . Φ -key malleability says that $y' = \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, x))$ as A expects. When A eventually halts and outputs a value x' , adversary B does the same.

E Proof of Theorem 5.1

Proof: Let A be a PT adversary playing game RKASIG. We build PT adversaries A_1, A_2, I such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A, \Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{F}, I, \Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$$

for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, from which the theorem follows.

The proof uses the games in Figure 12. These games switch to using simulated parameters and signatures. We will build A_1, A_2, I so that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$\Pr[\text{RKASIG}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) \tag{9}$$

$$\Pr[\text{G}_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) \tag{10}$$

$$\Pr[\text{G}_1^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{F}, I, \Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda). \tag{11}$$

<p>MAIN $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $d \leftarrow \text{false}$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_s \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$; $pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$; $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$; $sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma)$</p> <p>If $(\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma))$ and $(pk, M, \sigma) \notin Q$ then</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">$d \leftarrow \text{true}$</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">If $(\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') \neq pk)$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$; $\boxed{d \leftarrow \text{false}}$</p> <p>Ret d</p> <hr/> <p>SIGN(ϕ, M)</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, sk)$; $pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, pk', M)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(pk', M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>
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Figure 12: **Games used in proof of Theorem 5.1:** Game G_1 includes the boxed code and G_0 does not.

Games G_0 and G_1 are identical until bad , so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [18] and the above, for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \text{A}, \Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda) &= \Pr[\text{RKASIG}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] \\
&= (\Pr[\text{RKASIG}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]) + (\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)]) + \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] \\
&\leq (\Pr[\text{RKASIG}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]) + \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] + \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] \\
&\leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \text{A}_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \text{A}_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{F}, \text{I}, \Phi}^{\text{rka}}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A_1, A_2, I . Adversary A_1 behaves as follows:

<p>$A_1^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$; $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$</p> <p>If $(\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma))$ and $(pk, M, \sigma) \notin Q$ then $b' \leftarrow 1$</p> <p>Else $b' \leftarrow 0$</p> <p>Return b'</p>	<p>SIGNSIM(ϕ, M)</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, sk)$</p> <p>$pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk', M)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(pk', M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>
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When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 0, adversary A_1 simulates for A game G_0 , and if $b = 1$, adversary A_1 simulates game RKASIG. We thus have

$$\Pr[\text{RKASIG}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \Phi}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] = \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, \text{A}_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda),$$

establishing Equation (9). Adversary A_2 behaves as follows:

<p>$A_2^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(sk, pk) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$(M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, pp, pk)$</p> <p>Ret (pk, M, σ)</p>	<p>SIGNSIM(ϕ, M)</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, fp, \phi, sk)$; $pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(sk', M)$; $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(pk', M, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret σ</p>
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If bad is set to true in game G_0 then we have: (1) $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, pk, M, \sigma)$ (2) $(pk, M, \sigma) \notin Q$, and (3) $\text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') \neq pk$. These are exactly the necessary conditions for A_2 to win game EXT, establishing Equation (10). I behaves as follows:

$\begin{array}{l} \overline{I^{\text{EVAL}}(1^\lambda, fp, pk)} \\ (ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda) \\ (M, \sigma) \leftarrow_s A^{\text{SIGNSIM}}(1^\lambda, (fp, ap), pk) \\ sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, pk, M, \sigma) \\ \text{Ret } sk' \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \overline{\text{SIGNSIM}(\phi, M)} \\ pk' \leftarrow_s \text{EVAL}(\phi) \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, pk', M) \\ \text{Ret } \sigma \end{array}$
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We omit the analysis establishing Equation (11). \blacksquare

F Proof of Theorem 6.1

Proof: Part (1): IND security

Let A be a PT adversary playing game IND. Let $q(\cdot)$ be a polynomial such that the number of RETRIEVE queries of A in game $\text{IND}_{\text{ST},\Phi}^A(\lambda)$ is $q(\lambda)$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. We provide PT adversaries A_1, A_2, D and a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST},A,\Phi}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) \leq 2\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D,\Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) + 2\nu(\lambda) + 2q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$$

for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, from which part (1) of the theorem follows.

