Formal Verification of Communication Protocol using Type Theory

Xingyuan Zhang, Xiren Xie PLA University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China Email: {xyzhang, xiexr}@public1.ptt.js.cn

Mark Harman, Lin Hu

Department of Information Systems and Computing, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, U.K. Email: {Mark.Harman, Lin.Hu}@brunel.ac.uk

Abstract— In this paper, an approach is proposed to verify communication protocol using the type theoretical proof assistant Coq. Compared with existing methods of protocol verification, this approach is based directly on the simple notion of event trace. Without the burden of embedding external concurrent languages such as process algebra, finite state machine, temporal logic, etc., this approach leads to very efficient reasoning. The approach is deliberately designed to exploit the computational mechanism intrinsic to type theory so that many cases can be proved automatically by computation.

Because of these advantages, even non-trivial protocols can be verified within reasonable cost.

This paper shows that both safeness and liveness can be formalized and verified using only finite event traces. A simplified version of the sliding window protocol is used to illustrate the approach. All the results presented in this paper have been mechanically checked in Coq. The relevant Coq scripts are accessible through Internet.

Keywords: Protocol Engineering, Protocol Verification

I. INTRODUCTION

Protocol verification can roughly be divided into two categories: Model Checking [1], [2], [3] and Theorem Proving [4], [5], [6], [7]. This paper belongs to the latter category.

Mechanical support is crucial for the theorem proving approach to scale up. However, 'which language to use' remains an open question. A lot of formalisms have been proposed, Process Algebra [8], [9], I/O Automata [10], Temporal Logic [11], [12], Statechart [13] being just a few. One problem with these formalisms is that most of them leave the definition and reasoning of data types to the 'underlying mathematics'. The consequence is that when developing mechanical support for these languages, two languages have to be dealt with – the language for protocol specification (protocol language) and the language for the 'underlying mathematics' (mathematics language). How to merge these two languages into one integrated language is not yet clear.

As a practical consequence of this problem, theorem proving based protocol verification usually begins with language embedding. The disadvantage of language embedding is that a lot of theorem proving resources are spent on the management of language being embedded, rather than on the verification of Malcolm Munro

Department of Computer Science, University of Durham, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durhram, DH1 3LE, U.K. Email: Malcolm.Munro@durham.ac.uk

the protocol itself. This problem may be alleviated by using 'shallow embedding'.

In this paper, we go a step further – there is no embedding at all. Communication protocol is specified and verified using only standard mathematical notations. Since most general purpose proof assistant systems are initially developed to support mathematics, this approach is likely to be better supported.

The basic ideas of our approach are:

- The semantics of concurrent systems is modelled as set of event traces. The main difference from Focus is that we deal with finite traces only. Such a simpler notion of trace leads to efficient reasoning. It is shown that both safeness and liveness properties can be modelled using finite traces only.
- 2) Only standard mathematical language is used. In stead of using an embedded language such as Process Algebra, I/O Automata, Statechart or Temporal Logic, this paper uses the language of Coq [14], [15], [16], which is the language of constructive mathematics. Without the burden of language embedding, the theorem proving resources of Coq can be focused directly on the concurrent system under investigation. Such a kind of 'focus' results in efficient reasoning as well.

Another novelty of our work is that the approach of 'specification by observation' is used, where system properties are expressed as properties of observation functions, which are list processing functions defined using the computational mechanism intrinsic to type theory. Such a design is deliberate to exploit the computational mechanism of type theory so that many cases can be proved automatically by computation.

Because of these advantages, highly efficient reasoning is achieved, so that even non-trivial communication protocols can be treated with reasonable cost. A simplified sliding window protocol is chosen as an example to illustrate the ideas. Since sliding window protocol usually serves as a benchmark example in protocol verification, the choice makes it easier to compare our approach with others.

The particular version of sliding window protocol, although simplified, is still an infinite state system, which lies beyond the reach of ordinary model checking. The formal verification of this protocol shows the potential of our approach. It is shown that both safeness and liveness can be treated using our approach.

The relevant Coq scripts for this paper can be found at: http://www.dur.ac.uk/xingyuan.zhang/sw/concCoq.zip.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II shows how a concurrent system can be modelled as an inductively defined set of event traces. Section III describes the architecture of sliding window protocol and the set of events needed to specify it. Section IV specifies the desired behavior of the protocol. In Section V, additional observation functions required to implement the sliding window protocol are defined. Section VI presents the sliding window protocol as a concurrent system SW. Section VII gives the proof of safeness. A detailed explanation of the proof of Lemma 7.4 shows how the computational mechanism is used in proof construction. Section VIII gives the proof of liveness. Section IX summarizes related works and gives some discussions. Section X is the conclusion. Auxiliary definitions used in this paper can be found in Appendix A. Some preliminary lemmas are given in Appendix B.

A. Conventions

Because type theory is proposed to formalize constructive mathematics, we are able to present the work in standard mathematical notation. All these standard formlæ have precise meaning in type theory and this enables the results in this paper to be checked mechanically by Coq.

Type theory has a notion of computation, which is used as an definition mechanism, where the equation $a \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} b$ represents a 'computational rule' used to expand the definition of a to b.

The equality symbol '=' used in this paper is the Leibniz equality in type theory. Let $a \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} b$ means 'a computes to b', we have: $(a \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} b) \Rightarrow (a = b)$ but not vise versa.

Free variables in formulae are assumed to be universally quantified, for example, $n_1 + n_2 = n_2 + n_1$ is an abbreviation of $\forall n_1, n_2$. $n_1 + n_2 = n_2 + n_1$.

