EFFICIENT NONINTERACTIVE PROOF SYSTEMS FOR BILINEAR GROUPS∗

JENS GROTH† AND AMIT SAHAI‡

Abstract. Noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs and noninteractive witness-indistinguishable proofs have played a significant role in the theory of cryptography. However, lack of efficiency has prevented them from being used in practice. One of the roots of this inefficiency is that noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs have been constructed for general NP-complete languages such as Circuit Satisfiability, causing an expensive blowup in the size of the statement when reducing it to a circuit. The contribution of this paper is a general methodology for constructing very simple and efficient noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs and noninteractive witness-indistinguishable proofs that work directly for a wide class of languages that are relevant in practice (namely, ones involving the satisfiability of equations over bilinear groups), without needing a reduction to Circuit Satisfiability. Groups with bilinear maps have enjoyed tremendous success in the field of cryptography in recent years and have been used to construct a plethora of protocols. This paper provides noninteractive witness-indistinguishable proofs and noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs that can be used in connection with these protocols. Our goal is to spread the use of noninteractive cryptographic proofs from mainly theoretical purposes to the large class of practical cryptographic protocols based on bilinear groups.

Key words. noninteractive witness-indistinguishability, noninteractive zero-knowledge, common reference string, bilinear groups

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1. Introduction. Noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs and noninteractive witness-indistinguishable proofs have played a significant role in the theory of cryptography. However, lack of efficiency has prevented them from being used in practice. Our goal is to construct efficient and practical noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs and noninteractive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs.

Blum, Feldman, and Micali [3] introduced NIZK proofs. Their paper and subsequent works, e.g., [18, 15, 29, 16], demonstrate that NIZK proofs exist for all of

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NP. Unfortunately, these NIZK proofs are all very inefficient. Although they have led to interesting theoretical results, such as the construction of public-key encryption secure against chosen ciphertext attack by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [17], they have not been used in practice.

Since we want to construct NIZK proofs that can be used in practice, it is worthwhile to identify the roots of the inefficiency in the above-mentioned NIZK proofs. One drawback is that they were designed with a general NP-complete language in mind, e.g., Circuit Satisfiability. In practice, we want to prove statements such as “the ciphertext $c$ encrypts a signature on the message $m$” or “the three commitments $c_a, c_b, c_c$ contain messages $a, b, c$ such that $c = ab$.” An NP-reduction of even very simple statements like these gives us big circuits containing thousands of gates, and the corresponding NIZK proofs become very large.

While we want to avoid an expensive NP-reduction, it is still desirable to have a general way to express statements that arise in practice instead of having to construct noninteractive proofs on an ad hoc basis. A useful observation in this context is that many public-key cryptography protocols are based on finite abelian groups. If we can capture statements that express relations between group elements, then we can express statements that come up in practice such as “the commitments $c_a, c_b, c_c$ contain messages such that $c = ab$” or “the plaintext of $c$ is a signature on $m$,” as long as those commitment, encryption, and signature schemes work over the same finite group. We will therefore construct NIZI and NIZK proofs for group-dependent languages.

The next issue to address is where to find suitable group-dependent languages. We will look at statements related to groups with a bilinear map, which have become widely used in the design of cryptographic protocols. Not only have bilinear groups been used to give new constructions of such cryptographic staples as public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key agreement (see [31] and the references therein), but bilinear groups have enabled the first constructions to achieve goals that had never been attained before. The most notable of these is the identity-based encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin [9] (see also [6, 5, 33]), and there are many others, such as attribute-based encryption [32, 22], searchable public-key encryption [8, 11, 12], and one-time double-homomorphic encryption [10]. For an incomplete list of papers (currently more than 200) on the application of bilinear groups in cryptography, see [1].

1.1. Our contribution. For completeness, let us recap the definition of a bilinear group. Please note that for notational convenience we will follow the tradition of mathematics and use additive notation for the binary operations in $G_1$ and $G_2$. We have a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm $G$ that takes a security parameter as input and outputs $(n, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, P_1, P_2)$. In some cases, $G_1 = G_2$ and $P_1 = P_2$, in which case we write $(n, G, G_T, e, P)$.

- $G_1, G_2, G_T$ are descriptions of cyclic groups of order $n$.
- The elements $P_1$ and $P_2$ generate $G_1$ and $G_2$, respectively.
- $e : G_1 \times G_2$ is a nondegenerate bilinear map such that $e(P_1, P_2)$ generates $G_T$ and for all $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ we have $e(aP_1, bP_2) = e(P_1, P_2)^{ab}$.

\footnote{We remark that in the cryptographic literature it is more common to use multiplicative notation for these groups, since the “discrete log problem” is believed to be hard in these groups, which is also important to us. In our setting, however, it will be much more convenient to use multiplicative notation to refer to the action of the bilinear map.}
We can efficiently compute group operations, compute the bilinear map, and decide membership.

In this work, we develop a general set of highly efficient techniques for proving statements involving bilinear groups. The generality of our work extends in two directions. First, we formulate our constructions in terms of modules over commutative rings with an associated bilinear map. This framework captures all known bilinear groups with cryptographic significance—for both supersingular and ordinary elliptic curves, for groups of both prime and composite order. Second, we consider all mathematical operations that can take place in the context of a bilinear group: addition in $G_1$ and $G_2$, scalar point–multiplication, addition or multiplication of scalars, and use of the bilinear map. We also allow both group elements and scalars to be “unknowns” in the statements to be proved.

Since we cover all operations over the bilinear group, we can prove any statement formulated in terms of the operations associated with the bilinear group. With our level of generality, it would, for example, be easy to write a short statement, using the operations above, that encodes “$c$ is an encryption of the value committed to in $d$ under the product of the two keys committed to in $a$ and $b$,” where the encryptions and commitments being referred to are existing cryptographic constructions based on bilinear groups. Logical operations like AND and OR are also easy to encode into our framework using standard techniques in arithmetization.

The proof systems we build are noninteractive. This allows them to be used in contexts where interaction is undesirable or impossible. We first build highly efficient witness-indistinguishable proof systems, which are of independent interest. We then show how to, under certain conditions, transform these into zero-knowledge proof systems. We also provide a detailed examination of the efficiency of our constructions in various settings (depending on what type of bilinear group and cryptographic assumption is used).

The security of constructions arising from our framework can be based on any of a variety of computational assumptions about bilinear groups (three of which we discuss in detail here).

**Informal statement of our results.** We consider equations over variables from $G_1, G_2,$ and $\mathbb{Z}_n$ as described in Figure 1. Then we construct efficient witness-indistinguishable proofs for the simultaneous satisfiability of a set of such equations. The witness-indistinguishable proofs have perfect completeness, and there are two computationally indistinguishable types of common reference strings giving, respectively, perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability. We refer to section 2 for precise definitions.

We also consider the question of NIZK. We show that we can give zero-knowledge proofs for multiscalar multiplication in $G_1$ or $G_2$ and for quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_n$. We can also give zero-knowledge proofs for pairing product equations with $t_T = 1$. When $t_T \neq 1$ we can still give zero-knowledge proofs if we can find $P_1, Q_1, \ldots, P_n, Q_n$ such that $t_T = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(P_i, Q_i)$.

In sections 1–7, we give a general description of our techniques. In sections 8, 9, and 10 we then offer three concrete instantiations that illustrate the use of our techniques. They are based on, respectively, the subgroup decision assumption [10], the assumption that the decision Diffie–Hellman problem is hard in both $G_1$ and $G_2$, also known as the symmetric external Diffie–Hellman assumption (SXDH), and the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption [7]. We note that there are many other possible instantiations. The instantiations illustrate the variety of ways in which bilinear groups can be constructed. We can choose prime order groups or composite order
Variables: \(a\)
\[X_1, \ldots, X_m \in G_1, \ Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \in G_2, \ x_1, \ldots, x_m', y_1, \ldots, y_n' \in \mathbb{Z}_n.\]

Pairing product equation:
\[\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(A_i, Y_i) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{m} e(X_i, B_i) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(X_i, Y_j)^{\gamma_{ij}} = t_T\]
for constants \(A_i \in G_1, \ B_i \in G_2, \ t_T \in G_T, \ \gamma_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}_n.\)

Multiscalar multiplication equation in \(G_1: \)
\[\sum_{i=1}^{n'} y_i A_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i X_i + \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} y_j X_i = T_1\]
for constants \(A_i, T_1 \in G_1\) and \(b_i, \gamma_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}_n.\)

Multiscalar multiplication equation in \(G_2: \)
\[\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i Y_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m'} x_i B_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m'} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} x_i Y_j = T_2\]
for constants \(B_i, T_2 \in G_2\) and \(a_i, \gamma_{ij} \in \mathbb{Z}_n.\)

Quadratic equation in \(\mathbb{Z}_n: \)
\[\sum_{i=1}^{n'} a_i y_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m'} x_i b_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m'} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} x_i y_j \equiv t \mod n\]
for constants \(a_i, b_i, \gamma_{ij}, t \in \mathbb{Z}_n.\)

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Fig. 1. Equations over groups with bilinear map.

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groups, we can have \(G_1 = G_2\) and \(G_1 \neq G_2\), and we can make various cryptographic assumptions. All three security assumptions have been used in the cryptographic literature to build interesting protocols.

For all three instantiations, the techniques presented here yield efficient witness-indistinguishable proofs. In particular, the cost in proof size of each extra equation is constant and independent of the number of variables in the equation. The size of the proofs can be computed by adding the cost, measured in group elements from \(G_1\) or \(G_2\), of each variable and each equation listed in Table 1. We refer the reader to sections 8, 9, and 10 for more detailed tables. The tables should be read with care because the size of the group elements depends on the type of bilinear group [19]. We expect the SXDH-based instantiation to yield the smallest proofs when taking the size of group elements into account.
1.2. Related work. As we mentioned before, early work on NIZK proofs demonstrated that all NP-languages have noninteractive proofs, but did not yield efficient proofs. One cause for these proofs being inefficient in practice was the need for an expensive NP-reduction to, e.g., Circuit Satisfiability. Another cause of inefficiency was the reliance on the so-called hidden bits model, which even for small circuits is inefficient.

Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [28, 27] investigated NIZK proofs for Circuit Satisfiability using bilinear groups. This addressed the second cause of inefficiency since their techniques give efficient proofs for Circuit Satisfiability, but to use their proofs one must still make an NP-reduction to Circuit Satisfiability. We stress that while [28, 27] used bilinear groups, their application was to build proof systems for Circuit Satisfiability. Here, we devise entirely new techniques to deal with general statements about equations in bilinear groups, without having to reduce to an NP-complete language.

Addressing the issue of avoiding an expensive NP-reduction, we have works by Boyen and Waters [12, 13] that suggest efficient NIWI proofs for statements related to group signatures. These proofs are based on bilinear groups of composite order and rely on the subgroup decision assumption.

Groth [24] was the first to suggest a general group-dependent language and NIZK proofs for statements in this language. He investigated satisfiability of pairing product equations and allowed only group elements to be variables. He looked at the special case of prime order groups $G, G_T$ with a bilinear map $e : G \times G \to G_T$ and, based on the DLIN assumption [7], constructed NIZK proofs for such pairing product equations. However, even for very small statements, the very different and much more complicated techniques of Groth yield proofs consisting of thousands of group elements (whereas ours would be in the tens). Our techniques are much easier to understand, significantly more general, and vastly more efficient.

We summarize our comparison with other works on NIZK proofs in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of NIZK proofs according to usefulness.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circuit Satisfiability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Kilian and Petrank [29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [28, 27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-dependent language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groth [24] (restricted case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that there have been many earlier works (starting with [21]) dealing with efficient interactive zero-knowledge protocols for a number of algebraic relations. Here, we focus on noninteractive proofs. We also note that even for interactive zero-knowledge proofs, no set of techniques was known for dealing with general algebraic assertions arising in bilinear groups, as we do here.
1.3. New techniques. The authors of [28, 27, 24] start by constructing noninteractive proofs for simple statements and then combine many of them to get more powerful proofs. The main building block in [28], for instance, is a proof that a given commitment contains either 0 or 1, which has little expressive power on its own. Our approach is the opposite: we directly construct proofs for very expressive languages; as such, our techniques are very different from those of previous work.

The way we achieve our generality is by viewing the groups $G_1, G_2, G_T$ as modules over the ring $\mathbb{Z}_n$. The ring $\mathbb{Z}_n$ itself can also be viewed as a $\mathbb{Z}_n$-module. We therefore look at the more general question of satisfiability of quadratic equations over $\mathbb{Z}_n$-modules $A_1, A_2, A_T$ with a bilinear map; see section 3 for details. Since many bilinear groups with various cryptographic assumptions and various mathematical properties can be viewed as modules, we are not bound to any particular bilinear group or any particular assumption.

Given modules $A_1, A_2, A_T$ with a bilinear map, we construct new modules $B_1, B_2, B_T$, also equipped with a bilinear map, and we map the elements in $A_1, A_2, A_T$ to $B_1, B_2, B_T$. The latter modules will typically be larger thereby giving us room to hide the elements of $A_1, A_2, A_T$. More precisely, we devise commitment schemes that map variables from $A_1, A_2$ to the modules $B_1, B_2$. The commitment schemes are homomorphic both with respect to the module operations and also with respect to the bilinear map.

Our techniques for constructing witness-indistinguishable proofs are fairly involved mathematically, but we will try to present some high level intuition here. (We give more detailed intuition later in section 6, where we present our main proof system.) The main idea is the following: because our commitment schemes are homomorphic and we equip them with a bilinear map, we can take the equation that we are trying to prove and just replace the variables in the equation with commitments to those variables. Of course, because the commitment schemes are hiding, the equations will no longer be valid. Intuitively, however, we can extract the additional terms introduced by the randomness of the commitments: if we give away these terms in the proof, then this would be a convincing proof of the equation’s validity (again, because of the homomorphic properties). But giving away these terms might destroy witness-indistinguishability. Suppose, however, that there is only one “additional term” introduced by substituting the commitments. Then, because it would be the unique value which makes the equation true, giving it away would preserve witness-indistinguishability! In general, we are not so lucky. But if there are many terms, the nice algebraic environment allows us to randomize the terms such that their distribution is uniform over all possible terms satisfying the equation. We now get witness-indistinguishability because all possible witnesses after randomization yield the same uniform distribution of terms satisfying the equation.

1.4. Applications. Independently of our work, Boyen and Waters [13] have constructed noninteractive proofs that they use for group signatures (see also their earlier paper [12]). These proofs can be seen as examples of the NIWI proofs in the first instantiation based on the subgroup decision problem.

Subsequent to the announcement of our work, several papers have built upon it: Chandran, Groth, and Sahai [14] have constructed ring-signatures of sublinear size using the NIWI proofs in the first instantiation, which is based on the subgroup decision problem. Groth and Lu [26] have used the NIWI and NIZK proofs from the third instantiation to construct an NIZK proof for the correctness of a shuffle. Groth [25] has used the NIWI and NIZK proofs from the third instantiation to construct a
fully anonymous group signature scheme. Belenkiy, Chase, Kohlweiss, and Lysyanskaya [2] have used the second and third instantiations to construct noninteractive anonymous credentials. Green and Hohenberger [23] have used the third instantiation in a universally composable adaptive oblivious transfer protocol. Also, by attaching NIZK proofs to semantically secure public-key encryption in any instantiation, we get an efficient noninteractive verifiable cryptosystem. Boneh [4] has suggested using this for optimistic fair exchange [30], where two parties use a trusted but lazy third party to guarantee fairness.