The proof uses the games in Figure 13. We build A_1, A_2, D and $\nu(\cdot)$ such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{ST},\Phi}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) \tag{12}$$

$$2 \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] - 1 \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D,\Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) \tag{13}$$

$$\Pr[G_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \nu(\lambda) + q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) . \tag{14}$$

Games G_0, G_1 are identical until **bad**. We also observe that $\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \Pr[G_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}]$. (In both games, decryption in RETRIEVE is always done correctly.) Combining this with the above and the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [18], for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST},A,\Phi}^{\text{ind}}(\lambda) &= 2 \Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{ST},\Phi}^A(\lambda)] - 1 \\ &= 2 (\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{ST},\Phi}^A(\lambda) - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]] + 2 (\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)]) + 2 \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] - 1 \\ &\leq 2 (\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{ST},\Phi}^A(\lambda) - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)]] + 2 \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] + 2 \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda)] - 1 \\ &\leq 2\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D,\Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) + 2 \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \\ &\leq 2\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D,\Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) + 2 \Pr[G_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \\ &\leq 2\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D,\Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) + 2\nu(\lambda) + 2q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A_1, A_2, D and ν .

Adversary A_1 behaves as follows:

<p>MAIN $\boxed{G_0^A(\lambda)}$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$ / $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset; Q' \leftarrow \emptyset; b \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_s \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda); (ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda); pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$</p> <p>$b' \leftarrow_s A^{\text{MKKEY,STORE,RETRIEVE}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>Ret ($b = b'$)</p> <p>$\text{MKKEY}(1^n)$ // $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$ / $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>Ret \mathbf{pk}</p> <p>proc $\text{STORE}(\phi, i)$ // $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$ / $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then return \perp</p> <p>If $(b = 1)$ then $M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk})$ else $M \leftarrow 0^{\phi.m}$</p> <p>$C \leftarrow_s \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M); \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, \mathbf{pk}[i], C)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\}; Q' \leftarrow Q' \cup \{(\mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret (C, σ)</p> <p>proc $\text{RETRIEVE}((C, \sigma), i)$ // $\boxed{G_0^A(\lambda)}$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then return \perp</p> <p>If (not $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$) then Ret \perp</p> <p>If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma); pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk', C)$</p> <p>If $(pk' \neq \mathbf{pk}[i])$ then bad \leftarrow true; $\boxed{M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)}$</p> <p>Ret M</p> <p>proc $\text{RETRIEVE}((C, \sigma), i)$ // $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then return \perp</p> <p>If (not $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$) then Ret \perp</p> <p>If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)$</p> <p>If $(\mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma) \in Q'$ then bad \leftarrow true; Ret M</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma); pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>If $(pk' \neq \mathbf{pk}[i])$ then bad \leftarrow true</p> <p>Ret M</p>	
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Figure 13: **Games used in the proof of part (1) of Theorem 6.1.** Game G_0 includes the boxed code and game G_1 does not.

<p>$A_1^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset; d \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}$</p> <p>$d' \leftarrow_s A^{\text{MKKEYSIM,STORESIM,RETRIEVESIM}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>If $(d' = d)$ then $b' \leftarrow 1$ else $b' \leftarrow 0$</p> <p>Ret b'</p> <p>$\text{MKKEYSIM}(1^n)$</p> <p>For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do</p> <p>$(\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>Ret \mathbf{pk}</p>	<p>$\text{STORESIM}(\phi, i)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>If $d = 1$ then $M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk})$</p> <p>Else $M \leftarrow 0^{\phi.m}$</p> <p>$C \leftarrow_s \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M)$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(\mathbf{sk}[i], C); Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\}$</p> <p>Ret (C, σ)</p> <p>$\text{RETRIEVESIM}((C, \sigma), i)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>If (not $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$) then Ret \perp</p> <p>If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)$</p> <p>Ret M</p>
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When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 1, adversary A_1 simulates IND. We claim that if $b = 0$ then

A_1 simulates G_0 . This is because in G_0 , procedure RETRIEVE always performs the correct decryption, regardless of whether or not **bad** is set, and so does A_1 . (A_1 does not need to invoke the extractor, and indeed could not, since it does not have an extraction trapdoor.) We thus have

$$\Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{ST},\phi}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] = \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},\mathcal{F},A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda),$$

establishing Equation (12).