II. CONCURRENT SYSTEM

A concurrent system on event set Evt is written as CS(Evt) and defined as a relation between event trace and event:

$$\mathsf{CS}(\mathsf{Evt}) \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \llbracket \mathsf{Evt} \rrbracket \to \mathsf{Evt} \to \mathsf{Prop}$$
 (1)

where the event set Evt is represented as a type in type theory, event trace is represented as list of events: $[Evt]^{1}$. Prop is the type of propositions in type theory. For concurrent system cs : CS(Evt), event trace tr : [Evt] and event e : Evt, the expression

means: in concurrent system cs, e is a valid event to happen under the state defined by the event trace tr. The execution of

| $\overline{VT(cs,\langle\rangle)}$ vt_nil | VT(cs,tr) | cs(tr, e) | vt cons |
|---|---------------------------|-----------|---------|
| | $VT(cs, e \cdot tr)$ Vt | | vt_cons |

Fig. 1. Definition of VT

a concurrent system cs starts with empty trace, at each step of execution, if cs(tr, e) is true for some event e, then e could be the next event to happen, in which case it is added to the head of the current trace tr. Instead of defining the state of a concurrent system as a value assignment for a certain set of variables, we represent the state of a concurrent system as a finite trace of events. Therefore, the state of the system changes with the occurrence of events. The system is concurrent in the sense that the choice between several possible valid events is nondeterministic.

Such a notion of execution is reflected in the definition of the relation VT(cs, tr) in Figure 1, where VT(cs, tr) means the trace tr is a valid trace of the concurrent system cs. The rule **vt_nil** defines the empty trace (written as $\langle \rangle$) to be a valid trace; and the rule **vt_cons** says: if tr is a valid trace, and e is a valid event to happen under tr, then $e \cdot tr$ (the list obtained by adding e to the head of tr) is a valid trace.

In this way, the behavior of a concurrent system can be represented as an inductively defined set of event traces. Most of the lemmas verified in this paper have the form:

$$\forall tr \, . \, \mathsf{VT}(cs, tr) \Rightarrow P(tr) \tag{2}$$

where cs is the concurrent system under investigation, P is the property we are interested in. Since Coq has comprehensive support for structural induction, by induction on the formation of VT(cs, tr), P can be proved conveniently. Proofs of this kind often consist of a large number of cases. A particular appealing aspect of our approach is that many of them can be discharged automatically by the computational mechanism of type theory, so that people can concentrate more on interesting cases.

The composition of two concurrent systems cs_1, cs_2 : CS(Evt) is now simply defined as:

$$cs_1 \parallel cs_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \lambda tr, e. cs_1(tr, e) \lor cs_2(tr, e)$$
 (3)

III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Sliding window protocol is a communication protocol which provides reliable connection between two network nodes linked with an unreliable communication channel. It is required that all messages sent at one node will eventually be delivered at the other node in the same order as they were sent. The architecture of the sliding window protocol is given in Figure 2. The set of events determined by this architecture is given in Figure 3, where M is the type of messages, which is not defined explicitly in this paper.

In Figure 2, the the sliding window protocol is modelled by four event-generating entities, namely: Supplier, Sender, Channel and Receiver. Each class of events is represented as an arrow, from the entity which generates it, to the entity being affected. For example, the event $\triangleright[m]$ (generated by Supplier)

 $^{{}^{1}}$ [Evt] is the type of lists consisting of elements from type Evt. List operations can be found in Appendix A.2.



| Evt_formation | | | | | | |
|---------------|---------|----------------------------|---------|--------------------------|---------|------|
| m:M | msg in | m:M | msg out | ch:Chan | fm:Frm | send |
| ho[m]:Evt | msg_m | $[m] \triangleright : Evt$ | msg_out | ch!fm | n : Evt | senu |
| | ch:Chan | fm:Frm | receive | ch:Chan | lost | |
| | ch?fr | n:Evt | receive | $\divideontimes(ch):Evt$ | 1050 | |

Fig. 3. Definition of Evt

represents the creation of a message m to be transferred by the sliding window protocol. The event $[m] \triangleright$ (generated by Receiver) represents the delivery of message m to the outside world. There are two communication channels, ct is the one from Sender to Receiver and cf is the one from Receiver to Sender. The name of channels are defined in Figure 4 as the inductive type Chan.

For any channel ch, the sending of frame fm over ch is represented by the event ch!fm, the receiving of frame fmfrom ch is represented by the event ch?fm. The type of frames Frm is defined in Figure 5, where the frame data(n,m)is used by Sender to wrap the message m before sending it over ct and n is a sequence number managed by Sender. The frame ack(n) is used by Receiver to send acknowledging information back to Sender and n is the sequence number of the message being acknowledged.

Interferences may happen to communication channels, the effect of which is to destroy frames under transmission. The occurrence of a single interference to channel ch is represented by the event *(ch).

IV. SPECIFICATION BY OBSERVATION

Suppose the sliding window protocol is implemented as a concurrent system SW. Then the desired behavior of SW is expressed as properties of event traces generated by SW according to the inductive definition of VT given in Figure 1. Properties of event traces are described in terms of observation functions, which are simply list processing functions. For example, the list of all messages created by Supplier is defined by the observation function msgs_in:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \operatorname{msgs_in}(\rhd[m] \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} & \operatorname{msgs_in}(tr) \dotplus m \\ & \operatorname{msgs_in}(_ \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} & \operatorname{msgs_in}(tr) & (4) \\ & \operatorname{msgs_in}(\langle \rangle) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} & \langle \rangle \end{array}$$

where, the equation msgs_in($\triangleright[m] \cdot tr$) $\stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow}$ msgs_in(tr) \dotplus m says: when an event $\triangleright[m]$ happens, the message it carries is appended to the end of the resulting list (\dotplus is defined in (32)), and the equation msgs_in($_ \cdot tr$) $\stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow}$ msgs_in(tr) says: when any other kind of event happens, the resulting list remains unchanged, where 'all the other events' are written as _. Notice that the use of _ makes msgs_in resilient to the extension of Evt because there is no need to change the definition when new events are added to Evt. And finally, the equation msgs_in($\langle \rangle$) $\stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow}$ $\langle \rangle$ says: the resulting list is initially empty.