1.5. Roadmap. The main result is the NIWI proof that can be found in section 7. Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 explain the structure of the NIWI proof, which goes through modules, commitments, a description of the common reference string (CRS), and an explanation of how the NIWI proof works. For a concrete illustration of the steps, we refer the reader to the instantiation in section 8. Other instantiations are given in sections 9 and 10. In many cases, our NIWI proofs can also be used as NIZK proofs, which we discuss in section 11.


Notation. We write $y = A(x;r)$ when the algorithm $A$, on input $x$ and randomness $r$, outputs $y$. We write $y \leftarrow A(x)$ for the process of picking randomness $r$ uniformly at random and setting $y = A(x;r)$. More generally, we write $y \leftarrow S$ for sampling $y$ from the set $S$ according to some probability distribution on $S$, using the uniform distribution as the default when nothing else is specified.

We write $a \leftarrow A; b \leftarrow B(a); \ldots$ for running the experiment where $a$ is chosen from $A$, then $b$ is chosen from $B$, which may depend on $a$, etc. This yields a probability distribution over the outputs, and we write $\Pr[a \leftarrow A; b \leftarrow B(a); \ldots : C(a, b, \ldots)]$ for the probability of the condition $C(a, b, \ldots)$ being satisfied after running the experiment.

The security of our schemes is governed by a security parameter $k$, which can be used to scale up the security. Given two functions $f, g : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, we write $f(k) \approx g(k)$ when $|f(k) - g(k)| = O(k^{-c})$ for every constant $c$. We say that $f$ is negligible when $f(k) \approx 0$ and that it is overwhelming when $f(k) \approx 1$. We say that two families of probability distributions $\{S_1(k)\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}, \{S_2(k)\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ are indistinguishable when they are the same for all sufficiently large $k \in \mathbb{N}$, and we say they are computationally indistinguishable if for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have

$$\Pr[y \leftarrow S_1(k) : \mathcal{A}(1^k, y) = 1] \approx \Pr[y \leftarrow S_2(k) : \mathcal{A}(1^k, y) = 1].$$

Group dependent languages. Let $R$ be an efficiently computable ternary relation. For triplets $(gk, x, w) \in R$ we call $gk$ the setup, $x$ the statement, and $w$ the witness. Given some $gk$, we let $L$ be the language consisting of statements $x$ that have a witness $w$ so $(gk, x, w) \in R$. For a relation that ignores $gk$ this is, of course, the standard definition of an NP-language. We will be more interested in the case where $gk$ describes a bilinear group, though.

Noninteractive proofs. A noninteractive proof system for a relation $R$ with setup consists of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms: a setup algorithm $\mathcal{G}$, a CRS generation algorithm $K$, a prover $P$, and a verifier $V$. The setup algorithm outputs a setup $(gk, sk)$. In our paper, $gk$ will be a description of a bilinear group. The setup algorithm may output some related information $sk$, for instance, the factorization of the group order. A cleaner case, however, is when $sk$ is just the empty string, meaning the protocol is built on top of the group without knowledge of any trapdoors. The CRS generation algorithm takes $(gk, sk)$ as input and produces a CRS $\sigma$. The
prover takes as input \((gk, \sigma, x, w)\) and produces a proof \(\pi\). The verifier takes as input \((gk, \sigma, x, \pi)\) and outputs 1 if the proof is acceptable and 0 if rejecting the proof. We call \((G, K, P, V)\) a noninteractive proof system for \(R\) with setup \(G\) if it has the completeness and soundness properties described below.

**Perfect completeness.** A noninteractive proof is complete if an honest prover can convince an honest verifier whenever the statement belongs to the language and the prover holds a witness testifying to this fact.

**Definition 1 (perfect completeness).** We say \((G, K, P, V)\) is perfectly complete if for all adversaries \(A\) we have

\[
\Pr \left[ \left( gk, sk \right) \leftrightarrow G(1^k); \sigma \leftrightarrow K(gk, sk); (x, w) \leftrightarrow A(gk, \sigma); \pi \leftrightarrow P(gk, \sigma, x, w) : V(gk, \sigma, x, \pi) = 1 \right] = 1.
\]

**Perfect soundness.** A noninteractive proof is sound if it is impossible to prove a false statement.

**Definition 2 (perfect soundness).** We say \((G, K, P, V)\) is perfectly sound if for all adversaries \(A\) we have

\[
\Pr \left[ \left( gk, sk \right) \leftrightarrow G(1^k); \sigma \leftrightarrow K(gk, sk); (x, \pi) \leftrightarrow A(gk, \sigma) : V(gk, \sigma, x, \pi) = 0 \right] = 1.
\]

**Perfect culpable soundness.** In the standard definition of soundness given above, the adversary tries to create a valid proof for \(x \in \overline{L}\). Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [28, 24] generalized the notion of soundness to disallowing false proofs of statements \(x \in L_{\text{guilt}}\), where \(L_{\text{guilt}}\) is a language that may depend on \(gk\) and \(\sigma\). They call this notion culpable soundness. Standard soundness is a special case with \(L_{\text{guilt}} = \overline{L}\), but the notion can be used to capture other interesting cases as well. The instantiation in section 8 uses groups of composite order \(n = pq\) and offers an example where culpable soundness captures the inability of the adversary to produce convincing proofs for statements that are false in the order \(p\) subgroups of \(G\) and \(G_T\) (here \(L_{\text{guilt}} \subseteq \overline{L}\) is the language of statements that are false in the order \(p\) subgroups).

**Definition 3 (perfect culpable soundness).** We say \((G, K, P, V)\) has perfect \(L_{\text{guilt}}\)-soundness if for all adversaries \(A\) we have

\[
\Pr \left[ \left( gk, sk \right) \leftrightarrow G(1^k); \sigma \leftrightarrow K(gk, sk); (x, \pi) \leftrightarrow A(gk, \sigma) : V(gk, \sigma, x, \pi) = 0 \right] = 1.
\]

**Composable witness-indistinguishability.** A statement may have many possible witnesses. A noninteractive proof is witness-indistinguishable if the proof does not reveal which of those witnesses the prover has used. The standard definition of witness-indistinguishability requires that proofs using different witnesses for the same statement are computationally indistinguishable. We will use a stronger definition of witness-indistinguishability called composable witness-indistinguishability. In this

\footnote{Since the probability is exactly 1, the definition quantifies over all \(gk\) in the support of \(G\) and all \((gk, x, w) \in R\).}

\footnote{In an earlier version of their paper, Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [28] used the term cosoundness instead of culpable soundness.}
definition there is a reference string simulator $S$ that generates a simulated CRS, and we require that the adversary cannot distinguish a real CRS from a simulated CRS. We also require that on a simulated CRS there is no information whatsoever to distinguish the different witnesses that might have been used to construct the proof. The advantage of this definition is that different types of proofs using the same type of real/simulated CRS can share the same CRS, which facilitates easier security proofs. We will use this composability property in the instantiations in sections 8, 9, and 10.

Definition 4 (composable witness-indistinguishability). We say $(\mathcal{G}, K, P, V)$ is composable witness-indistinguishable if there is a probabilistic polynomial time simulator $S$ such that for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries $A$ we have

$$\Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); \sigma \leftarrow K(gk, sk) : A(gk, \sigma) = 1 \right] \approx \Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); \sigma \leftarrow S(gk, sk) : A(gk, \sigma) = 1 \right],$$

and for all adversaries $A$ we have

$$\Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); \sigma \leftarrow S(gk, sk); (x, w_0, w_1) \leftarrow A(gk, \sigma); \pi \leftarrow P(gk, \sigma, x, w_0) : A(\pi) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); \sigma \leftarrow S(gk, sk); (x, w_0, w_1) \leftarrow A(gk, \sigma); \pi \leftarrow P(gk, \sigma, x, w_1) : A(\pi) = 1 \right],$$

where we require $(gk, x, w_0), (gk, x, w_1) \in R$.

Composable zero-knowledge. A zero-knowledge proof is a proof that shows that the statement is true, but does not reveal anything else. Traditionally, this is defined by having a simulator $(S_1, S_2)$ that can simulate, respectively, the CRS and the proof. The first part of the simulator outputs a simulated CRS and a simulation trapdoor $\tau$, and the second part of the simulator uses the simulation trapdoor to simulate proofs for statements without knowing the corresponding witnesses. The standard definition of (multithorem) zero-knowledge then says that real proofs on a real CRS should be computationally indistinguishable from simulated proofs on a simulated CRS.

We obtain a strong notion of zero-knowledge, called composable zero-knowledge [24]. Composable zero-knowledge implies standard zero-knowledge [24] and has the advantage that it is simpler to work with, since it separates the computational indistinguishability into two separate parts addressing, respectively, the CRS and the proofs. In composable zero-knowledge, the real CRS and the simulated CRS are computationally indistinguishable. Moreover, the adversary, even when it gets access to the secret simulation key $\tau$, cannot distinguish real proofs from simulated proofs on a simulated CRS.

Definition 5 (composable zero-knowledge). We say $(\mathcal{G}, K, P, V)$ is composable zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator $(S_1, S_2)$ such that for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries $A$ we have

$$\Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); \sigma \leftarrow K(gk, sk) : A(gk, \sigma) = 1 \right] \approx \Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k); (\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(gk, sk) : A(gk, \sigma) = 1 \right].$$
and for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ we have
\[
\Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow G(1^k); (\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(gk, sk); (x, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, \sigma, \tau); \pi \leftarrow P(gk, \sigma, x, w) : \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[ (gk, sk) \leftarrow G(1^k); (\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(gk, sk); (x, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(gk, \sigma, \tau); \pi \leftarrow S_2(gk, \sigma, x) : \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \right],
\]
where $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $(x, w)$ so $(gk, x, w) \in R$.

3. Modules with bilinear maps. Let $(\mathcal{R}, +, 0, 1)$ be a finite commutative ring. Recall that an $\mathcal{R}$-module $A$ is an abelian group $(A, +, 0)$ where the ring acts on the group such that
\[
\forall r, s \in \mathcal{R}, \forall x, y \in A : (r + s)x = rx + sx \wedge r(x + y) = rx + ry \wedge r(sx) = (rs)x \wedge 1x = x.
\]

A cyclic group $G$ of order $n$ can in a natural way be viewed as a $\mathbb{Z}_n$-module. We will observe that all the equations in Figure 1 can be viewed as equations over $\mathbb{Z}_n$-modules with a bilinear map. To generalize completely, let $\mathcal{R}$ be a finite commutative ring and let $A_1, A_2, A_T$ be finite $\mathcal{R}$-modules with a bilinear map $f : A_1 \times A_2 \rightarrow A_T$. We will consider quadratic equations over variables $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in A_1, y_1, \ldots, y_n \in A_2$ of the form
\[
\sum_{j=1}^n f(a_j, y_j) + \sum_{i=1}^m f(x_i, b_i) + \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \gamma_{ij} f(x_i, y_j) = t.
\]

In order to simplify notation, let us for $x_1, \ldots, x_n \in A_1, y_1, \ldots, y_n \in A_2$ define
\[
x \cdot y = \sum_{i=1}^n f(x_i, y_i).
\]

The equations can now be written as
\[
\tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{y} + \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{b} + \tilde{x} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{y} = t,
\]
where $\tilde{a} \in A_1^n, \tilde{b} \in A_2^n, \Gamma \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(\mathcal{R})$. We note for future use that due to the bilinear properties of $f$, we have for any matrix $\Gamma \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(\mathcal{R})$ and for any $\tilde{x} \in A_1^n, \tilde{y} \in A_2^n$ that $\tilde{x} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{y} = \Gamma^\top \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{y}$.

Let us now return to the equations in Figure 1 and see how they can be recast as quadratic equations over $\mathbb{Z}_n$-modules with a bilinear map.

**Pairing product equations:** Define $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_1 = G_1, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_T, f(x, y) = e(x, y)$ and rewrite the pairing product equation as $(\tilde{A} \cdot \tilde{Y})(\tilde{X} \cdot \tilde{B})(\tilde{X}^\top \cdot \Gamma \tilde{Y}) = t_T$.

**Multiscalar multiplication in $G_1$:** Define $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_1 = G_1, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_T = G_1, f(X, Y) = yX$ and rewrite the multiscalar multiplication equation as $\tilde{A} \cdot \tilde{Y} + \tilde{X} \cdot \tilde{B} + \tilde{X} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{Y} = \mathcal{T}_1$.

**Multiscalar multiplication in $G_2$:** Define $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_2, f(x, Y) = xY$ and rewrite the multiscalar multiplication equation as $\tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{Y} + \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{B} + \tilde{x} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{Y} = \mathcal{T}_2$.

---

*We use multiplicative notation here because usually $G_T$ is written multiplicatively in the literature. When we work with the abstract modules, however, we will use additive notation.*
Quadratic equation in $\mathbb{Z}_n$: Define $R = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_n, AT = \mathbb{Z}_n, f(x,y) = xy \mod n$ and rewrite the quadratic equation in $\mathbb{Z}_n$ as $\bar{a} \cdot \bar{g} + \bar{x} \cdot \bar{b} + \bar{x} \cdot \Gamma \bar{y} \equiv t \mod n$.

We will therefore first focus on the more general problem of constructing noninteractive composable witness-indistinguishable proofs for satisfiability of quadratic equations over $R$-modules $A_1, A_2, AT$ (using additive notation for all modules) with a bilinear map $f$.

4. Commitment from modules. In our NIWI and NIZK proofs we will commit to the variables $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in A_1$, $y_1, \ldots, y_n \in A_2$. We do this by mapping them into other $R$-modules $B_1, B_2$ and making the commitments in those modules.

Let us for now just consider how to commit to elements from one $R$-module $A$. The public key for the commitment scheme will describe another $R$-module $B$ and $R$-linear maps $\iota : A \rightarrow B$ and $p : B \rightarrow A$. Operations in the module and computation of the map $\iota$ will be efficiently computable, but $p$ is hard to compute.\(^5\) The public key will also contain elements $u_1, \ldots, u_{\hat{m}} \in B$. To commit to $x \in A$ we pick $r_1, \ldots, r_{\hat{m}} \leftarrow R$ at random and compute the commitment

$$c := \iota(x) + \sum_{i=1}^{\hat{m}} r_i u_i.$$ 

Our commitment scheme will have two types of commitment keys.

**Binding key:** A binding key defines $(B, \iota, p, u_1, \ldots, u_{\hat{m}})$, where $\forall i : p(u_i) = 0$ and $p \circ \iota$ is nontrivial. The commitment $c := \iota(x) + \sum_{i=1}^{\hat{m}} r_i u_i$ therefore contains the nontrivial information $p(c) = p(\iota(x))$ about $x$. In particular, if $p \circ \iota$ is the identity map on $A$, then the commitment is perfectly binding to $x$.

**Hiding key:** A hiding key defines $(B, \iota, p, u_1, \ldots, u_{\hat{m}})$, where $\iota(A) \subseteq \langle u_1, \ldots, u_{\hat{m}} \rangle$.

The commitment $c := \iota(x) + \sum_{i=1}^{\hat{m}} r_i u_i$ therefore perfectly hides the element $x$ when $r_1, \ldots, r_{\hat{m}}$ are chosen at random from $R$.

**Computational indistinguishability:** The main security requirement that we need in the paper is that the distribution of binding keys and the distribution of hiding keys are computationally indistinguishable. Witness-indistinguishability of our NIWI proofs and later the zero-knowledge property of our NIZK proofs will rely on this.