Adversary D behaves as follows:

$\begin{aligned} & \underline{D^{\text{MKKEY,ENC}}(1^\lambda, fp)} \\ & Q \leftarrow \emptyset \\ & (ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda) \\ & pp \leftarrow (fp, ap) \\ & b' \leftarrow A^{\text{MKKEY,STORESIM,RETRIEVESIM}}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ & \text{Ret } b' \end{aligned}$	$\begin{aligned} & \underline{\text{STORESIM}(\phi, i)} \\ & \text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ & C \leftarrow \text{ENC}(\phi, i) \\ & \sigma \leftarrow \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, \mathbf{pk}[i], C) \\ & Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\} \\ & \text{Ret } (C, \sigma) \\ & \underline{\text{RETRIEVESIM}((C, \sigma), i)} \\ & \text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ & \text{If } (\text{not } \text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ & \text{If } ((C, \sigma), i) \in Q \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ & sk' \leftarrow \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma) \\ & M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk', C) \\ & \text{Ret } M \end{aligned}$
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We omit the analysis to establish Equation (13).

Now we would like to show that G_0 (equivalently, G_1) sets **bad** with negligible probability. Intuitively, this should follow from extractability, since **bad** is set when extraction fails. A difficulty is that extraction is not required to succeed when $(pk[i], C, \sigma) \in Q'$. So first we show that the latter event is unlikely, and then, assuming it does not happen, that failure of extraction is unlikely. This is formalized via G_2 , which breaks the setting of **bad** from G_0 into two parts corresponding to the two events of interest. To establish Equation (17), let E_1 be the event that **bad** is set by the line 5 “If” statement, and E_2 the event that **bad** is set by the line 7 “If” statement. We first show the existence of a negligible $\nu(\cdot)$ such that $\Pr[E_1] \leq \nu(\lambda)$. Then we build A_2 such that $\Pr[E_2 \wedge \bar{E}_1] \leq q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},\mathcal{F},A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$. This establishes Equation (14), as we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[G_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets } \mathbf{bad}] &= \Pr[E_1 \vee E_2] \\ &= \Pr[E_1] + \Pr[E_2 \wedge \bar{E}_1] \\ &\leq \nu(\lambda) + q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},\mathcal{F},A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda). \end{aligned}$$

For the first claim, let E be the event that there is a collision in the public keys chosen in MKKEY, meaning there are distinct $i, j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $\mathbf{pk}[i] = \mathbf{pk}[j]$. We claim that if this event does not happen, then neither will E_1 . This is because setting **bad** requires that $(\mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma) \in Q'$ yet $((C, \sigma), i) \notin Q$, but this cannot happen if the public keys are all distinct. So $\Pr[E_1] \leq \Pr[E]$. However, if E does happen with probability that is not negligible, then it is easy to break KDM security of PKE. An adversary just has to itself sample key-pairs, hoping to get one where the public key matches one of her challenge public keys. In that case, having the corresponding secret key, it is easy to defeat security. We omit the details because this argument is standard.

Adversary A_2 behaves as follows:

<p><u>MAIN $H^A(\lambda)$</u> $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $\text{win} \leftarrow \text{false}$; $(fp, ap) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$ $\perp \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{MKKEY,STORE,RETRIEVE}}(1^\lambda, pp)$ Ret win</p> <p><u>MKKEY(1^n)</u> For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ Ret pk</p> <p><u>STORE(ϕ, i)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp $M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk})$; $C \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M)$ $\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Sig}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)$; $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\}$ Ret (C, σ)</p> <p><u>RETRIEVE($(C, \sigma), i$)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp If $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$ then $\text{win} \leftarrow \text{true}$ else Ret \perp $M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)$ Ret M</p>
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Figure 14: **Game defining alternate form of SUF for the proof of part (2) of Theorem 6.1.**