Similarly, the list of messages delivered by the sliding window protocol is defined by the observation function msgs_out:

$$\operatorname{msgs_out}([m] \rhd \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \operatorname{msgs_out}(tr) \dotplus m$$
$$\operatorname{msgs_out}(_ \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \operatorname{msgs_out}(tr) \tag{5}$$
$$\operatorname{msgs_out}(\langle \rangle) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \langle \rangle$$

With these two functions, the desired behavior of SW can be expressed by the following two lemmas:

Lemma 4.1 (Safeness):

$$\forall tr . \mathsf{VT}(\mathsf{SW}, tr) \Rightarrow$$

 $\exists l. \text{ msgs_in}(tr) = \text{msgs_out}(tr)^{-} l \quad (6)$ which says: the list of messages delivered at the Receiver is a prefix of the messages injected into the system at the Sender. *Lemma 4.2 (Liveness):*

$$\forall tr. \mathsf{VT}(\mathsf{SW}, tr) \Rightarrow \\ \exists tr'. \mathsf{VT}(\mathsf{SW}, tr'^{tr}) \land$$

 $msgs_in(tr) = msgs_out(tr'^tr) \quad (7)$

which says: all the messages injected into the system at the Sender will eventually be delivered at the Receiver. The expression $VT(SW, tr'^{tr})$ means tr'^{tr} is a valid extension

| Chan : Set | tion $\frac{1}{ct:Chan}$ chan_to $\frac{1}{cf:Chan}$ chan_from |
|------------|---|
| | Fig. 4. Definition of Chan |
| Frm : Set | $\begin{array}{c c} n: Nat & m: M \\ \hline \\ \hline data(n,m) \\ \vdots \\ Frm \end{array} \mathbf{data} & \begin{array}{c} n: Nat \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ ack(n) \\ \vdots \\ Frm \end{array} \mathbf{ack}$ |
| | |

Fig. 5. Definition of Frm

of tr. Lemma 4.2 guarantees that there is always a valid extension (or future) for any valid trace tr, when the messages delivered at the Receiver equals the messages injected at the Sender at the moment denoted by tr. If the scheduling mechanism is fair to all possible futures, the phenomena described by Lemma 4.2 is guaranteed to happen.

Notice that both Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 are in the general pattern described in (2), as most of the lemmas in this paper.

V. MORE OBSERVATION FUNCTIONS

For the construction of SW, additional observation functions are required. The function msg_no_rcvd computes the list of sequence numbers from data frames data(n,m) observable by the Receiver:

$$\begin{cases} \operatorname{msg_no_rcvd}(\operatorname{ct?}\operatorname{data}(n,m) \cdot tr) \stackrel{\operatorname{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \\ n \cdot \operatorname{msg_no_rcvd}(tr) \\ \operatorname{msg_no_rcvd}(_ \cdot tr) \stackrel{\operatorname{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \\ \operatorname{msg_no_rcvd}(tr) \\ \operatorname{msg_no_rcvd}(\langle \rangle) \stackrel{\operatorname{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \langle \rangle \end{cases}$$

$$(8)$$

The function msgs_rcvd computes a finite mapping from sequence numbers to messages from data frames data(n,m) observable by the Receiver (the definition of 'finite mapping' is given in Appendix A.3):

$$\begin{cases} \operatorname{msgs_rcvd}(\operatorname{ct?}\overline{\operatorname{data}(n,m)} \cdot tr) \stackrel{\operatorname{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \\ \operatorname{msgs_rcvd}(tr) [m^{n}] \\ \operatorname{msgs_rcvd}(_ \cdot tr) \stackrel{\operatorname{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \operatorname{msgs_rcvd}(tr) \\ \operatorname{msgs_rcvd}(\langle \rangle) \stackrel{\operatorname{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \epsilon \end{cases}$$
(9)

The definition of $msgs_rcvd(tr) [m^n]$ can be found in (38).

The function msg_no_acked computes the list of acknowledged sequence numbers from the acknowledging frames ack(n) observable by the Sender:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \operatorname{msg_no_acked}(\mathsf{cf}? \fbox{ack}(n) \cdot tr) & \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{\longrightarrow} \\ & n \cdot \operatorname{msg_no_acked}(tr) \\ & \operatorname{msg_no_acked}(_ \cdot tr) & \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{\longrightarrow} & \operatorname{msg_no_acked}(tr) \\ & \operatorname{msg_no_acked}(\langle \rangle) & \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{\longrightarrow} & \langle \rangle \end{array}$$

$$(10)$$

Supplier($tr, \triangleright[m]$)sp_inFig. 6. Definition of Supplier

The function queue(ch, tr) computes the list of frames observable by communication channel ch, waiting to be transmitted to their destination:

$$queue(ch, \overline{ch}! fm \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, \overline{ch}! fm \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} fms$$

$$queue(ch, \overline{ch}? fm \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} fms$$

$$\text{if } \overline{ch} = ch \land \text{ queue}(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, *(\overline{ch}) \cdot tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} fms$$

$$\text{if } \overline{ch} = ch \land \text{ queue}(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, - tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, - tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, - tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, - tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, - tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

$$queue(ch, - tr) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} queue(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms$$

where, when a frame fm is sent to a channel \overline{ch} (represented by the event $\overline{ch!}fm$), if $\overline{ch} = ch$, the frame fm is appended to the end of the resulting list. When a frame is delivered to destination (represented by the event $\overline{ch?}fm$), if $\overline{ch} = ch$ and the current value of the resulting list is $fm \cdot fms$, the new value of the resulting list becomes fms. When an interference happens (represented by the event $*(\overline{ch})$), if $\overline{ch} = ch$ and the current value of the resulting list is $fm \cdot fms$, the new value of the resulting list becomes fms. For all other cases, the resulting list remains unchanged.