The treatment of commitments using the language of modules generalizes several previous works dealing with commitments over bilinear groups, including \cite{10, 28, 27, 24, 34}.

Since we will often be committing to many elements at a time, let us define some convenient notation. Given elements $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in A$, we will write $\vec{c} := \iota(\vec{x}) + R \vec{u}$ with $R \in \text{Mat}_{m \times \hat{m}}(R)$ for making commitments $c_1, \ldots, c_m$ computed as $c_i := \iota(x_i) + \sum_{j=1}^{\hat{m}} r_{ij} u_j$.

5. Setup. In our NIWI and NIZK proofs the setup and the CRS are

$gk$ defining $(R, A_1, A_2, AT, f)$,

$\sigma$ together with $gk$ defining $(B_1, B_2, BT, F, t_1, t_2, p_1, p_2, pt, \vec{u}, \vec{v}, H_1, \ldots, H_\eta)$.

\(^5\)There are scenarios where a secret key will make $p$ efficiently computable and $p \circ \iota$ is the identity map. In this case the commitment scheme is a public key encryption scheme with $p$ being the decryption operation.
\[ A_1 \times A_2 \xrightarrow{f} A_T \]
\[ B_1 \times B_2 \xrightarrow{F} B_T \]

\[ \forall x \in A_1, \forall y \in A_2 : \ F(\iota_1(x), \iota_2(y)) = \iota_T(f(x, y)), \]
\[ \forall x \in B_1, \forall y \in B_2 : \ f(p_1(x), p_2(y)) = p_T(F(x, y)) \]

**Fig. 2. Modules and maps between them.**

Part of the CRS specifies \( B_1, \iota_1, p_1, u_1, \ldots, u_m \) and \( B_2, \iota_2, p_2, v_1, \ldots, v_n \), which are commitment keys for \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \). We note that many of these components may be given implicitly instead of being described explicitly in the CRS.

Another part of the CRS specifies a third \( \mathcal{R} \)-module \( B_T \) together with \( \mathcal{R} \)-linear maps \( \iota_T : A_T \to B_T \) and \( p_T : B_T \to A_T \) and a bilinear map \( F : B_1 \times B_2 \to B_T \). We require that the maps are commutative as described in Figure 2 and, with the exception of \( p_1, p_2, \) and \( p_T \), that they are efficiently computable. For notational convenience, we define for \( \vec{x} \in B_1^n, \vec{y} \in B_2^n \) that

\[ \vec{x} \cdot \vec{y} = \sum_{i=1}^n F(x_i, y_i). \]

Due to the bilinear properties of \( F \) we have for all vectors and matrices with appropriate dimensions

\[ \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = \Gamma^\top \vec{x} \cdot \vec{y}. \]

The final part of the CRS is a set of matrices \( H_1, \ldots, H_\eta \in \text{Mat}_{\tilde{m} \times \tilde{n}}(\mathcal{R}) \) that all satisfy \( \vec{u} \cdot H_i \vec{v} = 0 \). The exact number of matrices \( H_1, \ldots, H_\eta \) that is needed depends on the concrete setting. In many cases, we need no matrices at all and we have \( \eta = 0 \), but there are also cases where they are needed, as we shall see in the instantiation in section 10.

There are two different settings of interest to us.

**Soundness setting:** In the soundness setting, we have binding commitment keys. This means \( p_1(\vec{u}) = \vec{0} \) and \( p_2(\vec{v}) = \vec{0} \), and the maps \( p_1 \circ \iota_1 \) and \( p_2 \circ \iota_2 \) are nontrivial. We will also want \( p_T \circ \iota_T \) to be nontrivial.

**Witness-indistinguishability setting:** In the witness-indistinguishability setting we have hiding commitment keys, such that \( \iota_1(A_1) \subseteq \langle u_1, \ldots, u_m \rangle \) and \( \iota_2(A_2) \subseteq \langle v_1, \ldots, v_n \rangle \). We also require that \( H_1, \ldots, H_\eta \) generate the \( \mathcal{R} \)-module of all matrices \( H \in \text{Mat}_{\tilde{m} \times \tilde{n}}(\mathcal{R}) \) such that \( \vec{u} \cdot H \vec{v} = 0 \). As we will see in the next section, these matrices play a role in the randomization of the NIWI proofs.

**Computational indistinguishability:** The (only) computational assumption made in this paper is that the two settings can be set up in a computationally indistinguishable way. The instantiations show that there are many ways to get such computationally indistinguishable soundness and witness-indistinguishability setups.
6. Proving that committed values satisfy a quadratic equation. Recall that in our setting, a quadratic equation looks like

\[ \bar{a} \cdot \bar{y} + \bar{x} \cdot \bar{b} + \bar{x} \cdot \Gamma \bar{y} = t, \]

with constants \( \bar{a} \in A_1^n, \bar{b} \in A_2^n, \Gamma \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(\mathcal{R}), t \in A_T \). We will first consider the case of a single quadratic equation of the above form. The first step in our NIWI proof will be to commit to all the variables \( \bar{x}, \bar{y} \). The commitments are of the form

\[ \bar{c} = \iota_1(\bar{x}) + R\bar{u}, \quad \bar{d} = \iota_2(\bar{y}) + S\bar{v}, \]

with \( R \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(\mathcal{R}), S \in \text{Mat}_{n \times n}(\mathcal{R}) \). The prover’s task is to convince the verifier that the commitments contain \( \bar{x} \in A_1^n, \bar{y} \in A_2^n \) that satisfy the quadratic equation. (Note that for all equations we will use these same commitments.)

**Intuition.** Before giving the construction let us give some intuition. In the previous sections, we have carefully set up our commitments such that the commitments themselves also “behave” like the values being committed to: they also belong to modules (the \( B \) modules) equipped with a bilinear map (the map \( \bar{F} \), also implicitly used in the \( \cdot \) operation). Given that we have done this, a natural idea is to take the quadratic equation (1), and “plug in” the commitments (2) in place of the variables; let us evaluate:

\[ \iota_1(\bar{a}) \cdot \bar{d} + \bar{c} \cdot \iota_2(\bar{b}) + c^\top \Gamma \bar{d}. \]

After some computations, where we expand the commitments (2), make use of the bilinearity of \( \cdot \), and rearrange terms (the details can be found in the proof of Theorem 6), we get

\[
\begin{align*}
&\left( \iota_1(\bar{a}) \cdot \iota_2(\bar{y}) + \iota_1(\bar{x}) \cdot \iota_2(\bar{b}) + \iota_1(\bar{x}) \cdot \Gamma \iota_2(\bar{y}) \right) \\
&\quad + \iota_1(\bar{a}) \cdot S\bar{v} + R\bar{u} \cdot \iota_2(\bar{b}) + \iota_1(\bar{x}) \cdot \Gamma S\bar{v} + R\bar{u} \cdot \Gamma \iota_2(\bar{y}) + R\bar{u} \cdot \Gamma S\bar{v}.
\end{align*}
\]

By the commutative properties of the maps, the first group of three terms is equal to \( \nu_T(t) \) if (1) holds. Looking at the remaining terms, note that \( \bar{u} \) and \( \bar{v} \) are part of the CRS and therefore known to the verifier. Using the fact that bilinearity implies that for any \( \bar{x}, \bar{y} \) we have \( \bar{x} \cdot \Gamma \bar{y} = \Gamma^\top \bar{x} \cdot \bar{y} \), we can sort the remaining terms so they match either \( \bar{u} \) or \( \bar{v} \) to get (again see the proof of Theorem 6 for details)

\[ \nu_T(t) + \bar{u} \cdot \left( R^\top \iota_2(\bar{b}) + R^\top \Gamma \iota_2(\bar{y}) + R^\top \Gamma S \bar{v} + S^\top \iota_1(\bar{a}) + S^\top \Gamma \iota_1(\bar{x}) \right) \cdot \bar{v}. \]

Now, for the sake of intuition, let us make some simplifying assumptions. Let us assume that we are working in a symmetric case where \( A_1 = A_2, B_1 = B_2 \), and \( \bar{u} = \bar{v} \), and so, the above equation can be simplified further to get

\[ \nu_T(t) + \bar{u} \cdot \left( R^\top \iota_2(\bar{b}) + R^\top \Gamma \iota_2(\bar{y}) + R^\top \Gamma S \bar{u} + S^\top \iota_1(\bar{a}) + S^\top \Gamma \iota_1(\bar{x}) \right). \]

Now, suppose the prover gives to the verifier as his proof \( \bar{\pi} = (R^\top \iota_2(\bar{b}) + R^\top \Gamma \iota_2(\bar{y}) + R^\top \Gamma S \bar{u} + S^\top \iota_1(\bar{a}) + S^\top \Gamma \iota_1(\bar{x})) \). The verifier would then check that the following verification equation holds:

\[ \iota_1(\bar{a}) \cdot \bar{d} + \bar{c} \cdot \iota_2(\bar{b}) + \bar{c} \cdot \Gamma \bar{d} = \nu_T(t) + \bar{u} \cdot \bar{\pi}. \]
Suppose further $p_1 \circ t_1, p_2 \circ t_2, p_T \circ t_T$ are the identity maps on $A_1, A_2, A_T$. It is easy to see that the proof is convincing in the soundness setting, because in that setting we have that $p_1(\bar{u}) = \vec{0}$. Then the verifier would know (but not be able to compute) that by applying the maps $p_1, p_2, p_T$ we get
\[ \vec{u} \bullet p_2(\vec{d}) + p_1(\vec{c}) \bullet \vec{b} + p_1(\vec{c}) \bullet \Gamma p_2(\vec{d}) = t + p_1(\bar{u}) \bullet p_2(\vec{\pi}) = t. \]
This gives us soundness, since $\vec{x} := p_1(\vec{c})$ and $\vec{y} := p_2(\vec{d})$ satisfy the equations.

The remaining problem is to get witness-indistinguishability. Recall that in the witness-indistinguishability setting, the commitments are perfectly hiding. Therefore, in the verification equation, nothing except for $\vec{\pi}$ holds any information about $\vec{x}$ and $\vec{y}$ (except for the information that can be inferred from the quadratic equation itself).

So, let us consider two cases:

1. Suppose that $\vec{\pi}$ is the unique value such that the verification equation is valid. In this case, we trivially have witness-indistinguishability, since the uniqueness means that any witness would lead to the same value for $\vec{\pi}$.

2. The simple case above might seem too good to be true, but let us see what it means if it is not true. If two values $\vec{\pi}$ and $\vec{\pi}'$ both satisfy the verification equation, then just subtracting the equations shows that $\vec{u} \bullet (\vec{\pi} - \vec{\pi}') = 0$.

On the other hand, recall that in the witness-indistinguishability setting, the $\vec{u}$ vectors generate the entire space where $\vec{\pi}$ and $\vec{\pi}'$ live, and furthermore we know that the matrices $H_1, \ldots, H_n$ generate all $H$ such that $\vec{u} \bullet H \vec{u} = 0$. Therefore, let us choose $r_1, \ldots, r_n$ at random and consider the distribution $\vec{\pi}'' = \vec{\pi} + \sum_{i=1}^n r_i H_i \vec{u}$.

We thus obtain the same distribution on $\vec{\pi}''$ that satisfies the verification equation regardless of whether we started from $\vec{\pi}$ or $\vec{\pi}'$ or any other proof.

Thus, for the symmetric case we obtain a witness-indistinguishable proof system. For the general nonsymmetric case, instead of having just $\vec{\pi}$ for the $\vec{u}$ part of (3), we would also have a proof $\vec{\theta}$ for the $\vec{v}$ part. In this case, we would also have to make sure that this split does not reveal any information about the witness. What we will do is to randomize the proofs such that they get a uniform distribution on all $\vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta}$ that satisfy the verification equation. If we pick $T \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{\bar{n} \times \bar{m}}(\mathcal{R})$ at random, we have that $\vec{\theta} + T\vec{u}$ completely randomizes $\vec{\theta}$. The part we add in $\vec{\theta}$ can be “subtracted” from $\vec{\pi}$ by observing that
\[ t_T(t) + \vec{u} \bullet \vec{\pi} + \vec{\theta} \bullet \vec{v} = t_T(t) + \vec{u} \bullet \left( \vec{\pi} - T^\top \vec{v} \right) + \left( \vec{\theta} + T \vec{u} \right) \bullet \vec{v}. \]
This leads to a uniform distribution of proofs for the general nonsymmetric case as well.

### 6.1. The general case.
Having explained the intuition behind the proof system, we proceed to a formal description of how the prover handles a single equation and the security properties the procedure has.

**Prover:** Pick $T \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{\bar{n} \times \bar{m}}(\mathcal{R}), r_1, \ldots, r_n \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ at random. Compute
\begin{align*}
\vec{\pi} &:= R^\top t_2(\vec{b}) + R^\top \Gamma t_2(\vec{y}) + R^\top \Gamma S \vec{u} - T^\top \vec{v} + \sum_{i=1}^n r_i H_i \vec{v}, \\
\vec{\theta} &:= S^\top t_1(\vec{a}) + S^\top \Gamma t_1(\vec{x}) + T \vec{u}
\end{align*}
and return the proof $(\vec{\theta}, \vec{\pi})$. 
**Verifier:** Return 1 if and only if
\[ \iota_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{c} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}) + \vec{c} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota_T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} + \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v}. \]

Perfect completeness of our NIWI proof will follow from the following theorem regardless of whether we are in the soundness setting or the witness-indistinguishability setting.

**Theorem 6.** Given \( \vec{x} \in A_1^n, \vec{y} \in A_2^n, R \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(R), S \in \text{Mat}_{n \times \hat{n}}(R) \) satisfying
\[
\vec{c} = \iota_1(\vec{x}) + R \vec{u}, \quad \vec{d} = \iota_2(\vec{y}) + S \vec{v}, \quad \vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = t,
\]
we have for all choices of \( T, r_1, \ldots, r_n \) that the proofs \( \vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta} \) constructed as above will be accepted.

**Proof.** The commutative property of the linear and bilinear maps gives us
\[
i_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{c} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}) + \vec{c} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \iota_2(\vec{y}) + \left( \iota_1(\vec{x}) + R \vec{u} \right) \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}) + \left( \iota_1(\vec{x}) + R \vec{u} \right) \cdot \Gamma \left( \iota_2(\vec{y}) + S \vec{v} \right)
\]
\[
= \iota_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \iota_2(\vec{y}) + \iota_1(\vec{x}) \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}) + \iota_1(\vec{x}) \cdot \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{y})
\]
\[
+ R \vec{u} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}) + R \vec{u} \cdot \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{y}) + R \vec{u} \cdot \Gamma S \vec{v} + \iota_1(\vec{a}) \cdot S \vec{v} + \iota_1(\vec{x}) \cdot \Gamma S \vec{v}
\]
\[
= \iota_T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \left( R^{\top} \iota_2(\vec{b}) + R^{\top} \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{y}) + R^{\top} \Gamma S \vec{v} \right) + \left( S^{\top} \iota_1(\vec{a}) + S^{\top} \Gamma \iota_1(\vec{x}) \right) \cdot \vec{v}
\]
\[
= \iota_T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \left( R^{\top} \iota_2(\vec{b}) + R^{\top} \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{y}) + R^{\top} \Gamma S \vec{v} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i \left( \vec{u} \cdot H_i \vec{v} \right) - \vec{u} \cdot T^{\top} \vec{v}
\]
\[
= \iota_T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} + \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v}.
\]

**Theorem 7.** In the soundness setting, where we have \( p_1(\vec{u}) = 0 \) and \( p_2(\vec{v}) = 0 \), a valid proof implies
\[
p_1(\iota_1(\vec{a})) \cdot p_2(\vec{d}) + p_1(\vec{c}) \cdot p_2(\iota_2(\vec{b})) + p_1(\vec{c}) \cdot \Gamma p_2(\vec{d}) = p_T(\iota_T(t)).
\]

**Proof.** An acceptable proof \( \vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta} \) satisfies \( \iota(a) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{c} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}) + \vec{c} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota_T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} + \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v} \).