<p><u>$A_2^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</u> $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $d \leftarrow_{\\$} \{0, 1\}$; $j \leftarrow 0$ $d' \leftarrow_{\\$} A^{\text{MKKEYSIM,STORESIM,RETRIEVESIM}}(1^\lambda, pp)$ $\ell \leftarrow_{\\$} \{1, \dots, j\}$ Ret $(pk_\ell, C_\ell, \sigma_\ell)$</p> <p><u>MKKEYSIM($1^n$)</u> For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$ Ret pk</p>	<p><u>STORESIM(ϕ, i)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp If $d = 1$ then $M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk})$ Else $M \leftarrow 0^{\phi.m}$ $C \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M)$ $\sigma \leftarrow_{\\$} \text{SIGN}(\mathbf{sk}[i], C)$; $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\}$ Ret (C, σ)</p> <p><u>RETRIEVESIM($(C, \sigma), i$)</u> If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then Ret \perp If (not $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$) then Ret \perp If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp $M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)$ $j \leftarrow j + 1$; $pk_j \leftarrow \mathbf{pk}[i]$; $C_j \leftarrow C$; $\sigma_j \leftarrow \sigma$ Ret M</p>
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Adversary A_2 always performs correct decryptions in responding to RETRIEVE queries, following G_2 . If bad is set at line 7 but not at line 5, then there is some tuple on which the extractor would succeed. Since a tuple is guessed at random we have $\Pr[E_2 \wedge \overline{E}_1] \leq q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, F, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$ as desired. The importance of bad not being set at line 5 is that otherwise extraction is not required to succeed according to game EXT.

Part (2): SUF security

Let A' be a PT adversary playing game SUF. Our first step is to consider a simplified form of the SUF game shown in Figure 14. Here the adversary does not output a forgery but instead wins via RETRIEVE queries. We can easily transform A' into a PT adversary A such that $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST}, A', \Phi}^{\text{suf}}(\lambda) \leq \Pr[H^A(\lambda)]$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. Adversary A simply runs A' , answering all queries via its own oracles (the two adversaries have the same oracles). When A' halts with output $((C, \sigma), i)$, A makes query RETRIEVE($(C, \sigma), i$) and halts with output \perp . The flag win is set to true with at least the probability that A' wins its game. Now we proceed to upper bound $\Pr[H^A(\lambda)]$.

<p>MAIN $\boxed{G_0^A(\lambda)}$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$ / $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>$Q \leftarrow \emptyset$; $Q' \leftarrow \emptyset$; $\text{win} \leftarrow \text{false}$</p> <p>$fp \leftarrow_s \text{F.Pg}(1^\lambda)$; $(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda)$; $pp \leftarrow (fp, ap)$</p> <p>$\perp \leftarrow_s A^{\text{MKKEY,STORE,RETRIEVE}}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>Ret win</p> <p>$\text{MKKEY}(1^n)$ // $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$ / $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do $(\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp)$</p> <p>Ret \mathbf{pk}</p> <p>proc $\text{STORE}(\phi)$ // $G_0^A(\lambda)$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$ / $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then return \perp</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk})$; $C \leftarrow_s \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M)$</p> <p>$\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, \mathbf{pk}[i], C)$; $Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\}$; $Q' \leftarrow Q' \cup \{(\mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)\}$</p> <p>Ret (C, σ)</p> <p>proc $\text{RETRIEVE}((C, \sigma), i)$ // $\boxed{G_0^A(\lambda)}$ / $G_1^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then return \perp</p> <p>If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>If $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$ then $\text{win} \leftarrow \text{true}$ else Ret \perp</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$; $pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk', C)$</p> <p>If $(pk' \neq \mathbf{pk}[i])$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$; $\boxed{M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)}$</p> <p>Ret M</p> <p>proc $\text{RETRIEVE}((C, \sigma), i)$ // $G_2^A(\lambda)$</p> <p>If not $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ then return \perp</p> <p>If $((C, \sigma), i) \in Q$ then Ret \perp</p> <p>If $\text{DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$ then $\text{win} \leftarrow \text{true}$ else Ret \perp</p> <p>$M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C)$</p> <p>If $(\mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma) \in Q'$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$; Ret M</p> <p>$sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)$; $pk' \leftarrow \text{F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk')$</p> <p>If $(pk' \neq \mathbf{pk}[i])$ then $\text{bad} \leftarrow \text{true}$</p> <p>Ret M</p>

Figure 15: **Games used in the proof of part (2) of Theorem 6.1.** Game G_0 includes the boxed code and game G_1 does not.

Let $q(\cdot)$ be a polynomial such that the number of RETRIEVE queries of A in game $H^A(\lambda)$ is $q(\lambda)$ for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. We provide PT adversaries A_1, A_2, D and a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[H^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, D, \Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) + \nu(\lambda) + q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$$

for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, from which part (2) of the theorem follows.