VI. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SW

The sliding window protocol SW can now be defined as the composition of four concurrent sub-systems, each corresponding to an entity in Figure 2:

 $\mathsf{SW} \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \mathsf{Supplier} \parallel \mathsf{Sender} \parallel \mathsf{Channel} \parallel \mathsf{Receiver}$

The definition of Supplier is given in Figure 6. There is only one rule for Supplier, which says: Supplier is allowed to inject message into the system at any time.

The definition of Sender is given in Figure 7, where the operation $\max(...)$ is defined in (41) and the operation ...[...] is defined in (35). The rule sd_send says: any message injected into the system which has not yet been acknowledged may be sent over the channel ct. The premise $\max(\operatorname{msg_no_acked}(tr)) = acked$ means that there is a number , acked, representing the maximum number acknowledged at the moment tr. For any sequence numbers



V

Fig. 7. Definition of Sender

n (acked < n), if the message for n has been injected into the system (specified by the premise $msgs_in(tr)[n] = m$), then, that massage m is allowed to be sent over ct after being encapsuled in data(n,m). The rule sd_send_init says, if there is no acknowledgement received at all (specified by the premise $mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = \bot$), then, any message injected into the system is allowed to be sent over the the channel ct.

When defining an entity, the observation functions used must be observable by that entity. For example, the two observation functions msg_no_acked and msgs_in in Figure 7 are all observable by the Sender.

The definition of Receiver is given in Figure 8, where the operation |...| is defined in (33) and the operation mcat(...) is defined in (42). The rule **rv_out** says: messages stored in the finite map msgs_rcvd(tr) is allowed to be delivered sequentially. The observation function $|msgs_out(tr)|$ records the number of messages delivered at the moment denoted by tr, therefore, the next message to deliver must have $|msgs_out(tr)|$ as its sequence number. If this message is available in msgs_rcvd(tr) (specified by the premise $(msgs_rcvd(tr))(|msgs_out(tr)|) = m$), then the message can be delivered by $[m] \triangleright$. The rule **rv_ack** concerns the acknowledging frame [ack(rcvd)]. As indicated by the premise

$$mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = rcvd$$

rcvd is the largest continuous number of the list of sequence numbers which have arrived at the Receiver.

The definition of Channel is given in Figure 9, where the rule **ch_out** specifies that: if the list of frames waiting to be delivered in channel ch is not empty, then the first frame in that list is delivered to its destination. The rule **ch_lost** specifies that: when the list of frames waiting to be delivered in channel ch is not empty, interference may happen to ch.

VII. PROOF OF SAFENESS

The proof of the Safeness (Lemma 4.1) consists of a series of lemmas. The following lemma shows that: all frames contained in channel ct are of the form data(n,m).

Lemma 7.1:

 $VT(SW, tr) \Rightarrow$

 $fm \in \text{queue}(\operatorname{ct}, tr) \Rightarrow \exists n, m \cdot fm = \boxed{\operatorname{data}(n, m)}$ (12) The following lemma shows that all frames contained in channel cf are of the form $\boxed{\operatorname{ack}(n)}$. Lemma 7.2:

$$VT(SW, tr) \Rightarrow$$

$$fm \in \text{queue}(cf, tr) \Rightarrow \exists n . fm = \boxed{ack(n)} \quad (13)$$
are following lemma shows that when the frame $\boxed{data(n, m)}$

The following lemma shows that when the frame data(n, m) is in channel ct, the condition $msgs_in(tr)[n] = m$ must hold. Lemma 7.3:

$$\mathsf{VT}(\mathsf{SW}, tr) \Rightarrow \\ \boxed{\mathsf{data}(n, m)} \in \text{queue}(\mathsf{ct}, tr) \Rightarrow \\$$

 $msgs_in(tr)[n] = m \quad (14)$

5)

The following lemma shows that for all pairs (n,m) in msgs_rcvd(tr), the condition msgs_in(tr)[n] = m holds. Lemma 7.4:

$$T(SW, tr) \Rightarrow$$
msgs_rcvd(tr)(n) = m \Rightarrow
msgs_in(tr)[n] = m (1)

A lot of proof cases in this paper are discharged automatically by the computational mechanism of type theory, but space does not allow us to explain each of them. To illustrate, we shall explain the use of computation through the proof of Lemma 7.4.

The proof is by induction on the structure of the VT(SW, tr). After expanding the definition of SW, there is one case for each rule in Figures 6 – 9. Since Lemma 7.4 concerns only msgs_rcvd and msgs_in, the values of which are only affected by the occurrence of ct? data(n,m) and $\triangleright[m]$, all those rules which do not generate these two events have no effect on the truth of Lemma 7.4. For these 'irrelevant rules', the goal can be proved automatically by the computational mechanism of Coq, because, after expanding the definition of msgs_rcvd and msgs_in, the goal is exactly the same as the induction hypothesis.

Only two nontrivial cases are left, the one for sp_in and the one for ch_out. For sp_in, since the occurrence of $\triangleright[m]$ has no effect on msgs_rcvd, only msgs_in gets extended at the end, the goal can be proved easily from the induction hypothesis. For ch_out, when ch = cf, the occurrence of ch?fm has no effect on either msgs_rcvd or msgs_in, the goal can be proved directly from the induction hypothesis. When ch = ct, according to Lemma 7.1, we have fm = data(n,m). From this, Lemma 7.3 and the induction hypothesis, the goal can be proved. This ends the proof of Lemma 7.4.

| $(msgs_rcvd(tr))(msgs_out(tr)) = m$ | ry out | $mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = rcvd$ | ry ock |
|---|--------|--------------------------------|--------|
| $Receiver(tr, [m] \triangleright)$ | IV_Out | Receiver $(tr, cf! ack(rcvd))$ | IV_ack |

Fig. 8. Definition of Receiver

| $\frac{\text{queue}(ch, tr) = fm \cdot fms}{\text{Channel}(tr, ch?fm)} \text{ ch_out}$ | $\frac{\text{queue}(ch, tr) \neq \langle \rangle}{\text{Channel}(tr, *(ch))} \text{ ch_lost}$ |
|--|---|
|--|---|

Fig. 9. Definition of Channel

The following lemma shows that: if m is the *n*-th element of msgs_out(tr), (n, m) must be contained in msgs_rcvd(tr). Lemma 7.5:

 $VT(SW, tr) \Rightarrow$

 $msgs_out(tr)[n] = m \Rightarrow$

 $msgs_rcvd(tr)(n) = m \quad (16)$

Combining Lemma 7.5 and Lemma 7.4, it can be proved that: *Lemma 7.6:*

$$\mathsf{VT}(\mathsf{SW}, tr) \Rightarrow$$

$$msgs_out(tr)[n] = m \Rightarrow$$

msgs_in(tr)[n] = m (17) which says: the *n*-th elements of msgs_out(tr) is also the *n*-th elements of msgs_in(tr).