The commutative property of the linear and bilinear maps gives us
\[
p_1(\iota_1(\vec{a})) \cdot p_2(\vec{d}) + p_1(\vec{c}) \cdot p_2(\iota_2(\vec{b})) + p_1(\vec{c}) \cdot \Gamma p_2(\vec{d})
\]
\[
= p_T(\iota_T(t)) + p_1(\vec{u}) \cdot p_2(\vec{\pi}) + p_1(\vec{\theta}) \cdot p_2(\vec{v}) = p_T(\iota_T(t)).
\]

Observe as a particularly interesting case that when \( p_1 \circ \iota_1, p_2 \circ \iota_2, p_T \circ \iota_T \) are the identity maps on \( A_1, A_2, \) and \( A_T \), respectively, this means that \( \vec{x} := p_1(\vec{c}) \) and \( \vec{y} := p_2(\vec{d}) \) give us a satisfying solution to the equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = t \). In this case, the theorem says that the proof is perfectly sound in the soundness setting. In the case where they are not the identity maps, it is still possible to have a form of culpable soundness; see the instantiation in section 8 for an example based on composite order bilinear groups.

**Theorem 8.** In the witness-indistinguishable setting where \( \iota_1(A_1) \subseteq \langle u_1, \ldots, u_m \rangle \), \( \iota_2(A_2) \subseteq \langle v_1, \ldots, v_n \rangle \), and \( H_1, \ldots, H_n \) generate all matrices \( H \) such that \( \vec{u} \cdot H \vec{v} = 0 \),
all satisfying witnesses \(\vec{x}, \vec{y}, R, S\) yield proofs \(\vec{\pi} \in (v_1, \ldots, v_n)^n\) and \(\vec{\theta} \in (u_1, \ldots, u_m)^n\) that are uniformly distributed conditioned on the verification equation \(t_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{c} \cdot t_2(\vec{b}) + \vec{\epsilon} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} - \Gamma T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} + \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v} \).

Proof. Since \(t_1(A_1) \subseteq \langle u_1, \ldots, u_m \rangle\) and \(t_2(A_2) \subseteq \langle v_1, \ldots, v_n \rangle\) there exist \(A, B, X, Y\) such that \(t_1(\vec{a}) = A\vec{u}, t_1(\vec{\epsilon}) = X\vec{u}\) and \(t_2(\vec{b}) = B\vec{v}, t_2(\vec{y}) = Y\vec{v}\). We have \(\vec{c} = (X + R)\vec{u}\) and \(\vec{d} = (Y + S)\vec{v}\). The proof is \((\vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta})\) given by

\[
\vec{\pi} = R^T t_2(\vec{b}) + R^T \Gamma t_2(\vec{y}) + R^T \Gamma S \vec{v}) - T^T \vec{v} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i H_i \vec{v} = (R^T B + R^T \Gamma Y + R^T \Gamma S - T^T) \vec{v} + \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i H_i \right) \vec{v}.
\]

We choose \(
T
\) at random, so we can think of \(\vec{\theta}\) being a uniformly random variable given by \(\vec{\theta} = \Theta \vec{v}\) for a randomly chosen matrix \(\Theta\). We can think of \(\vec{\pi}\) as being written \(\vec{\pi} = \Pi \vec{v}\), where \(\Pi\) is a random variable that depends on \(\Theta\).

By perfect completeness all satisfying witnesses yield proofs where \(t_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{c} \cdot t_2(\vec{b}) + \vec{\epsilon} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} - \Gamma T(t) - \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v} = \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} = \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\Pi} \vec{v}\). Conditioned on the random variable \(\Theta\), we therefore have that any two possible solutions \(\vec{\pi}, \vec{\pi}'\) satisfy \(\vec{u} \cdot (\Pi - \Pi') \vec{v} = 0\). Since \(H_1, \ldots, H_n \) all satisfy the equation \(\vec{u} \cdot H \vec{v} = 0\), we can write this as \(\vec{u} \cdot H \vec{v} = 0\). By perfect completeness we form it as \((R^T B + R^T \Gamma Y + R^T \Gamma S - T^T) \vec{v} + \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i H_i \right) \vec{v}\) for randomly chosen \(r_1, \ldots, r_n \in R\). We therefore get a uniform distribution over all \(\vec{\pi}\) that satisfy the equation conditioned on \(\vec{\theta}\). Since \(\vec{\theta}\) is uniformly chosen, we conclude that for any witness we get a uniform distribution over \((\vec{\theta}, \vec{\pi})\) conditioned on it being an acceptable proof. \(\Box\)

6.2. Linear equations. As a special case, we will consider the proof system when \(\vec{a} = 0\) and \(\Gamma = 0\). In this case the equation is simply

\[
\vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} = t.
\]

The scheme can be simplified in this case by choosing \(T = 0\) in the proof, which gives \(\vec{\theta} := 0\) and \(\vec{\pi} := R^T t_2(\vec{b}) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} r_i H_i \vec{v}\). Theorem 6 still applies with \(T = 0\). Theorem 7 says \(p_1(\vec{c}) \cdot p_2(t_2(\vec{b})) = pr(\Gamma T(t))\), which will give us soundness. Finally, we have the following theorem.

**Theorem 9.** In the witness-indistinguishable setting where \(t_1(A_1) \subseteq \langle u_1, \ldots, u_m \rangle\), \(t_2(A_2) \subseteq \langle v_1, \ldots, v_n \rangle\), and \(H_1, \ldots, H_n\) generate all matrices \(H\) such that \(\vec{u} \cdot H \vec{v} = 0\), all satisfying witnesses \(\vec{x}, \vec{y}, R, S\) yield the uniform distribution of the proof \(\vec{\pi} \in \langle v_1, \ldots, v_n \rangle^m\) on the verification equation \(\vec{c} \cdot t_2(\vec{b}) = \Gamma T(t) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi}\) being satisfied.

Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 8 we can write \(\vec{\pi} = \Pi \vec{v}\). Any witness gives a proof that satisfies

\[
\vec{c} \cdot t_2(\vec{b}) - \Gamma T(t) = \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} = \vec{u} \cdot \Pi \vec{v}.
\]

Since \(H_1, \ldots, H_n\) generate all matrices \(H\) such that \(\vec{u} \cdot H \vec{v} = 0\), we have that \(\Pi\) has a uniform distribution over all matrices \(\Pi\) satisfying the verification equation. \(\Box\)
6.3. The symmetric case. An interesting special case is when \( B := B_1 = B_2 \), 
\( \hat{m} \geq \hat{n} \) with \( u_1 = v_1, \ldots, u_{\hat{m}} = v_{\hat{n}} \), and for all \( x, y \in B \) we have \( F(x, y) = F(y, x) \). 
We call this the symmetric case. In the symmetric case, we can simplify the scheme 
by just padding \( \tilde{\theta} \) with zeros in the end to extend the length to \( \hat{m} \), call this vector \( \tilde{\theta}' \), 
and reveal the proof \( \tilde{\phi} = \tilde{\theta}' + \tilde{\theta} \). In the verification, we check that 
\[
\iota_1(\tilde{a}) \bullet \tilde{d} + \tilde{c} \bullet \iota_2(\tilde{\theta}) + \tilde{c} \bullet \hat{\Gamma} \tilde{d} = \iota_T(t) + \tilde{u} \bullet \tilde{\phi}.
\]
Theorems 6 and 8 still hold in this setting. With respect to soundness we have the 
following theorem.

**THEOREM 10.** In the soundness setting, where we have \( p_1(\tilde{u}) = 0 \), a valid proof 
implies 
\[
p_1(\iota_1(a)) \cdot p_2(\tilde{d}) + p_1(\tilde{c}) \cdot p_2(\iota(\tilde{\theta})) + p_1(\tilde{c}) \cdot \hat{\Gamma} p_2(\tilde{d}) = \Pr(\iota_T(t)).
\]

**Proof.** An acceptable proof \( \tilde{\phi} \) satisfies \( \iota_1(\tilde{a}) \bullet \tilde{d} + \tilde{c} \bullet \iota_2(\tilde{\theta}) + \tilde{c} \bullet \hat{\Gamma} \tilde{d} = \iota_T(t) + \tilde{u} \bullet \tilde{\phi} \). The commutative property of the linear and bilinear maps gives us 
\[
p_1(\iota_1(\tilde{a})) \cdot \tilde{p}_2(\tilde{d}) + p_1(\tilde{c}) \cdot \tilde{p}_2(\iota(\tilde{\theta})) + p_1(\tilde{c}) \cdot \hat{\Gamma} \tilde{p}_2(\tilde{d}) = \Pr(\iota_T(t)) + p_1(\tilde{u}) \cdot \tilde{p}_2(\tilde{\phi})
\]
We can simplify the computation of the proof in the symmetric case. We have 
\[
\tilde{\phi} := R^T \iota_2(\tilde{b}) + R^T \Gamma \iota_2(\tilde{\theta}) + R^T \Gamma S \tilde{u} - T^T \tilde{v} + \sum_{i=1}^{\eta} r_i \tilde{H}_i \tilde{v},
\]
and we extend \( \theta \) to \( \theta' \) by padding it with \( \hat{m} - \hat{n} \) 0's. Another way to accomplish this 
padding is by padding \( T \) with \( m - \hat{n} \) 0-rows and \( S \) with \( m - \hat{n} \) 0-columns and each 
\( H_i \) with \( m - \hat{n} \) 0-columns. We then have 
\[
\tilde{\phi} := R^T \iota_2(\tilde{b}) + R^T \Gamma \iota_2(\tilde{\theta}) + R^T \Gamma S' \tilde{u} - (T')^T \tilde{u} + \sum_{i=1}^{\eta} r_i \tilde{H}'_i \tilde{u} + (S')^T \iota_1(\tilde{a}) + (S')^T \Gamma \iota_1(\tilde{x}) + T' \tilde{u}.
\]
Since the map is symmetric, we have \( \tilde{u} \bullet (T' - (T')^T) \tilde{u} = 0 \), so we can simplify the proof as 
\[
\tilde{\phi} := R^T \iota_2(\tilde{b}) + R^T \Gamma \iota_2(\tilde{\theta}) + (S')^T \iota_1(\tilde{a}) + (S')^T \Gamma \iota_1(\tilde{x}) + R^T \Gamma S' \tilde{u} + \sum_{i=1}^{\eta'} r_i \tilde{H}'_i \tilde{u}.
\]

7. NIWI proof for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations. We 
will now give the full composable NIWI proof for satisfiability of a set of quadratic 
equations in a module with a bilinear map, i.e., the language 
\[
L = \left\{ ((\tilde{a}_i, \tilde{b}_i, \Gamma_i, t_i))_{i=1}^{\hat{N}} \mid \exists \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \forall i : \tilde{a}_i \cdot \tilde{y} + \tilde{b}_i + \tilde{x} \cdot \Gamma_i \tilde{y} = t_i \right\}.
\]
The proof will have \( L_{\text{guilt-soundness}} \) for 
\[
L_{\text{guilt}} = \left\{ ((\tilde{a}_i, \tilde{b}_i, \Gamma_i, t_i))_{i=1}^{\hat{N}} \mid \forall \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \exists i : p_1(\iota_1(\tilde{a}_i)) \cdot \tilde{y} + \tilde{x} \cdot p_2(\iota_2(\tilde{b}_i)) + \tilde{x} \cdot \Gamma_i \tilde{y} \neq \Pr(\iota_T(t_i)) \right\}.
\]
Observe as an important special case that if \( p_1 \circ \iota_1, p_2 \circ \iota_2, p_T \circ \iota_T \) are the identity maps on \( A_1, A_2, \) and \( A_T, \) then \( L_{\text{guilt}} = L, \) making soundness and \( L_{\text{guilt}}\)-soundness the same notion.

The cryptographic assumption we make is that the CRS is created by one of two algorithms \( K \) and \( S, \) and that their outputs are computationally indistinguishable. The first algorithm outputs a CRS that specifies a soundness setting, whereas the second algorithm outputs a CRS that specifies a witness-indistinguishability setting.

**Setup:** \( (gk, sk) = ((R, A_1, A_2, A_T, f), sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k). \)

**CRS generators:** The CRS defines \( (B_1, B_2, B_T, F, \iota_1, p_1, \iota_2, p_2, \iota_T, p_T, \bar{u}, \bar{v}, H_1, \ldots, H_\eta) \).

It can be generated as a soundness string \( \sigma \leftarrow K(gk, sk) \) or as a witness-indistinguishability string \( \sigma \leftarrow S(gk, sk). \)

**Prover:** The input consists of \( \vec{x}, \vec{y} \) and a list of quadratic equations \( \{ (\vec{a}, \vec{b}, \Gamma, t) \}_{i=1}^N \) and a satisfying witness \( \vec{x} \in A_1^n, \vec{y} \in A_2^n. \)

Pick at random \( R \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_m(\mathcal{R}) \) and \( S \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_{n \times h}(\mathcal{R}) \) and commit to all the variables as \( \vec{c} := \vec{x} + R\vec{u} \) and \( \vec{d} := \vec{y} + S\vec{v}. \)

For each equation \( (\vec{a}, \vec{b}, \Gamma, t) \) make a proof as described in section 6. In other words, pick \( T_i \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_{n \times m}(\mathcal{R}) \) and \( r_{i1}, \ldots, r_{i\eta} \leftarrow \mathcal{R} \) and compute

\[
\pi_i := R^T \iota_2(\vec{b}_i) + R^T \Gamma_i \iota_2(\vec{y}) + R^T \Gamma_i S\vec{v} - T_i^T \vec{v} + \sum_{j=1}^{\eta} r_{ij} H_j \vec{v},
\]

\[
\tilde{b}_i := S^T \iota_1(\vec{a}_i) + S^T \Gamma_i T_1(\vec{x}) + T_i \vec{u}.
\]

Output the proof \( (\bar{c}, \bar{d}, \{ (\pi_i, \tilde{b}_i) \}_{i=1}^N). \)

**Verifier:** The input is \( gk, \sigma, \{ (\vec{a}, \vec{b}, \Gamma, t) \}_{i=1}^N, \) and the proof is \( (\bar{c}, \bar{d}, \{ (\pi_i, \tilde{b}_i) \}). \)

For each equation check that

\[
\iota_1(\vec{a}_i) \cdot \bar{d} + \bar{c} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{b}_i) + \bar{c} \cdot \Gamma_i \bar{d} = \iota_T(t_i) + \bar{u} \cdot \pi_i + \tilde{b}_i \cdot \vec{v}.
\]

Output 1 if all the checks pass; else output 0.

**Theorem 11.** The proof system \( (\mathcal{G}, K, F, V) \) given above is an NIWI proof for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations with perfect completeness, perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}}\)-soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability.