The proof uses the games in Figure 15. We build A_1, A_2, D and ν such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have

$$\Pr[H^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[G_0^A(\lambda)] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) \tag{15}$$

$$\Pr[G_1^A(\lambda) \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}] \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, D, \Phi}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) \tag{16}$$

$$\Pr[G_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \nu(\lambda) + q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) . \tag{17}$$

The notation in Equation (16) means that we are considering the event that the game returns **true** and also **bad** is not set. Now games G_0, G_1 are identical until **bad** so a variant of the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing [18] says that $\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}] = \Pr[G_1^A(\lambda) \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}]$. We also observe that $\Pr[G_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \leq \Pr[G_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}]$. (In both games, decryption in RETRIEVE is always done correctly.) Combining this

with the above, for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ST},A',\Phi}^{\text{sup}}(\lambda) &\leq \Pr[\mathbf{H}^A(\lambda)] \\
&= \Pr[\mathbf{H}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda)] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda)] \\
&\leq \Pr[\mathbf{H}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda)] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda) \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \\
&\leq \Pr[\mathbf{H}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda)] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_1^A(\lambda) \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \\
&\leq \Pr[\mathbf{H}^A(\lambda)] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_0^A(\lambda)] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_1^A(\lambda) \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}] + \Pr[\mathbf{G}_2^A(\lambda) \text{ sets bad}] \\
&\leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_1}^{\text{sim}}(\lambda) + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{PKE},D}^{\text{kdm}}(\lambda) + \nu(\lambda) + q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS},F,A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

as desired. We proceed to the constructions of A_1 , A_2 , D and ν .

Adversary A_1 behaves as follows:

$ \begin{aligned} &\underline{A_1^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)} \\ &Q \leftarrow \emptyset \\ &\perp \leftarrow_s A^{\text{MKKEYSIM, STORESIM, RETRIEVESIM}}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ &\text{If win then } b' \leftarrow 1 \text{ else } b' \leftarrow 0 \\ &\text{Ret } b' \\ \\ &\underline{\text{MKKEYSIM}(1^n)} \\ &\text{For } i = 1, \dots, n \text{ do} \\ &\quad (\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ &\text{Ret } \mathbf{pk} \end{aligned} $	$ \begin{aligned} &\underline{\text{STORESIM}(\phi, i)} \\ &\text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk}) \\ &C \leftarrow_s \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M) \\ &\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(\mathbf{sk}[i], C); Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\} \\ &\text{Ret } (C, \sigma) \\ \\ &\underline{\text{RETRIEVESIM}((C, \sigma), i)} \\ &\text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &\text{If } ((C, \sigma), i) \in Q \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &\text{If DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma) \text{ then win } \leftarrow \text{true}; \\ &\text{Else Ret } \perp \\ &M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C) \\ &\text{Ret } M \end{aligned} $
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When the challenge bit b in game SIM is 1, adversary A_1 simulates \mathbf{H} , and when $b = 0$ it simulates \mathbf{G}_0 . Note that in the latter, decryptions done by RETRIEVE are always correct, so A_1 does not need to invoke the extractor. (Indeed, it could not, since it does not have an extraction trapdoor.) This establishes Equation (15).

Adversary D behaves as follows:

$ \begin{aligned} &\underline{D^{\text{MKKEY, ENC}}(1^\lambda, fp)} \\ &Q \leftarrow \emptyset; sk^* \leftarrow \perp; j \leftarrow \perp \\ &(ap, std, xtd) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimPg}(1^\lambda) \\ &pp \leftarrow (fp, ap) \\ &\perp \leftarrow_s A^{\text{MKKEY, STORESIM, RETRIEVESIM}}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ &\text{If } (sk^*, j) = (\perp, \perp) \text{ then Ret } 0 \\ &M_1 \leftarrow 1^\lambda; C^* \leftarrow_s \text{ENC}(\langle M_1 \rangle, j) \\ &M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk^*, C^*) \\ &\text{If } (M = M_1) \text{ then } b' \leftarrow 1 \text{ else } b' \leftarrow 0 \\ &\text{Ret } b' \end{aligned} $	$ \begin{aligned} &\underline{\text{STORESIM}(\phi, i)} \\ &\text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &C \leftarrow_s \text{ENC}(\phi, i) \\ &\sigma \leftarrow_s \text{DS.SimSig}(1^\lambda, pp, std, \mathbf{pk}[i], C) \\ &Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\} \\ &\text{Ret } (C, \sigma) \\ \\ &\underline{\text{RETRIEVESIM}((C, \sigma), i)} \\ &\text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &\text{If } ((C, \sigma), i) \in Q \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &\text{If (not DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ &sk' \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Ext}(1^\lambda, pp, xtd, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma) \\ &\text{If (F.Ev}(1^\lambda, fp, sk') = \mathbf{pk}[i]) \text{ then } (sk^*, j) \leftarrow (sk', i) \\ &M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, sk', C) \\ &\text{Ret } M \end{aligned} $
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Recall that $\langle M_1 \rangle$ denotes the constant function that always returns M_1 . If win is set in G_1 then we are assured that there is at least one **RETRIEVE** query which leads to extraction being performed. If additionally bad is not set then this extraction succeeds, which means decryption under sk^* will be correct. That in turn means that M is the correct decryption of C^* and hence D succeeds if $\text{win} \wedge \overline{\text{bad}}$. This establishes Equation (16).