The following lemma shows that: if for any n, the *n*-th element of l_1 is also the *n*-th element of l_2 , then l_1 is a prefix of l_2 .

Lemma 7.7:

 $(\forall n, a. l_1[n] = a \Rightarrow l_2[n] = a) \Rightarrow \exists l . l_2 = l_1 \ l$ (18) By applying Lemma 7.7 to Lemma 7.6, Lemma 4.1 can be proved.

VIII. PROOF OF LIVENESS

Instead of proving Liveness (Lemma 4.2) directly, we first prove Lemma 8.1, which says: if the messages delivered by the Receiver is less than the messages injected into the Sender at least by m (expressed as msgs_in $(tr) = msgs_out(tr)^{(m \cdot l)}$), then there is a valid extension of tr which delivers the message m (expressed as msgs_out $(tr'^{(r)} tr) = msgs_out(tr) + m$). Lemma 4.2 can be proved easily by repeated application of Lemma 8.1.

Lemma 8.1 (One step liveness):

$$VT(SW, tr) \Rightarrow$$

$$msgs_in(tr) = msgs_out(tr)^{(m \cdot l)} \Rightarrow$$

$$\exists tr' \cdot (VT(SW, tr'^{tr}) \land$$

$$magg_out(tr'^{(m \cdot l)}) = magg_out(tr)^{(l)} i \circ$$

msgs_out($tr'^{-}tr$) = msgs_out(tr) $\dotplus m$) Several preliminary lemmas are needed to prove this lemma. These lemmas are explained in Appendix B.

The proof of Lemma 8.1 is: It is important to notice that: since $|msgs_out(tr)|$ is the number of messages delivered at the moment tr, the next message to deliver must have the number $|msgs_out(tr)|$ (the definition of |...| is in (33)). The proof is to find where this message resides and to show that this message will eventually be delivered by the Receiver.

Depending on the value of $mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr))$, there are two cases:

1) When $mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = rcvd$, from Lemma 1.4, we have:

$$|msgs_out(tr)| \le rcvd + 1$$

Depending on the value of $|msgs_out(tr)|$, there are two sub-cases:

a) When $|msgs_out(tr)| = rcvd + 1$, from this and the premise

$$\mathrm{msgs_in}(tr) = \mathrm{msgs_out}(tr)^{\widehat{}}(m \cdot l) \quad (19)$$

it can be deduced that:

$$msgs_in(tr)[rcvd+1] = m$$
(20)

The next message to be delivered must have sequence number rcvd + 1 and this message has not arrived at the Receiver yet. We first search this message in queue(ct, tr). According to Lemma 1.1, there could be two cases:

i) When

$$\begin{array}{l} (\exists \, hd: \llbracket Frm \rrbracket, \, \overline{m}: \mathsf{M}, \, tl: \llbracket Frm \rrbracket. \\ \mathrm{queue}(\mathsf{ct}, tr) = \\ & (hd \dotplus \left[\mathsf{data}(rcvd + 1, \overline{m}) \right])^{\frown} \, tl \ \land \\ & (\forall fm. \, fm \in hd \Rightarrow \\ & fm \neq \left[\mathsf{data}(rcvd + 1, \overline{m}) \right])) \end{array}$$

which means the message is in queue(ct, tr).

By applying Lemma 1.2 to this, we have:

$$\exists \overline{tr}, nl.$$

$$VT(SW, \overline{tr}^{\uparrow} tr) \land \qquad (21a)$$

$$queue(ct, \overline{tr}^{\uparrow} tr) =$$

$$\boxed{\mathsf{data}(rcvd+1,\overline{m})} \cdot tl \land (21b)$$
msg_no_rcvd($\overline{tr}^{\uparrow} tr$) =

$$nl \cdot msg_no_rcvd(tr) \land$$
 (21c)

$$r(rcvd + 1 \leq nl) \land \tag{21d}$$

$$\operatorname{msgs_out}(\overline{tr}^{\ }tr) = \operatorname{msgs_out}(tr) \land$$
(21e)

$$msgs_in(\overline{tr}^{}tr) = msgs_in(tr)$$
(21f)

By assigning $[\overline{m}] \triangleright \cdot \operatorname{ct}$? $\operatorname{data}(rcvd + 1, \overline{m}) \cdot \overline{tr}$ to tr', the goal can be proved as the following: The execution of \overline{tr} moves $\operatorname{data}(rcvd + 1, \overline{m})$ to the head of ct so that the event ct? $\operatorname{data}(rcvd + 1, \overline{m})$ can be generated by using the rule ch_out. Since rv -out is waiting for the message numbered rcvd + 1 in order to deliver the next message, the event $[\overline{m}] \triangleright$ can now be generated by rv -out. From (21e), it can be deduced that:

msgs_out((
$$[\overline{m}] \triangleright .ct$$
? data($rcvd + 1, \overline{m}$) . \overline{tr})^ tr)
= msgs_out(tr) $\dotplus \overline{m}$
(22)