**Proof.** Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 6.

Consider a proof \( (\bar{c}, \bar{d}, \{ (\pi_i, \tilde{b}_i) \}) \) on a soundness string. Define \( \vec{x} := p_1(\bar{c}), \vec{y} := p_2(\bar{d}). \) It follows from Theorem 7 that for each equation we have

\[
p_1(\iota_1(\vec{a}_i)) \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot p_2(\iota_2(\vec{b}_i)) + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma_i \vec{y} = p_1(\iota_1(\vec{a}_i)) \cdot p_2(\bar{d}) + p_1(\bar{c}) \cdot p_2(\iota_2(\vec{b}_i)) + p_1(\bar{c}) \cdot \Gamma_i p_2(\bar{d}) = p_T(\iota_T(t_i)).
\]

This means we have perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}}\)-soundness.

We have assumed that soundness strings and witness-indistinguishability strings are computationally indistinguishable. Consider now a witness-indistinguishability string \( \sigma. \) The commitments are perfectly hiding, so they do not reveal the witness \( \vec{x}, \vec{y} \) that the prover uses in the commitments \( \bar{c}, \bar{d}. \) Theorem 8 says that in each equation either of two possible witnesses yields the same distribution on the proof for that equation. A straightforward hybrid argument then shows that we have perfect witness-indistinguishability.

**Proof of knowledge.** We observe that if \( K \) outputs an additional secret piece of information \( \xi \) that makes it possible to efficiently compute \( p_1 \) and \( p_2, \) then \( \xi \) makes it possible to extract the witness \( \vec{x} = p_1(\bar{c}) \) and \( \vec{y} = p_2(\bar{d}).\)
Proof size. The size of the CRS is \(n\) elements in \(B_1\) and \(\hat{n}\) elements in \(B_2\) in addition to the description of the modules, the maps, and \(H_1, \ldots, H_n\). The size of the proof is \(m + N\hat{n}\) elements in \(B_1\) and \(n + Nn\) elements in \(B_2\).

Typically, \(n\) and \(\hat{n}\) will be small, giving us a proof size that is \(O(m + n + N)\) elements in \(B_1\) and \(B_2\). The proof size may thus be smaller than the description of the statement, which can be of size up to \(Nn\) elements in \(A_1\), \(Nm\) elements in \(A_2\), \(Nnm\) elements in \(R\), and \(N\) elements in \(A_T\).

7.1. NIWI proofs for bilinear groups. We will now outline the strategy for making NIWI proofs for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations over bilinear groups. As we described in section 3, there are four different types of equations corresponding to the following four combinations of \(\mathbb{Z}_n\)-modules:

- **Pairing product equations**: \(A_1 = G_1, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_T, f(X, Y) = e(X, Y)\).
- **Multiscalar multiplication in \(G_1\)**: \(A_1 = G_1, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_T = G_1, f(X, Y) = yX\).
- **Multiscalar multiplication in \(G_2\)**: \(A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_2, f(x, Y) = xY\).
- **Quadratic equations in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\)**: \(A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_T = \mathbb{Z}_n, f(x, y) = xy \mod n\).

The CRS will specify commitment schemes to, respectively, scalars and group elements. We first commit to all the variables and then make the NIWI proofs that correspond to the types of equations that we are looking at. It is important that we use the same commitment schemes and commitments for all equations; i.e., for instance, we commit to a scalar \(x\) only once, and we use the same commitment in the proof whether \(x\) is involved in a multiscalar multiplication in \(G_2\) or a quadratic equation in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\). The use of the same commitment in all the equations is necessary to ensure a consistent choice of \(x\) throughout the proof. As a consequence of this we use the same module \(B_1^i\) to commit to \(x\) in both multiscalar multiplication in \(G_2\) and quadratic equations in \(\mathbb{Z}_n\). We therefore end up with at most four different modules \(B_1, B_1^1, B_2, B_2^1\) to commit to, respectively, \(X, x, y, y\) variables.

8. Instantiation based on the subgroup decision assumption.

Setup. The first instantiation is based on the composite order groups introduced by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [10]. The setup algorithm \(G_{\text{BGN}}\) outputs \((gk, sk)\), where \(gk = (n, G, G_T, e, P)\) describes a bilinear group of composite order \(n\) and \(sk = (p, q)\) consists of two primers such that \(n = pq\). Boneh, Goh, and Nissim also introduced the subgroup decision assumption, which says that it is hard to distinguish a random element of order \(q\) from a random element of order \(n\).

**Definition 12** (subgroup decision assumption). We say the subgroup decision assumption holds for \(G_{\text{BGN}}\) if for all nonuniform polynomial time \(A\)

\[
\Pr[(gk, sk) \leftarrow G_{\text{BGN}}(1^k); \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*; U := \alpha p^P : A(gk, U) = 1] \approx \Pr[(gk, sk) \leftarrow G_{\text{BGN}}(1^k); \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^*; U := \alpha P : A(gk, U) = 1].
\]

Statements. Based on the subgroup decision assumption we will construct NIWI proofs for the language consisting of pairing product equations, multiscalar multiplication equations, and quadratic equations as described in Figure 1. A statement consists of \(N_P\) pairing product equations of the form \(\prod_i e(A_i, Y_i) \cdot \prod_{ij} e(Y_i, Y_j)^{\gamma_{ij}} = t_T\), \(N_M\) multiscalar multiplication equations of the form \(\sum_i a_i Y_i + \sum_i x_i B_i + \sum_{ij} \gamma_{ij} x_i Y_j = T\), \(N_Q\) quadratic equations of the form \(\sum_i a_i x_i + \sum_{ij} \gamma_{ij} x_i x_j \equiv t \mod n\), and a claim that there are \(x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}_n\) and \(Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \in G\) that satisfy all equations.
Formally, given a setup $g_k = (n, G, G_T, e, P)$, we define the language:

$$L = \left\{ \left( (\mathcal{A}_i, \mathcal{G}_i^T, t_{G_T}) \right)_{i=1}^{N_p}, \left( (\mathcal{B}_j, \mathcal{M}_j^T, T_j) \right)_{j=1}^{N_m}, \left( (\vec{b}_k, \mathcal{G}_k^Q, t_k) \right)_{k=1}^{N_q} \right\}$$

$$\exists m, n \in \mathbb{N}, \exists \vec{x} \in Z_n^m, \exists \vec{y} \in G^n, \forall i \in [N_p], \forall j \in [N_m], \forall k \in [N_q] :$$

$$\mathcal{A}_i \in G^n \land \mathcal{G}_i^T \in \text{Mat}_{n \times n}(Z_n) \land t_{G_T} \in G_T \land (\mathcal{A}_i \cdot \vec{y})(\vec{y} \cdot \mathcal{G}_i^T) = t_{G_T}$$

$$\land \mathcal{B}_j \in G^n \land \mathcal{M}_j^T \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(Z_n) \land T_j \in G \land \mathcal{B}_j \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \mathcal{M}_j^T = T_j$$

$$\land \vec{b}_k \in Z_n^m \land \mathcal{G}_k^Q \in \text{Mat}_{m \times m}(Z_n) \land t_k \in Z_n \land \vec{b}_k + \vec{x} \cdot \mathcal{G}_k^Q \vec{x} \equiv t_k \mod n.$$

Soundness will hold in the order $p$ subgroups of $G, G_T$, and $Z_n$. More precisely, define $\lambda \in Z_n$ as an integer satisfying $\lambda \equiv 1 \mod p$ and $\lambda \equiv 0 \mod q$. We will get $L_{\text{guilt}}$-soundness for

$$L_{\text{guilt}} = \left\{ \left( (\mathcal{A}_i, \mathcal{G}_i^T, t_{G_T}) \right)_{i=1}^{N_p}, \left( (\mathcal{B}_j, \mathcal{M}_j^T, T_j) \right)_{j=1}^{N_m}, \left( (\vec{b}_k, \mathcal{G}_k^Q, t_k) \right)_{k=1}^{N_q} \right\}$$

$$\forall m, n \in \mathbb{N}, \forall \vec{x} \in (AZ_n)^m, \forall \vec{y} \in (AG)^n, \exists i \in [N_p], \exists j \in [N_m], \exists k \in [N_q] :$$

$$\mathcal{A}_i \notin G^n \lor \mathcal{G}_i^T \notin \text{Mat}_{n \times n}(Z_n) \lor t_{G_T} \notin G_T \lor (\mathcal{A}_i \cdot \vec{y})(\vec{y} \cdot \mathcal{G}_i^T) \neq t_{G_T}$$

$$\lor \mathcal{B}_j \notin G^n \lor \mathcal{M}_j^T \notin \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(Z_n) \lor T_j \notin G \lor \mathcal{B}_j \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \mathcal{M}_j^T \neq T_j$$

$$\lor \vec{b}_k \notin Z_n^m \lor \mathcal{G}_k^Q \notin \text{Mat}_{m \times m}(Z_n) \lor t_k \notin Z_n \lor \vec{b}_k + \vec{x} \cdot \mathcal{G}_k^Q \vec{x} \neq t_k \mod p \}.$$

\textbf{Multiscalar multiplication equations.} We will build our full NIWI proof from a combination of NIWI proofs for pairing product equations, multiscalar multiplication equations, and quadratic equations. First consider the case where we only have multiscalar multiplication equations. Define $L^M (L_{\text{guilt}}^M)$ to be $L (L_{\text{guilt}})$ restricted to $N_p = N_q = 0$ such that it only has $N_m$ multiscalar multiplication equations.

We can use our framework to get NIWI proofs for $L^M$. The multiscalar multiplication case corresponds to $R = Z_n, A_1 = Z_n, A_2 = G, A_T = G, f(x, y) = x \cdot y$, and equations of the form $\vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{G} \vec{Y} = T$ over variables $\vec{x} \in A_1^m$ and $\vec{Y} \in A_2^n$.

The setup $g_k = (n, G, G_T, e, P)$ implicitly defines $A_1, A_2, A_T, f$. It also implicitly defines $B_1 = B_2 = B_T = G$ and $F(X, Y) = e(X, Y)$ and the linear maps $^6$

$$\iota_1(x) = x \cdot P, \quad \iota_2(Y) = Y, \quad \iota_T(T) = e(P, T), \quad p_1(xP) = \lambda x \mod n, \quad p_2(Y) = \lambda Y, \quad p_T(e(P, T)) = \lambda T.$$

Since $\lambda^2 \equiv \lambda \mod n$, the maps commute as described in Figure 2. That is, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
(x, Y) & \xrightarrow{f} x \cdot Y \\
(xP, Y) & \xrightarrow{F} e(P, xY) \\
(\iota_1, \iota_2) & \xrightarrow{\iota_T} \lambda T
\end{align*}
\]

\[ ^6 \text{To uniquely define the maps let the setup include a bit indicating whether } p \text{ is the large or the small prime factor of } n. \]
and we have
\[
\begin{array}{c}
(p_1, p_2) \quad f \quad \lambda x, \lambda y \\
\lambda x, \lambda y \quad f \quad \lambda x, \lambda y \\
(p_1, p_2) \quad \lambda x, \lambda y \\
\end{array}
\]

The CRS \( \sigma \) consists of an element \( U \in G \). In the soundness setting it is generated as \( U = \alpha P \), and in the witness-indistinguishability setting it is generated as \( U = \alpha \cdot \mathbf{p} \), where \( \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n \). The subgroup decision assumption implies that soundness strings and witness-indistinguishability strings are computationally indistinguishable.

We will be using \( U \) as a commitment key in both \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \). In order to commit to \( x \in A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n \) we pick \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_n \) and compute the commitment \( C := \iota_1(x) + rU = xP + rU \in B_1 = G \). In order to commit to \( y \in A_2 = G \) we pick \( s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n \) and compute the commitment \( D := \iota_2(s) + sU = y + sU \in B_2 = G \).

On a soundness string, \( U \) describes a binding key for both commitment schemes. We have \( p_1(U) = p_1(\alpha P) = \lambda \alpha P \equiv 0 \mod n \) and \( p_2(U) = \lambda \alpha \cdot \mathbf{p}U = G \). Furthermore, the maps \( p_1 \circ \iota_1(x) = p_1(xP) = \lambda x \mod n \), \( p_2 \circ \iota_2(y) = p_2(Y) = \lambda Y \), and \( p_T \circ \iota_T(T) = p_T(e(P, T)) = \lambda T \) are all nontrivial. A commitment \( C \in B_1 \) defines the committed value uniquely in \( \lambda \mathbb{Z}_n \), and a commitment \( D \in B_2 \) defines the committed value uniquely in \( \lambda G \).

On a witness-indistinguishability string, \( U \) describes a hiding key for both commitment schemes. Since \( U \) is a generator for \( B_1 = B_2 = G \), we have \( \iota_1(A_1) = \iota_1(\mathbb{Z}_n) = G = \langle U \rangle \) and \( \iota_2(A_2) = \iota_2(G) = G = \langle U \rangle \). This implies that the commitment schemes are perfectly hiding. The only solution \( H \in \text{Mat}_{1 \times 1}(\mathbb{Z}_n) \) to \( U \cdot HU = 1 \), i.e., \( e(U, HU) = 1 \), is \( H = 0 \). We therefore do not need to include any \( H_1, \ldots, H_n \) in the CRS.

Theorem 11 now gives us an NIWI proof for the simultaneous satisfiability of a set of multiscalar multiplication equations with perfect completeness, perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}} \)-soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability.

Pairing product equations. Now consider the case where we have only pairing product equations. Define \( L^P \) (\( L_{\text{guilt}}^P \)) to be \( L \left( L_{\text{guilt}} \right) \) restricted to \( N_M = N_Q = 0 \) such that it has only \( N_P \) pairing product equations. Using our framework, this corresponds to \( R = \mathbb{Z}_n \), \( A_1 = A_2 = G \), \( A_T = G_T \), \( \mathcal{f}(x, y) = e(x, y) \), and equations of the form \((\overline{A} \cdot \overline{Y})\cdot(\overline{Y} \cdot \Gamma \overline{Y}) = t_T \) over variables \( Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \in G \). The setup also defines modules \( B_1 = B_2 = G \) and \( B_T = G_T \) and the bilinear map \( F(X, Y) = e(X, Y) \). We use the maps \( \iota_2(Y) = Y \) and \( p_2(Y) = \lambda Y \) described in the multiscalar multiplication case above together with \( \iota_T(z_T) = z_T \) and \( p_T(z_T) = z_T^\lambda \) to get the commutative diagram

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A_1 = G \quad \times \quad A_2 = G \quad \lambda Y \quad A_T = G_T \\
\iota_2 \quad p_2 \quad \iota_2 \quad p_2 \quad \iota_T \quad p_T \\
B_1 = G \quad \times \quad B_2 = G \quad \lambda Y \quad B_T = G_T
\end{array}
\]

Using the same type of CRS as in the multiscalar multiplication case described above, we get an NIWI proof for the simultaneous satisfiability of pairing prod-
uct equations with perfect completeness, perfect $L^P_{\text{guilt}}$-soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability.

**Quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_n$.** Finally, consider the case where we have only quadratic equations. Define $L^Q (L^Q_{\text{guilt}})$ to be $L (L^Q_{\text{guilt}})$ restricted to $N_P = N_M = 0$ such that it has only $N_Q$ quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_n$. Using our framework, this corresponds to $R = \mathbb{Z}_n$, $A_1 = A_2 = A_T = \mathbb{Z}_n$, $f(x, y) = xy \mod n$, and equations of the form $\vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{\gamma} \equiv t \mod n$ over variables $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. The setup also defines modules $B_1 = B_2 = G$ and $B_T = G_T$ and the bilinear map $F(xP, yP) = e(xP, yP)$. We use the maps $f_t(x) = xP$ and $p_t(xP) = \lambda x$ described in the multiscalar multiplication case above together with $f_T(t) = e(P, tP)$ and $p_T(e(P, tP)) = \lambda t \mod n$ to get the commutative diagram

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n & \times & A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_n \\
\downarrow f(x, y) = xy \mod n & \downarrow f_t & \downarrow p_T \\
B_1 = G & \times & B_2 = G \\
\end{array}$$

Using the same type of CRS as in the multiscalar multiplication case described above, we get an NIWI proof for the simultaneous satisfiability of quadratic equations with perfect completeness, perfect $L^Q_{\text{guilt}}$-soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability.