Now we would like to show that G_0 (equivalently, G_1) sets bad with negligible probability. Intuitively, this should follow from extractability, since bad is set when extraction fails. A difficulty is that extraction is not required to succeed when $(pk[i], C, \sigma) \in Q'$. So first we show that the latter event is unlikely, and then, assuming it does not happen, that failure of extraction is unlikely. This is formalized via G_2 , which breaks the setting of bad from G_0 into two parts corresponding to the two events of interest. To establish Equation (17), let E_1 be the event that bad is set by the line 5 “If” statement, and E_2 the event that bad is set by the line 7 “If” statement. We show the existence of a negligible $\nu(\cdot)$ such that $\Pr[E_1] \leq \nu(\lambda)$ as in the proof of part (1) above, first arguing that $\Pr[E_1]$ is at most the probability of a collision in public keys, and then arguing that this is negligible by the assumed security of **PKE**. To establish Equation (17), we now build A_2 so that $\Pr[E_2 \wedge \overline{E_1}] \leq q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$:

$\begin{array}{l} \overline{A_2^{\text{SIGN}}(1^\lambda, pp)} \\ Q \leftarrow \emptyset; j \leftarrow 0 \\ \perp \leftarrow_s A^{\text{MKKEYSIM}, \text{STORESIM}, \text{RETRIEVESIM}}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ \ell \leftarrow_s \{1, \dots, j\} \\ \text{Ret } (pk_\ell, C_\ell, \sigma_\ell) \\ \\ \overline{\text{MKKEYSIM}}(1^n) \\ \text{For } i = 1, \dots, n \text{ do} \\ \quad (\mathbf{sk}[i], \mathbf{pk}[i]) \leftarrow_s \text{DS.Kg}(1^\lambda, pp) \\ \text{Ret } \mathbf{pk} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \overline{\text{STORESIM}}(\phi, i) \\ \text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ M \leftarrow \Phi(1^\lambda, \phi, \mathbf{sk}) \\ C \leftarrow_s \text{PKE.Enc}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{pk}[i], M) \\ \sigma \leftarrow_s \text{SIGN}(\mathbf{sk}[i], C); Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{((C, \sigma), i)\} \\ \text{Ret } (C, \sigma) \\ \\ \overline{\text{RETRIEVESIM}}((C, \sigma), i) \\ \text{If not } (1 \leq i \leq n) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ \text{If } ((C, \sigma), i) \in Q \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ \text{If (not DS.Ver}(1^\lambda, pp, \mathbf{pk}[i], C, \sigma)) \text{ then Ret } \perp \\ M \leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(1^\lambda, fp, \mathbf{sk}[i], C) \\ j \leftarrow j + 1; pk_j \leftarrow \mathbf{pk}[i]; C_j \leftarrow C; \sigma_j \leftarrow \sigma \\ \text{Ret } M \end{array}$
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Adversary A_2 always performs correct decryptions in responding to **RETRIEVE** queries, following G_2 . If bad is set at line 7 but not at line 5, then there is some tuple on which the extractor would succeed. Since a tuple is guessed at random we have $\Pr[E_2 \wedge \overline{E_1}] \leq q(\lambda) \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DS}, \text{F}, A_2}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda)$ as desired. The importance of bad not being set at line 5 is that otherwise extraction is not required to succeed according to game **EXT**.

■