From (19), (21f) and (22), it can be proved that $\overline{m} = m$. From this, the specialized goal: msgs_out(($[\overline{m}] \triangleright \cdot ct$? data($rcvd + 1, \overline{m}$) $\cdot tr$)[^] tr) = msgs_out(tr) $\dotplus m$

can be proved from (22). ii) When

$$(\forall fm. fm \in \text{queue}(\mathsf{ct}, tr) \Rightarrow \\ (\forall m. fm \neq \boxed{\mathsf{data}(rcvd+1, m)})) \quad (23)$$

which means the message is not in ct. We are going to show that the event ct! data(rcvd + 1, m) will eventually happen, which sends the message numbered rcvd + 1 over channel ct. Therefore, by the same argument as Case 1(a)i, the goal can be proved. The rules capable of generating this event are sd_send and sd_send_init. Depending on the value of maxn(msg_no_acked(tr)), there are two sub-cases:

A) When maxn(msg_no_acked(tr)) = ackd, from Lemma 1.3, it can be derived that $ackd \leq rcvd$. Therefore, we have

$$ackd < rcvd + 1$$
 (24)

Now, the event ct! data(rcvd + 1, m) can be generated by applying sd_send to (24) and (20).

- B) When maxn(msg_no_acked(tr)) = \perp , by applying sd_send_init to this and (20), the event ct! data(rcvd + 1, m) is generated.
- b) When $|msgs_out(tr)| \leq r\overline{cvd}$, since rcvd is the largest continuous sequence number observed by the Receiver, all messages less or equal to rcvd have already received by the Receiver. Therefore, we have:

$$\exists \overline{m}. \operatorname{msgs_rcvd}(tr)(|\operatorname{msgs_out}(tr)|) = \overline{m} \quad (25)$$

which makes the rule **rv_out** applicable. The goal can be proved easily.

- When mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = ⊥, which means there is no largest continuous sequence number in all the frames observed by the Receiver. Therefore, it can be deduced that the message with sequence number 0 has not been observed by the Receiver. From Lemma 1.4, it can be deduced that |msgs_out(tr)| = 0. Therefore, a frame data(0, m) must arrive for the Receiver to deliver the next message.
 - a) When data(0, m) is already in ct, a similar argument to Case 1(a)i can be used to prove the goal.
 - b) When $data(0, \overline{m})$ is not in ct. By applying Lemma 1.3 to the fact that

$$mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = \bot$$

it can be deduced that:

$$\max(\operatorname{msg_no_acked}(tr)) = \bot \qquad (26)$$

By a similar argument to (20), we have:

$$\exists \overline{m} . \text{ msgs_in}(tr)[0] = \overline{m}$$
 (27)

By applying sd_send_init to (26) and (27), the event ct! data(0,m) is generated. After the occurrence of this event, a similar argument to Case 1(a)i can be used to prove the goal.

This ends the proof of Lemma 8.1.

IX. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION

Similar approach has been used by Paulson to verify security protocols [17], [18]. Our work differs from Paulson's in the following sense:

- In section II, a formal notion of concurrent systems and their parallel composition is proposed, which is not present in Paulson's work. We believe, this makes the conception much more clearer.
- While Paulson's approach mainly deals security protocols, our approach is proposed as a general approach for protocol verification. To serve this purpose, a method to

specify and treat liveness is proposed in this paper, which is absent in Paulson's work as well.

As summarized in [19], a lot of experiments have been carried out in Focus, which, similar to our approach, is based on event traces and standard mathematics notation as well. However, the Focus allows infinite event traces, which is treated using denotational approach. The work in this paper shows that: the additional complexity of infinite traces is not strictly necessary.

In [20], Yodaiken proposed using basic mathematical languages directly. Our approach is much of the same spirit as theirs, but with more stress on mechanical support. Additionally, the notion of 'Specification by Observation' in this paper is absent in [20].

Gimenez [21] verified Alternate Bit Protocol using Coq co-inductive type, Bezem and Groote [22] verified the same protocol using an axiomatic approach. Both these two work are done using Coq, and both are using language embedding of process algebras. Therefore, despite the fact that we are using the same proof assistant as theirs, our approach is quite different from theirs.

X. CONCLUSION

This paper proposes a approach of protocol verification in type theoretical proof assistant Coq. We believe that this approach is applicable to other type theory based proof assistants as well. A simplified version of sliding window protocol is used as an illustrating example. It shows that both safeness and liveness can be formalized and reasoned about by using *only* finite traces. Such a simplified notion of trace leads to efficient reasoning, so that the overall verification of a nontrivial protocol can be carried out within reasonable cost. The approach of 'specification by observation' is used so that many cases can be proved automatically by using the computational mechanism intrinsic to type theory.

APPENDIX

A. Auxiliary Definitions

1) Exceptional Set: For A: Set, exceptional set $\mathcal{M}(A)$ is defined as:

$$\frac{A : \text{Set}}{\perp : \mathcal{M}(A)} \text{ bottom_value}$$

$$\frac{A : \text{Set} \quad a : A}{\text{return}(a) : \mathcal{M}(A)} \text{ normal_value}$$
(28)

Intuitively, $\mathcal{M}(A)$ represents the type obtained from A by adding a special element \perp to represent undefined value. A normal element a of the original type A is represented as $\operatorname{return}(a)$ in exceptional set $\mathcal{M}(A)$. However, the return is usually omitted in the sequel, unless there is possibility of confusion.

For $el : \mathcal{M}(A)$, $f : A \to \mathcal{M}(B)$, the operation $el \succeq f$ is used to compute a value in $\mathcal{M}(B)$, which is defined as:

$$\begin{cases} \operatorname{return}(a) \succcurlyeq f \stackrel{\text{det}}{\Longrightarrow} f(a) \\ \bot \succcurlyeq f \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \bot \end{cases}$$
(29)

2) List: In the type theory of Coq, data types used in concrete reasoning usually reside in the universe Set. So, the assertion 'A is a data types' is written as A : Set.