**The general case.** In the three special cases described above, we used the same type of CRS $\sigma = \mathcal{U}$. To get an NIWI proof for the simultaneous satisfiability of equations, we will combine them by using the same $\mathcal{U}$ for all three types of equations. The same commitments to scalars $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ are used both in multiscalar multiplication equations and in quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_n$, and the same commitments to variables $y_j \in G$ are used both in pairing product equations and in multiscalar multiplication equations to enforce consistency across different types of equations. The full NIWI proof for $L$ is as follows:

**Setup:** $(gk, sk) := (\langle \vec{a}, G, GT, e, P \rangle, \langle \vec{p}, q \rangle) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k)$, where $\vec{a} = \vec{p}q$.

**Soundness string:** On input $(gk, sk)$ return $\sigma := \mathcal{U}$, where $\mathcal{U} := rP$ for random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.

**Witness-indistinguishability string:** On input $(gk, sk)$ return $\sigma := \mathcal{U}$, where $\mathcal{U} := rP$ for random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.

**Prover:** On input $(\vec{a}, G, GT, e, P, \mathcal{U})$, a set of $N = N_P + N_M + N_Q$ equations, and a witness $\vec{x}, \vec{y}$ do:

1. Commit to the scalars $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and the group elements $y_1, \ldots$, $\vec{y}_n \in G$ as

$$C_i := x_iP + r_i \mathcal{U}, \quad D_i := y_i + s_i \mathcal{U}$$

for randomly chosen $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, $s_i \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.  

2. For each pairing product equation $(\vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y})(\vec{Y} \cdot \Gamma) = tT$ make a proof as described in section 6.3:

$$\phi := \vec{s}^T \vec{A} + \vec{s}^T (\Gamma + \Gamma^T) \vec{Y} + \vec{s}^T \Gamma \vec{\mathcal{U}}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i A_i + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} (\gamma_{ij} + \gamma_{ji}) s_i y_j + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} s_i s_j \mathcal{U}.$$
3. For each multiscalar multiplication equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y} = \mathcal{T} \) the proof is
\[
\phi : = \vec{r}^T \vec{B} + \vec{r}^T \Gamma \vec{Y} + \vec{r}^T \vec{a} \mathcal{U} + \vec{s}^T \vec{a} \mathcal{P} + \vec{s}^T \Gamma \vec{x} \mathcal{P} \\
= \sum_{i=1}^{m} r_i \mathcal{B}_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} r_i \gamma_{ij} \mathcal{Y}_j + \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} r_i \mathcal{s}_j \mathcal{U} \\
+ \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i \left( a_i + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_{ij} x_j \right) \mathcal{P}.
\]

4. For each quadratic equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{x} = t \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) we have
\[
\phi : = \vec{r}^T \vec{b} \mathcal{P} + \vec{r}^T (\Gamma + \Gamma^T) \vec{x} \mathcal{P} + \vec{s}^T \Gamma \mathcal{U} \\
= \left( \sum_{i=1}^{m} r_i \mathcal{b}_i + \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} (\gamma_{ij} + \gamma_{ji}) r_i \mathcal{x}_j \right) \mathcal{P} + \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{ij} r_i \mathcal{r}_j \mathcal{U}.
\]

**Verifier:** On input \( (\mathbf{n}, G, G_T, e, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}) \), a set of equations, and a proof \( \vec{C}, \vec{D}, \{ \phi_i \}^N_{i=1} \)
do:

1. For each pairing product equation \((\vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y})(\vec{Y} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y}) = t_T\) with proof \( \phi \) check that
\[
\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(A_i, \mathcal{D}_i) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{j=1}^{m} e(D_i, \mathcal{D}_j)^{\gamma_{ij}} = t_T e(\mathcal{U}, \phi).
\]

2. For each multiscalar multiplication \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y} = \mathcal{T} \) with proof \( \phi \) check that
\[
\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(a_i, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{D}_i) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{m} e(C_i, \mathcal{B}_i) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{m} \prod_{j=1}^{n} e(C_i, \mathcal{D}_j)^{\gamma_{ij}} = e(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{T}) e(\mathcal{U}, \phi).
\]

3. For each quadratic equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{x} = t \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) with proof \( \phi \) check that
\[
\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(C_i, \mathcal{b}_i \mathcal{P}) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{m} \prod_{j=1}^{n} e(C_i, \mathcal{C}_j)^{\gamma_{ij}} = e(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P})^t e(\mathcal{U}, \phi).
\]

**Theorem 13.** The NIWI proof for \( L \) given above has perfect completeness, perfect \( L_{\text{gilt}} \)-soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability.

**Proof.** Perfect completeness follows from the perfect completeness of each of the three types of proofs. Perfect \( L_{\text{gilt}} \)-soundness follows from Theorem 7 since we use the same commitments and maps \( p_1, p_2 \) across different types of equations, thus making the order \( p \) solutions \( \vec{x} = p_1(\vec{C}), \vec{Y} = p_2(\vec{D}) \) consistent with each other for all three types of equations. The subgroup decision assumption implies that soundness and witness-indistinguishability CRSs are indistinguishable. On a witness-indistinguishability string the commitments are perfectly hiding, and we get perfect witness-indistinguishability from Theorem 8.

**Size.** The size of the NIWI proof is \( m + n + N \) group elements in \( G \), where \( m \) is the number of variables in \( \vec{x} \), \( n \) is the number of variables in \( \vec{Y} \), and \( N = N_p + N_M + N_Q \) is the total number of equations.
9. Instantiation based on the SXDH assumption.

Setup. The setup algorithm \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{SXDH}} \) returns a prime order bilinear group \( gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, P_1, P_2) \). We will assume the decision Diffie–Hellman problem is hard in both groups; this is known as the symmetric external Diffie–Hellman (SXDH) assumption.

**Definition 14 (SXDH assumption).** We say the SXDH assumption holds for \( \mathcal{G}_{\text{SXDH}} \) if for all nonuniform polynomial time \( A \) and all \( b \in \{1, 2\} \) we have

\[
Pr[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\text{SXDH}}(1^k); \alpha, t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* : A(gk, \alpha P_b, t P_b, \alpha t P_b) = 1] \\
\approx Pr[gk \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{\text{SXDH}}(1^k); \alpha, t, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* : A(gk, \alpha P_b, t P_b, r P_b) = 1].
\]

**Statements.** The setup \( gk = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, P_1, P_2) \) defines the ring \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) and modules \( \mathbb{Z}_p, G_1, G_2, G_T \) and bilinear maps corresponding to, respectively, multiplication in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), scalar-multiplication in \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \), and the pairing \( e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T \).

With this setup we can define pairing product equations, multiscalar multiplication equations and quadratic equations as follows:

**Pairing product equations:** Using our framework, this corresponds to \( R = \mathbb{Z}_p \),

\[
A_1 = G_1, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_T, f(x, y) = e(x, y), \text{ and equations of the form } (\overrightarrow{A} \cdot \overrightarrow{Y})(\overrightarrow{A} \cdot \overrightarrow{Y}) = t_T.
\]

**Multiscalar multiplication in \( G_1 \):** Using our framework, this corresponds to \( R = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_1 = G_1, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_T = G_1, f(x, y) = y \overrightarrow{x}, \text{ and equations of the form } \overrightarrow{A} \cdot \overrightarrow{Y} + \overrightarrow{x} \cdot \overrightarrow{B} + \overrightarrow{x} \cdot \Gamma \overrightarrow{Y} = \mathcal{T}_1.
\]

**Multiscalar multiplication in \( G_2 \):** Using our framework, this corresponds to \( R = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_2, f(x, y) = x \overrightarrow{Y}, \text{ and equations of the form } \overrightarrow{a} \cdot \overrightarrow{Y} + \overrightarrow{x} \cdot \overrightarrow{b} + \overrightarrow{x} \cdot \Gamma \overrightarrow{Y} = \mathcal{T}_2.
\]

**Quadratic equation in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \):** Using our framework, this corresponds to \( R = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_T = \mathbb{Z}_p, f(x, y) = x y \mod p, \text{ and equations of the form } \overrightarrow{a} \cdot \overrightarrow{Y} + \overrightarrow{x} \cdot \overrightarrow{b} + \overrightarrow{x} \cdot \Gamma \overrightarrow{Y} = t.
\]

We consider statements that consist of sets of pairing product equations, multiscalar multiplications in \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \), and quadratic equations as described above. The equations are over variables \( x_1, \ldots, x_m, y_1, \ldots, y_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \text{ and } X_1, \ldots, X_m \in G_1 \text{ and } Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \in G_2. \text{ We let } L \text{ be the language of statements where there exists a solution } \overrightarrow{x}, \overrightarrow{Y}, \overrightarrow{X}, \overrightarrow{Y} \text{ that simultaneously satisfies all equations of all types.}

**Commitments.** Consider a group \( G \) of prime order \( p \). With entrywise addition we get the \( \mathbb{Z}_p \)-module \( B := G^2 \). We will use a commitment key of the form

\[
u_1 = (P, Q) := (P, \alpha P), \quad \nu_2 = (U, V),
\]

where \( \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) is chosen at random. We can choose \( u_2 = (U, V) \) in two different ways:

\[
u_2 := tu_1 \text{ or } u_2 := tu_1 - (O, P) \text{ for a random } t \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{. The former choice of } u_2 \text{ gives a perfectly binding commitment key, whereas the latter choice of } u_2 \text{ gives a perfectly hiding commitment key. The two types of commitment keys are computationally indistinguishable under the decision Diffie–Hellman assumption.}
\]

Let us now describe how to commit to an element \( \overrightarrow{X} \in G_1 \) using randomness \( r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \): \n
\[
u_1(Z) := (O, Z), \quad p(Z_1, Z_2) := Z_2 - \alpha Z_1, \quad c := \nu(\overrightarrow{X}) + r_1 u_1 + r_2 u_2.
\]

On a binding key where \( u_2 = tu_1 \), we have that \( p \circ \nu \) is the identity map on \( G \) and \( p(u_1) = p(u_2) = O \). The commitment \( c = ((r_1 + r_2 t)P, (r_1 + r_2 t)Q + \overrightarrow{X}) \) corresponds
to an ElGamal encryption of \( F \) and \( v \) as described above.

Commitment to a scalar \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) using randomness \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) works as follows:

\[
u := u_2 + (\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{P}), \quad \iota'(z) := zu, \quad p'(z_1 \mathcal{P}, z_2 \mathcal{P}) := z_2 - \alpha z_1, \quad c := \iota'(x) + ru_1.
\]

On a binding key \( p' \circ \iota' \) is the identity map and \( p'(u_1) = 0 \), so the commitment scheme is perfectly binding, and in fact the commitment \( c = ((r + xt)\mathcal{P}, (r + xt)\mathcal{Q} + x\mathcal{P}) \) is an ElGamal encryption of \( x\mathcal{P} \). On a hiding key we have \( u = tu_1 \), so \( u \in (u_1) \), which implies \( \iota'(\mathbb{Z}_p) \subseteq (u_1) \). A hiding key therefore gives us a perfectly hiding commitment scheme.

**Common reference string.** The CRS is of the form \((u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2)\), where \((u_1, u_2)\) is a commitment key for the group \( G_1 \) implicitly defining maps \( \iota_1, p_1, \iota'_1, p'_1 \) as described above, and \((v_1, v_2)\) is a commitment key for \( G_2 \) implicitly defining maps \( \iota_2, p_2, \iota'_2, p'_2 \) as described above.

We will always use \( B_1 = G_1^2, B_2 = G_2^2 \), and we define \( B_T := G_T^4 \) with addition being entrywise multiplication. The map \( F \) is defined as follows:

\[
F : G_1^2 \times G_2^2 \to G_T^4, \quad \left( \begin{array}{c} X_1 \\ X_2 \end{array} \right), \left( \begin{array}{c} Y_1 \\ Y_2 \end{array} \right) \mapsto \left( \begin{array}{cc} e(X_1, Y_1) & e(X_1, Y_2) \\ e(X_2, Y_1) & e(X_2, Y_2) \end{array} \right).
\]

On a witness-indistinguishability string, we have hiding commitment keys \( u_1, u_2 \) and \( v_1, v_2 \), where each pair of vectors is linearly independent. The four elements \( F(u_1, v_1), F(u_1, v_2), F(u_2, v_1), F(u_2, v_2) \) are also linearly independent in the witness-indistinguishability scenario. This implies that when \( H \) is the \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix with 0-entries, \( u \bullet H \mathcal{E} \) only has the trivial solution. Therefore, the CRS does not need to include any matrices \( H_1, \ldots, H_n \) for the pairing product equations. The same holds true for the other types of equations; we do not need any matrices \( H_1, \ldots, H_n \) in the CRS.

**Pairing product equations.** First consider the restricted language \( L^P \subset L \), where the statements have only pairing product equations. The CRS describes \( R = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_1 = G_1, A_2 = G_2, A_T = G_T; B_1 = G_1^2, B_2 = G_2^2, B_T = G_T^4 \); commitment keys \( u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2 \); and the following commuting linear and bilinear maps:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
\mathcal{O} \\
\mathcal{X}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
\mathcal{O} \\
\mathcal{Y}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\xrightarrow{F}
\begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{c}
1 \\
1
\end{array}
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
e(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})
\end{array}
\end{array}
\]

For the following maps we recall \( u_1 = (\mathcal{P}_1, \alpha_1 \mathcal{P}_1) \) and \( v_1 = (\mathcal{P}_2, \alpha_2 \mathcal{P}_2) \):
\[
(\mathcal{X}_2 - \alpha_1 \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_2 - \alpha_2 \mathcal{Y}_1) \xrightarrow{f} e(\mathcal{X}_2 - \alpha_1 \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_2 - \alpha_2 \mathcal{Y}_1)
\]

\[
(p_1, p_2) \xrightarrow{pr} (\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_1, \mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_2) \xrightarrow{F} (e(\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_1), e(\mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_1), e(\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_2), e(\mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_2))
\]

This gives us the setup from section 5, and we can use the NIWI proofs described in section 6 on the pairing product equations.

Multiscalar multiplication in \(G_1\) or \(G_2\). For multiscalar multiplications in \(G_1\), we will need maps \(i_T : G_1 \to G_T^1\) and \(\hat{p}_T : G_T^1 \to G_1\). For multiscalar multiplications in \(G_2\), we will need maps \(i_T : G_2 \to G_T^2\) and \(\hat{p}_T : G_T^2 \to G_2\). The two cases are symmetric, so we will just focus on multiscalar multiplication in \(G_2\) here.

We define

\[
i_T(Z) := F(i'_1(1), i_2(Z)) = F(u, (O, Z)), \quad \hat{p}_T = e^{-1}(p_T(z)),
\]

where \(e^{-1}(e(P_1, Z)) := Z\). In the soundness setting \(i_T \circ \hat{p}_T\) is the identity map on \(G_2\).