For any data types type A: Set, another data types $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ is defined for the lists made of elements from A:

$$\frac{A: \text{Set}}{\langle \rangle : \llbracket A \rrbracket} \text{ nil-value}
\underline{A: \text{Set} \quad a: A \quad l: \llbracket A \rrbracket} \\
a \cdot l: \llbracket A \rrbracket \quad \text{cons_value}$$
(30)

Intuitively, $\langle \rangle$ is the empty list, and the operator \cdot is used to put a : A (an element of A) to the head of $l : \llbracket A \rrbracket$ (an element of $\llbracket A \rrbracket$).

The append operation $l_1 \cap l_2$ is defined as:

$$\begin{cases} \langle \rangle^{\widehat{}} l_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} l_2 \\ (a \cdot l_1)^{\widehat{}} l_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} a \cdot (l_1^{\widehat{}} l_2) \end{cases}$$
(31)

The operation l + a is used to append element a to the end of l:

$$l \dotplus a \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} l^{\widehat{}}(a \cdot \langle \rangle) \tag{32}$$

The operation |l| is used to compute the length of a list, which is defined as:

$$\begin{cases} |a \cdot l| \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} |l| + 1\\ |\langle\rangle| \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} 0 \end{cases}$$
(33)

The relation $i \in l$ means i is contained in list l, which is define as:

$$\begin{cases} \overline{i} \in (i \cdot l) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \overline{i} = i \lor (\overline{i} \in l) \\ \overline{i} \in \langle \rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \text{False} \end{cases}$$
(34)

The operation l[n] is used to select the *n*-th elements of *l*. It is defined as:

$$\begin{cases} a \cdot l[0] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} a \\ a \cdot l[n+1] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} l[n] \\ \langle \rangle[n] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \bot \end{cases}$$
(35)

3) Finite Mapping: Given any two type A and B, $A \rightarrow B$ is the type of finite mappings from A to B, which is defined as:

$$A \rightarrow B \stackrel{\text{der}}{\Longrightarrow} A \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(B)$$
 (36)

The empty mapping, which does not map anything, is written as ϵ , and is defined as:

$$\epsilon \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \lambda a : A. \perp \tag{37}$$

Intuitively, for finite map $\chi : A \rightarrow B$, a : A, b : B, the assertion $\chi(a) = b$ means: the mapping χ maps a to b.

The operation $\chi [b^a]$ is used to add a new map 'a to b' to χ , overriding the original maps for a in χ , it is formally defined as:

$$\begin{cases} \chi \left[b^{a} \right] \left(\overline{a} \right) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} b & \text{if } \overline{a} = a \\ \chi \left[b^{a} \right] \left(\overline{a} \right) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \chi \left(\overline{a} \right) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(38)

4) Largest Continuous Number: Suppose nl is a list of natural numbers, if n is the largest number in nl such that all natural numbers less or equal to n are also in nl, then n is called the 'largest continuous number' in nl. This concept is used in our construction of the sliding window protocol.

To define largest continuous number constructively, we first need to define the concept of continuous number, if n is in nl and all the natural numbers less or equal to n are also in nl, then n is a continuous number in nl. This conception is captured by $(|nl|)_{0...n}$, which is defined as:

$$\begin{cases} (nl)_{0...0} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} 0 \leq nl \\ (nl)_{0...(n+1)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} (n+1) \leq nl \land (nl)_{0...n} \end{cases}$$
(39)

The operation $(|nl\rangle)[\overline{nl}]$ is defined to compute the list of natural numbers in \overline{nl} which are continuous in nl:

$$\begin{cases} (nl)[n \cdot \overline{nl}] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} n \cdot (nl)[\overline{nl}] & \text{if } (nl)_{0...n} \\ (nl)[n \cdot \overline{nl}] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} (nl)[\overline{nl}] & \text{if } \neg (nl)_{0...n} \\ (nl)[\langle \rangle] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \langle \rangle \end{cases}$$
(40)

The operation maxn(nl) is defined to compute the largest natural number in nl:

$$\begin{cases} \max(n \cdot nl) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \\ \max(nl) \succcurlyeq \lambda \,\overline{n}. \, \text{if } n < \overline{n} \text{ then } \overline{n} \text{ else } n \\ \max(\langle \rangle) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \bot \end{cases}$$
(41)

With all these preliminary definitions, the largest continuous natural number in nl can be computed with mcat(nl), which is defined as:

$$\operatorname{mcat}(nl) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Longrightarrow} \operatorname{maxn}((|nl|)[nl])$$
 (42)

B. Lemmas used in the proof of Lemma 8.1

The following lemma is about searching for frame data(n,m) with sequence number n in a list of frames l. It shows that: there could be only two cases: either such a frame is found, or there is not such a frame in l at all.

Lemma 1.1:

$$\begin{split} \forall l : \llbracket Frm \rrbracket, n . \\ (\exists hd : \llbracket Frm \rrbracket, m : \mathsf{M}, tl : \llbracket Frm \rrbracket. \\ l &= (hd \dotplus \left[\mathsf{data}(n, m) \right])^{\uparrow} tl \land \\ (\forall fm. fm \in hd \Rightarrow fm \neq \left[\mathsf{data}(n, m) \right])) \lor \\ (\forall fm. fm \in l \Rightarrow (\forall m . fm \neq \left[\mathsf{data}(n, m) \right])) \end{split}$$

The list hd is the list of frames ahead of data(n, m), which contains no frames with sequence number n, tl is the list of frames behind data(n, m).

The following lemma shows that: if data(n,m) is in queue(ct, tr), there is a valid execution tr' extending tr, which delivers all frames ahead of data(n,m). Additionally, the extension does not change the values of msgs_out and msgs_in.