We have \(F(i'_1(x), i_2(Y)) = F(i'_1(1), i_2(xY)) = i_T(xY)\) by the linearity and bilinearity of the maps, and \(p'_1(x_1 P_1, x_2 P_2) p_2(Y_1, Y_2) = (x_2 - \alpha_1 x_1)(Y_2 - \alpha_2 Y_1) = x_2 Y_2 - \alpha_1 x_1 Y_2 - \alpha_2 (x_2 Y_1 - \alpha_1 x_1 Y_1) = p_T(F((x_1 P_1, x_2 P_2), (Y_1, Y_2))).\) This gives us the following commutative diagram of linear and bilinear maps:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_p & \times & A_2 = G_2 \\
p'_1 & | & i_2 \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
B_1 = G_1^2 & \times & B_2 = G_2^2 \\
\end{array}
\]

Using this setup, we can apply the NIWI proof from section 6 to multiscalar multiplication equations in \(G_2\). The case of multiscalar multiplication in \(G_1\) is treated similarly.

Quadratic equations. For quadratic equations in \(\mathbb{Z}_p\) we define the maps \(i'_T : \mathbb{Z}_p \to G_T^1\) and \(p'_T : G_T^1 \to \mathbb{Z}_p\) as follows:

\[
i'_T(t) := F(i'_1(1), i'_2(t)) = F(u, tv), \quad p'_T(z) := \log_{e(P_1, P_2)}(p_T(z)).
\]

In the soundness setting \(p'_T \circ i'_T\) is the identity map on \(\mathbb{Z}_p\). To see that the maps satisfy the two commutative properties from Figure 2, observe that \(F(i'_1(x), i'_2(y)) = F(i'_1(1), i'_2(xy)) = i'_T(xy)\) by the linearity and bilinearity of the maps, and

\[
p'_1(x_1 P_1, x_2 P_1) p'_2(y_1 P_2, y_2 P_2) = (x_2 - \alpha_1 x_1)(y_2 - \alpha_2 y_1) = x_2 y_2 - \alpha_1 x_1 y_2 - \alpha_2 (x_2 y_1 - \alpha_1 x_1 y_1) = p'_T(F((x_1 P_1, x_2 P_2), (y_1 P_2, y_2 P_2))).
\]

This gives us the following setup:
ON INPUT SOUNDNESS STRING: \( gk \)

**NIWI proof:** We now give the full NIWI proof for \( L \).

**Setup:** \( gk := (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, P_1, P_2) \leftarrow GSDH(1^k) \).

**Soundness string:** On input \( gk \) return \( \sigma := (u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2) \), where \( u_2 = t_1 u_1 \) and \( v_2 = t_2 v_1 \) for random \( t_1, t_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).

**Witness-indistinguishability string:** On input \( gk \) return \( \sigma := (u_1, u_2, v_1, v_2) \), where \( u_2 = t_1 u_1 - (O, P_1) \) and \( v_2 = t_2 v_1 - (O, P_2) \) for random \( t_1, t_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).

**NIWI proof:** On input \( gk, \sigma \), a set of equations, and a witness \( \vec{x}, \vec{y}, \vec{z}, \vec{t} \) do:

1. Commit to the group elements \( \vec{A} \in G_1^m \) and the scalars \( \vec{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^m \) as
   \[
   \vec{e} := \iota_1(\vec{A}) + R \vec{u}, \quad \vec{e}' := \iota_1(x) + R u_1, \quad \text{where } R \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{m \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}_p), \vec{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^m.
   \]

   Commit to the group elements \( \vec{Y} \in G_2^3 \) and the scalars \( \vec{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3 \) as
   \[
   \vec{d} := \iota_2(\vec{Y}) + S \vec{v}, \quad \vec{d}' := \iota_2(y) + S v_1, \quad \text{where } S \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{n \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}_p), \vec{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n.
   \]

2. For each pairing product equation \( (\vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y})(\vec{X} \cdot \vec{B})(\vec{X} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y}) = \vec{T} \) make a proof as described in section 6. Writing it out, we have for \( T \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{2 \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}_p) \) the following proof:
   \[
   \vec{\pi} := R^T \iota_2(\vec{B}) + R^T \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{Y}) + (R^T \Gamma S - T^T) \vec{e},
   \vec{\theta} := S^T \iota_1(\vec{A}) + S^T \Gamma^T \iota_1(\vec{X}) + T \vec{u}.
   \]

   For each linear equation \( \vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y} = \vec{T} \) we use \( \vec{\pi} := \vec{0} \) and \( \vec{\theta} := S^T \iota_1(\vec{A}) \).
   
   There is a bijective correspondence between \( S^T \vec{A} = p_1(\vec{\theta}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} = \iota_1(S^T \vec{A}) \). The proof can therefore be communicated by sending \( S^T \vec{A} \), which consists of two group elements in \( G_1 \).

   For each linear equation \( \vec{X} \cdot \vec{B} = \vec{T} \) we use \( \vec{\pi} := R^T \iota_2(\vec{B}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} := \vec{0} \).
   
   As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the two group elements \( R^T \vec{B} \) in \( G_2 \).

3. For each multiscale multiplication equation \( \vec{A} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{X} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{X} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = \vec{T} \) in \( G_1 \) the proof is for random \( T \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{1 \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}_p) \)
   \[
   \vec{\pi} := R^T \iota_2(\vec{b}) + R^T \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{y}) + (R^T \Gamma S - T^T) \vec{e},
   \vec{\theta} := S^T \iota_1(\vec{A}) + S^T \Gamma^T \iota_1(\vec{X}) + T \vec{u}.
   \]

   For each linear equation \( \vec{A} \cdot \vec{y} = \vec{T} \) the proof is \( \vec{\pi} := \vec{0} \) and \( \vec{\theta} := S^T \iota_1(\vec{A}) \).
   
   There is a bijective correspondence between \( S^T \vec{A} = p_1(\vec{\theta}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} = \iota_1(S^T \vec{A}) \). The proof can therefore be communicated by sending \( S^T \vec{A} \), which consists of one group element in \( G_1 \).

   For each linear equation \( \vec{X} \cdot \vec{b} = \vec{T} \) the proof is \( \vec{\pi} := R^T \iota_2(\vec{b}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} := \vec{0} \).
   
   As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the two field elements \( R^T \vec{b} \).
4. For each multiscalar multiplication equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y} = \mathcal{T}_2 \) in \( G_2 \) the proof is for random \( T \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{2 \times 1}(\mathbb{Z}_p) \)

\[
\pi := \vec{r}^\top \iota_2(\vec{B}) + \vec{r}^\top \Gamma \iota_2(\vec{Y}) + (\vec{r}^\top \Gamma S - T^\top) \vec{v},
\]

\[
\vec{\theta} := S^\top \iota'_1(\vec{a}) + S^\top \Gamma^\top \iota'_1(\vec{x}) + Tu_1.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} = \mathcal{T}_2 \) the proof is \( \pi := 0 \) and \( \vec{\theta} := S^\top \iota'_1(\vec{a}) \).

There is a bijective correspondence between \( S^\top \vec{a} = p'_1(\vec{\theta}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} = \iota'_1(S^\top \vec{a}) \). The proof can therefore be communicated by sending \( S^\top \vec{a} \), which consists of two field elements.

For each linear equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} = \mathcal{T}_2 \) the proof is \( \pi := \vec{r}^\top \iota_2(\vec{B}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} := 0 \).

As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the single group element \( \vec{r}^\top \vec{B} \).

5. For each quadratic equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = t \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) the proof is for random \( T \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)

\[
\pi := \vec{r}^\top \iota'_2(\vec{b}) + \vec{r}^\top \Gamma \iota'_2(\vec{y}) + (\vec{r}^\top \Gamma S - T)v_1,
\]

\[
\vec{\theta} := S^\top \iota'_1(\vec{a}) + S^\top \Gamma^\top \iota'_1(\vec{x}) + Tu_1.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} = t \) we use \( \pi := 0 \) and \( \vec{\theta} := S^\top \iota'_1(\vec{a}) \).

There is a bijective correspondence between \( S^\top \vec{a} = p'_1(\vec{\theta}) \) and \( \vec{\theta} = \iota'_1(S^\top \vec{a}) \). The proof can therefore be communicated by sending \( S^\top \vec{a} \), which consists of one field element.

For each linear equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} = t \) we use \( \pi := \vec{r}^\top \iota'_2(\vec{b}) \).

As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the single field element \( \vec{r}^\top \vec{b} \).

**Verifier:** On input \((gk, \sigma)\), a set of equations, and a proof \(\vec{c}, \vec{d}, \vec{e}, \vec{f}, \{\vec{\pi}_i, \vec{\theta}_i\}_{i=1}^N\) do:

1. For each pairing product equation \((\vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y})(\vec{X} \cdot \vec{B})(\vec{X} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y}) = t_T\) with proof \((\vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta})\) check that

\[
\iota_1(\vec{A}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{e} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{B}) + \vec{e} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota_T (t_T) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} + \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v}.
\]

2. For each multiscalar equation \(\vec{A} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{X} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{X} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = \mathcal{T}_1\) in \( G_1 \) with proof \((\vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta})\) check that

\[
\iota_1(\vec{A}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{e} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{B}) + \vec{e} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota_T (t_T) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi} + F(\vec{\theta}, v_1).
\]

3. For each multiscalar equation \(\vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y} = \mathcal{T}_2\) in \( G_2 \) with proof \((\vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta})\) check that

\[
\iota'_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{e} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{B}) + \vec{e} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota_T (t_T) + F(u_1, \vec{\pi}) + \vec{\theta} \cdot \vec{v}.
\]

4. For each quadratic equation \(\vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = t\) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) with proof \((\vec{\pi}, \vec{\theta})\) check that

\[
\iota'_1(\vec{a}) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{e} \cdot \iota_2(\vec{B}) + \vec{e} \cdot \Gamma \vec{d} = \iota'_T( t_T ) + F(u_1, \vec{\pi}) + F(\vec{\theta}, v_1).
\]

**Theorem 15.** The protocol is an NIWI proof with perfect completeness, perfect soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability for satisfiability of a set of equations over a bilinear group where the SXDH problem is hard.

**Proof.** Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 6. Perfect soundness follows from Theorem 7 since the \( p \circ i \) maps are identity maps on \( \mathbb{Z}_p, G_1, G_2, \) and \( G_T \). The SXDH assumption gives us that the two types of CRSs are computationally indistinguishable. On a witness-indistinguishability string, the commitments are perfectly hiding, and we get perfect witness-indistinguishability from Theorem 8.
Size. The modules we work in are $B_1 = G_1^2$ and $B_2 = G_2^2$, so each element in a module consists of two group elements from, respectively, $G_1$ and $G_2$. Table 3 lists the cost of all the different types of equations.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption: SXDH</th>
<th>$G_1$</th>
<th>$G_2$</th>
<th>$\mathbb{Z}_p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \vec{\alpha} \in \mathbb{G}_1$</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{Y} \in \mathbb{G}_2$</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing product equations</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{\alpha} \cdot \vec{\mathcal{Y}} = t_T$</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{X} \cdot \vec{B} = t_T$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiscalar multiplication equations in $G_1$</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{\alpha} \cdot \vec{g} = T_1$</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{X} \cdot \vec{b} = T_1$</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiscalar multiplication equations in $G_2$</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} = T_2$</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} = T_2$</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_p$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} = t$</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} = t$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 10. Instantiation based on the DLIN assumption.

Setup. Let $\mathcal{G}_{DLIN}$ be a generator of a bilinear group $(p, G, G_T, e, \mathcal{P})$. The decisional linear (DLIN) assumption introduced by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [7] states that given $(\alpha \mathcal{P}, \beta \mathcal{P}, \rho \mathcal{P}, s \beta \mathcal{P}, t \mathcal{P})$ for random $\alpha, \beta, \rho, s, t$ it is hard to tell whether $t = r + s$ or $t$ is random.

**Definition 16 (DLIN assumption).** The DLIN assumption holds for $\mathcal{G}_{DLIN}$ if for all nonuniform polynomial time $A$ we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{g}k \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{DLIN}(1^n); \alpha, \beta, \rho, s, t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* : A(gk, \alpha \mathcal{P}, \beta \mathcal{P}, \rho \mathcal{P}, s \beta \mathcal{P}, (r+s) \mathcal{P}) = 1]$$

$$\approx \Pr[\mathcal{g}k \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_{DLIN}(1^n); \alpha, \beta, \rho, s, t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* : A(gk, \alpha \mathcal{P}, \beta \mathcal{P}, \rho \mathcal{P}, s \beta \mathcal{P}, t \mathcal{P}) = 1].$$

**Statements.** The setup $\mathcal{g}k = (p, G, G_T, e, \mathcal{P})$ describes three $\mathbb{Z}_p$-modules $\mathbb{Z}_p, G$, and $G_T$. A statement will consist of a set of equations, which can include quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, multiscalar multiplication equations in $G$, and pairing product equations. The equations are over variables $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $\mathcal{Y}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{Y}_n \in G$.

**Pairing product equations:** Using our framework, this corresponds to $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_p$, $A_1 = G, A_2 = G, A_T = G_T, f(x, y) = e(x, y)$, and equations of the form $(\vec{A} \cdot \vec{\mathcal{Y}}) \cdot (\vec{Y} \cdot \Gamma \vec{Y}) = t_T$.

**Multiscalar multiplication in $G$:** Using our framework, this corresponds to $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_2 = G, A_T = G_2, f(x, \mathcal{Y}) = x \mathcal{Y}$, and equations of the form $\vec{a} \cdot \vec{\mathcal{Y}} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{\mathcal{Y}} = T$.

**Quadratic equation in $\mathbb{Z}_n$:** Using our framework, this corresponds to $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}_p, A_1 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_2 = \mathbb{Z}_n, A_T = \mathbb{Z}_n, f(x, y) = xy \mod p$, and equations of the form $\vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{x} = t$.

We will construct NIWI proofs for the language $L$ that consists of statements with pairing product equations, multiscalar multiplication equations, and quadratic equations for which there is a choice of $\vec{\mathcal{X}}, \vec{\mathcal{Y}}$ satisfying all equations simultaneously.
Commitments. We will now describe how to commit to elements in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and $G$. The commitments will belong to the $\mathbb{Z}_p$-module $B = G^3$ formed by entrywise addition. The commitment key is of the form

$$u_1 := (\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{P}) = (\alpha \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{P}), \quad u_2 := (\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}) = (\mathcal{O}, \beta \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{P}), \quad u_3 = (W_1, W_2, W_3),$$

where $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. The vector $u_3$ can be chosen as either $u_3 := ru_1 + su_2$ or $u_3 := ru_1 + su_2 - (\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{P})$, giving, respectively, a binding key and a hiding key. The DLIN assumption says that it is hard to tell whether three elements $ru, sv, t\mathcal{P}$ have the property that $t = r + s$, which implies that the two types of commitment keys are computationally indistinguishable.

For committing to $Y \in G$ using randomness $(s_1, s_2, s_3) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^3$ we define

$$\iota(Z) := (\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{Z}), \quad p(Z_1, Z_2, Z_3) := 3 \sum_{i=1}^{3} s_i u_i.$$

On a binding key we have that $p \circ \iota$ is the identity map and $p(u_1) = p(u_2) = p(u_3) = \mathcal{O}$, so the commitment is perfectly binding, and in fact $c = ((s_1 + rs_3)\mathcal{U}, (s_2 + ss_3)\mathcal{V}, (s_1 + s_2 + (r + s)s_3)\mathcal{P} + Y)$ is a linear encryption [7] of $Y$ with $p$ being the decryption algorithm. On a hiding key, $u_1, u_2, u_3$ are linearly independent, so they form a basis for $B = G^3$ and therefore $\iota(G) \subseteq (u_1, u_2, u_3)$, so the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding. The commitment scheme described here coincides with the scheme of [34]. We note that the different, and less efficient, commitment scheme of [24] can be similarly described in our language of modules.