Lemma 1.2:

$$VT(SW, tr) \Rightarrow$$

$$queue(ct, tr) = (hd + data(n, m))^{r} tl) \Rightarrow$$

$$(\forall fm. fm \leq hd \Rightarrow fm \neq data(n, m)) \Rightarrow$$

$$\exists tr', nl.$$

$$VT(SW, tr'^{r} tr) \land$$

$$queue(ct, tr'^{r} tr) = data(n, m) \cdot tl \land$$

$$msg_no_rcvd(tr'^{r} tr) = nl \cdot msg_no_rcvd(tr) \land$$

$$\neg(n \leq nl) \land$$

$$msgs_out(tr'^{r} tr) = msgs_out(tr) \land$$

$$msgs_in(tr'^{r} tr) = msgs_in(tr)$$

The following lemma shows: if there exists a maximum acknowledged sequence number ackd at the Sender side, there must be a largest continuous received sequence number rcvd at the Receiver side. Additionally, we have $ackd \leq rcvd$. Lemma 1.3:

$$\mathsf{VT}(\mathsf{SW}, tr) \Rightarrow \max(\mathsf{msg_no_acked}(tr)) = ackd \Rightarrow \exists rcvd.$$

 $mcat(msg_no_rcvd(tr)) = rcvd \land ackd \le rcvd$

The following lemmas shows: if there is a largest continuous received sequence number rcvd at the Receiver side, the number of messages delivered by Receiver is less than or equal to rcvd + 1; Otherwise, the number of messages delivered by Receiver is 0.

Lemma 1.4:

V

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{T}(\mathsf{SW},tr) \Rightarrow \\ (\mathrm{mcat}(\mathrm{msg_no_rcvd}(tr)) = rcvd \Rightarrow \\ |\mathrm{msgs_out}(tr)| \leq rcvd + 1) \land \\ (\mathrm{mcat}(\mathrm{msg_no_rcvd}(tr)) = \bot \Rightarrow |\mathrm{msgs_out}(tr)| = 0) \end{aligned}$$

REFERENCES

- E. M. Clarke, E. A. Emerson, and A. P. Sistla, "Automatic verification of finite state concurrent systems using temporal logic specifications," Austin, Tech. Rep., 1985.
- [2] G. J. Holzmann, *Design and Validation of Computer Protocols*. Prentice Hall, 1990.
- [3] J. R. Burch, E. M. Clarke, K. L. McMillan, D. L. Dill, and L. J. Hwang, "Symbolic model checking: 10²⁰ states and beyond," *Information and Computation*, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 142–170, June 1992.
- [4] K. M. Chandy and J. Misra, Parallel Program Design : a Foundation. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1988.
- [5] A. U. Shankar and S. S. Lam, "A stepwise refinement heuristic for protocol construction," ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 417–461, July 1992.
- [6] M. Abadi and L. Lamport, "The existence of refinement mappings," DEC Research Center, Palo Alto, CA, Tech. Rep. 29, 1988. [Online]. Available: ftp://ftp.digital.com/pub/DEC/SRC/researchreports/SRC-029.pdf
- [7] —, "Composing Specifications," in Stepwise Refinement of Distributed Systems - Models, Formalisms, Correctness, ser. LNCS, J. W. de Bakker, W.-P. de Roever, and G. Rozenberg, Eds., vol. 430. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1989, pp. 1–41. [Online]. Available: ftp://ftp.digital.com/pub/DEC/SRC/research-reports/SRC-066.pdf
- [8] C. A. R. Hoare, Communicating Sequential Processes. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985.
- [9] R. Milner, Communication and Concurrency. Prentice-Hall, 1989.

- [10] N. Lynch and M. Tuttle, "An introduction to Input/Output automata," CWI-Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 219-246, 1989.
- [11] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli, The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concur-
- [11] Z. Mainia and A. Huen, *The Temporal Logic of Actions and Content rent Systems*. New York: Springer, 1992.
 [12] L. Lamport, "The Temporal Logic of Actions," Digital Equipment Corporation, Systems Research Centre, Tech. Rep. 79, Dec. 1991. [Online]. Available: ftp://ftp.digital.com/pub/DEC/SRC/researchreports/SRC-079.pdf
- [13] D. Harel, "Statecharts: a visual approach to complex systems," Science
- [14] G. Huet, G. Kahn, and C. Paulin-Mohring, "The Coq proof assistant, A tutorial, version 5.10," Inria, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, Technical Report RT-0178, 1995.
- [15] E. Gimenez, "A tutorial on recursive types in Coq," Inria, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, Technical Report RT-0221, 1998.
- [16] C. Cornes, J. Courant, J. Filliatre, G. Huet, P. Manoury, C. Munoz, C. Murthy, Christine, A. Saibi, and B. Werner, "The Coq proof assistant, reference manual, version 7.0," INRIA (Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique), Technical Report RT-0177, 2001.
- [17] L. Paulson, "Proving properties of security protocols by induction," in 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW '97). Washington - Brussels - Tokyo: IEEE, June 1997, pp. 70-83.
- [18] --, "Proving security protocols correct," in 14th Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS'99). Washington - Brussels - Tokyo: IEEE, July 1999, pp. 370-383.
- [19] M. Broy, M. Breitling, B. Schtz, and K. Spies, "Summary of case studies in Focus - Part II," Technische Univerität München, Tech. Rep. TUM-I9740, 1997. [Online]. Available: http://www4.informatik.tumuenchen.de/reports/TUM-I9740.html
- [20] V. Yodaiken and K. Ramamritham, "Verification of a reliable net protocol," in Symp. on Formal Techniques in Real-Time and Fault Tolerant Systems, 1992, pp. 194-215.
- [21] M. A. Bezem and J. F. Groote, "A formal verification of the alternating bit protocol in the calculus of constructions," Dept. of Philosophy, Utrecht University, Logic Group Preprint Series 88, Mar. 1993.
- [22] E. Giménez, "Co-inductive types in Coq: An experiment with the alternating bit protocol," Laboratoire de l'Informatique du Parallélisme, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, Research report RR 95-38, June 1995. [Online]. Available: ftp://ftp.enslyon.fr/pub/LIP/Rapports/RR/RR95/RR95-38.ps.Z