To commit to a scalar $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ using randomness $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ we use

$$\iota'(z) := zu, \quad p'(z_1 \mathcal{P}, z_2 \mathcal{P}, z_3 \mathcal{P}) := z_3 - \frac{1}{\alpha} z_1 - \frac{1}{\beta} z_2, \quad \text{giving us } c := xu + r_1 u_1 + r_2 u_2,$$

where $u := u_3 + (\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{P})$. On a binding key, $p' \circ \iota'$ is the identity map on $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and $p'(u_1) = p'(u_2) = 0$, so the commitment $c = ((r_1 + \alpha x)\mathcal{U}, (r_2 + \beta x)\mathcal{V}, (r_1 + r_2 + x(r + s))\mathcal{P} + x\mathcal{P})$ is perfectly binding. On a hiding key, we have that $u = ru_1 + su_2$, so $\iota'(\mathbb{Z}_p) \subseteq (u_1, u_2)$ and the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding.

Common reference string. The CRS is of the form $(u_1, u_2, u_3)$, which implicitly defines maps $\iota, p, \iota', p'$ and commitment schemes in $B = G^3$ as described above.

We use the module $B_T := G_p^9$ with addition corresponding to entrywise multiplication. We use two different bilinear maps $F, \tilde{F}$. The map $\tilde{F} : G^3 \times G^3 \to G^9_p$ is defined as follows:

$$\tilde{F} : \begin{pmatrix} \mathcal{X}_1 \\ \mathcal{X}_2 \\ \mathcal{X}_3 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \mathcal{Y}_1 \\ \mathcal{Y}_2 \\ \mathcal{Y}_3 \end{pmatrix} \mapsto \begin{pmatrix} e(\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_1) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_2) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_3) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_1) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_2) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}_3) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_3, \mathcal{Y}_1) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_3, \mathcal{Y}_2) \\ e(\mathcal{X}_3, \mathcal{Y}_3) \end{pmatrix}.$$

The symmetric map $F$ is defined by

$$F(x, y) := \frac{1}{2} \tilde{F}(x, y) + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{F}(y, x).$$

We use the notation • and ◦ when using $F$ and $\tilde{F}$, respectively, as the underlying bilinear maps.
Pairing product equations. For pairing product equations we define
\[ \nu_T(z) := \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & z \end{pmatrix}, \]
\[ p_T \begin{pmatrix} z_{11} & z_{12} & z_{13} \\ z_{21} & z_{22} & z_{23} \\ z_{31} & z_{32} & z_{33} \end{pmatrix} := z_{33} - z_{13} - z_{23} \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{1}{\alpha} & -\frac{1}{\beta} \\ 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} z_{11} & 1 & 0 \\ z_{21} & 0 & 1 \\ z_{31} & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{1}{\alpha} & -\frac{1}{\beta} \\ 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}^{-1}. \]

The map \( p_T \) corresponds to first decrypting down the columns using the decryption key \( \alpha, \beta \) for the linear encryption scheme [7] and then decrypting along the resulting row. We note that \( p_T \circ \nu_T \) is the identity map. Both \( \overline{F} \) and \( F \) satisfy the two commutative properties in Figure 2.

Some computation shows that the nine elements \( \overline{F}(u_i, u_j) \) are linearly independent in the witness-indistinguishability setting. This implies that when \( H \) is the \( 3 \times 3 \) matrix with 0-entries, \( \overline{u} \bullet H \overline{u} \) only has the trivial solution. On the other hand, the map \( F \) has nontrivial solutions to \( \overline{u} \bullet H \overline{u} \) corresponding to the identities \( F(u_i, u_j) = F(u_j, u_i) \).

Some computation shows that the matrices
\[ H_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad H_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad H_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \]
form a basis for the matrices \( H \) such that \( \overline{u} \bullet H \overline{u} = 0 \). Since these matrices are fixed, we do not need to define them explicitly in the CRS.

Multiscalar multiplication equations. We will now look at the case of multiscalar multiplication in \( G \). We define
\[ \overline{\nu}_T(Z) := \overline{F}(\nu(1), \nu(2)(Z)) = \overline{F}(u, (O, O, Z)), \quad \nu_T(Z) := F(\nu'(1), \nu(2)(Z)) = F(u, (O, O, Z)), \]
\[ \overline{p}_T(z) = \hat{p}_T(z) := e^{-1}(p_T(z)), \quad \text{where} \quad e^{-1}(e(P, Z)) := Z. \]

In the soundness setting \( \overline{p}_T \circ \overline{\nu} \) and \( \hat{p}_T \circ \nu_T \) are the identity maps on \( G \). \( \overline{F} \) satisfies the two commutative properties, since by the linear and bilinear properties \( \overline{F}(\nu'(x), \nu(y)) = \overline{F}(\nu'(1), \nu(x,y)) = \nu_T(x) \nu(y) \) and \( p'(x_1 P, x_2 P, x_3 P) p(\mathcal{Y}_1, \mathcal{Y}_2, \mathcal{Y}_3) = (x_3 - \frac{1}{\alpha} x_1 - \frac{1}{\beta} x_2)(\mathcal{Y}_3 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \mathcal{Y}_1 - \frac{1}{\beta} \mathcal{Y}_2) = \hat{p}_T(\overline{F}(x_1 P, x_2 P, x_3 P), (\mathcal{Y}_1, \mathcal{Y}_2, \mathcal{Y}_3)). \) \( F \) also satisfies the two commutative properties, since by the bilinearity gives us \( F(\nu'(x), \nu(y)) = F(\nu'(1), \nu(x,y)) = \nu_T(x) \nu(y) \) and \( p'(x) p(y) = \frac{1}{2} p'(x) p(y) + \frac{1}{2} p'(y) p(x) = \frac{1}{2} \hat{p}_T(\overline{F}(x, y)) + \frac{1}{2} \hat{p}_T(\overline{F}(y, x)) = \hat{p}_T(\overline{F}(x, y)). \)

In the witness-indistinguishability setting, when \( H \) is the \( 2 \times 3 \) matrix containing 0-entries, \( (u_1, u_2) \bullet H \overline{u} \) only has the trivial solution, whereas \( H_1 = (0, 0, 0) \) generates the matrices \( H \) such that \( (u_1, u_2) \bullet H \overline{u} = 0 \).

Quadratic equations. Finally, we have the case of quadratic equations in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). We define
\[ \overline{\nu}_T(z) := \overline{F}(\nu'(1), \nu'(z)), \quad \nu_T'(z) := F(\nu'(1), \nu'(z)), \quad p_T'(z) := \log_{e(P, P)}(p_T(z)). \]

On a soundness string \( p_T' \circ \overline{\nu}_T \) and \( p_T' \circ \nu_T' \) are the identity maps on \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).
\( \tilde{F} \) satisfies the commutative properties from Figure 2, since by the linear and bilinear properties \( \tilde{F}(t'(x), t'(y)) = \tilde{F}(t'(1), t'(xy)) = t_\tau(xy) \) and \( p'(x_1 P, x_2 P, x_3 P) p'(y_1 P, y_2 P, y_3 P) = (x_3 - \frac{1}{\alpha} x_1 - \frac{1}{\beta} x_2)(y_3 - \frac{1}{\alpha} y_1 - \frac{1}{\beta} y_2) = p_\tau(\tilde{F}(x_1 P, x_2 P, x_3 P), (y_1 P, y_2 P, y_3 P)). \) \( F \) also satisfies the two commutative properties, since the bilinearity gives us \( \tilde{F}(t'(x), t'(y)) = F(t'(1), t'(xy)) = t'_\tau(xy) \) and \( p'(x)p'(y) = \frac{1}{2} p'_\tau(\tilde{F}(x,y)) = \frac{1}{2} p'_\tau(F(x,y)). \)

For \( \tilde{F} \) we have only the trivial matrix \( H = 0 \), and for \( F \) we have the nontrivial basis \( H_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ -1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \).

**NIWI proof.** Having described the modules, maps, and matrices that are implicitly given by the CRS above, we are now ready to give the full NIWI proof.

**Setup:** \( gk := (p, G, G_{T, e}, P) \leftarrow G_{DLIN}(1^k) \).

**Soundness string:** On input \( gk \) return \( \sigma := (u_1, u_2, u_3) \), where \( u_1 = (\alpha P, O, P, u_2 = (O, \beta P, P), u_3 = ru_1 + su_2 \) for random \( \alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and \( r, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).

**Witness-indistinguishability string:** On input \( gk \) return \( \sigma := (u_1, u_2, u_3) \), where \( u_1 = (\alpha P, O, P, u_2 = (O, \beta P, P), u_3 = ru_1 + su_2 \) for random \( \alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and \( r, s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).

**Prover:** For notational convenience let \( \tilde{\sigma} = (u_1, u_2) \). On input \( gk, \sigma, \) a set of equations, and a witness \( \tilde{x}, \tilde{\gamma} \) do:

1. Commit to the scalars \( \tilde{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^m \) and the group elements \( \tilde{\gamma} \in G^m \) as

\[
\tilde{c} := t'(\tilde{x}) + R\tilde{\sigma}, \quad \tilde{d} := t'(\tilde{\gamma}) + S\tilde{\sigma}
\]

for randomly chosen \( R \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{m \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}_p), S \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{n \times 3}(\mathbb{Z}_p) \).

2. For each pairing product equation \( (A\tilde{\gamma})(\tilde{\gamma}^T \Gamma \tilde{\gamma}) = t_\tau \) make a proof as described in section 6 using the symmetric map \( \tilde{F} \) and random \( r_1, r_2, r_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \):

\[
\tilde{\phi} := S^T t'(\tilde{A}) + S^T (\Gamma + \Gamma^T)t'(\tilde{\gamma}) + S^T \Gamma S\tilde{u} + \sum_{i=1}^{3} r_i H_i \tilde{u}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \tilde{A} \cdot \tilde{\gamma} = t_\tau \) we use the asymmetric map \( \tilde{F} \) to get the proof

\[
\tilde{\pi} = \tilde{0}, \quad \tilde{\theta} := S^T t'(\tilde{A}).
\]

The reason we use the asymmetric \( \tilde{F} \) for the linear equation is that there are no nontrivial matrices \( H \) such that \( \tilde{u} \bullet H\tilde{u} = 0 \), which simplifies the proof. Observe that \( \tilde{\theta} = t'(S^T \tilde{A}) = S^T t'(\tilde{A}) \) and, conversely, \( p(\tilde{\theta}) = S^T \tilde{A} \) is easily computable in this special setting, since \( t'(A) = (O, O, A) \). We can therefore reveal just the proof \( \tilde{\phi} := p(\tilde{\theta}) = S^T \tilde{A} \), which consists of only three group elements.

3. For each multiscalar multiplication equation \( \tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{\gamma} + \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{B} + \tilde{x} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{\gamma} = \tau_2 \) we use the symmetric map \( \tilde{F} \). There is one matrix \( H_1 \) that generates all \( H \) such that \( \tilde{v} \bullet H\tilde{v} \). The proof is for random \( r_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)

\[
\tilde{\phi} := R^T t'(\tilde{B}) + R^T \Gamma t'(\tilde{\gamma}) + (S^T)^T t'(\tilde{a}) + (S^T)^T \Gamma t'(\tilde{x}) + R^T \Gamma S' \tilde{u} + r_1 H_1 \tilde{u}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{\gamma} = \tau \) we use the asymmetric map \( \tilde{F} \) to get the proof

\[
\tilde{\pi} = \tilde{0}, \quad \tilde{\theta} := S^T t'(\tilde{a}).
\]
It suffices to reveal the value \( \vec{\phi} = S^\top \vec{a} \). Since \( \vec{\theta} \) determines \( \vec{\phi} \) uniquely, this does not compromise the perfect witness-indistinguishability we have on witness-indistinguishability strings. The verifier can compute \( \vec{\theta} = \iota'(\vec{\phi}) \). The proof now consists of only three elements in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \).

For each linear equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} = T \) we use \( \widetilde{F} \) to get the proof
\[
\vec{\pi} := R^\top \iota(\vec{B}), \quad \vec{\theta} = \vec{0}.
\]

We can use \( \vec{\phi} = R^\top \vec{B} \) as the proof, since it allows the verifier to compute \( \vec{\pi} = \iota(\vec{B}) \). The proof therefore consists of only two group elements.

4. For each quadratic equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{\Gamma} \vec{x} = t \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) we use the symmetric map \( F \). There is one matrix \( H_1 \) that generates all \( H \) such that \( \vec{v} \cdot H \vec{v} \).

The proof is for random \( r_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \)
\[
\vec{\phi} := R^\top \iota'(\vec{b}) + R^\top (\vec{\Gamma} + \vec{\Gamma}^\top) \iota'(x) + R^\top \vec{\Gamma} R \vec{v} + r_1 H_1 \vec{v}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} = t \) we use the asymmetric map \( \widetilde{F} \) to get the proof \( \vec{\pi} := R^\top \iota'(\vec{b}) \). It suffices to reveal just \( \vec{\phi} = R^\top \vec{b} \), from which the verifier can compute \( \vec{\pi} = \iota'(\vec{b}) \).

**Verifier:** On input \((g_k, \sigma)\), a set of equations, and a proof \( \vec{c}, \vec{d}, \{\vec{\phi}_i\}_{i=1}^N \) do:

1. For each pairing product equation \((\vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y})(\vec{Y} \cdot \vec{\Gamma} \vec{Y}) = t_T \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\iota(\vec{A}) \bullet \vec{d} + \vec{d} \bullet \vec{\Gamma} \vec{d} = \iota_T(t_T) + \vec{u} \bullet \vec{\phi}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y} = t_T \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\iota(\vec{A}) \bullet \vec{d} = \iota_T(t_T) + \iota(\vec{\phi}) \bullet \vec{u}.
\]

2. For each multiscalar multiplication \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{\Gamma} \vec{Y} = T \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\iota'(\vec{a}) \bullet \vec{d} + \vec{c} \bullet \iota(\vec{B}) + \vec{c} \bullet \vec{\Gamma} \vec{d} = \iota_T(t_T) + \vec{u} \bullet \vec{\phi}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} = T \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\iota'(\vec{a}) \bullet \vec{d} = \iota_T(t_T) + \iota'(\vec{\phi}) \bullet \vec{u}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} = T \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\vec{c} \vec{\Gamma} \iota(\vec{B}) = \iota_T(t_T) + \vec{v} \bullet \iota(\vec{\phi}).
\]

3. For each quadratic equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{\Gamma} \vec{x} = t \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\vec{c} \bullet \iota'(\vec{b}) + \vec{c} \bullet \vec{\Gamma} \vec{c} = \iota_T'(t) + \vec{v} \bullet \vec{\phi}.
\]

For each linear equation \( \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} = t \) with proof \( \vec{\phi} \) check that
\[
\vec{c} \vec{\Gamma} \iota'(\vec{b}) = \iota_T'(t) + \vec{v} \bullet \iota'(\vec{\phi}).
\]
Theorem 17. The protocol is an NIWI proof with perfect completeness, perfect soundness, and composable witness-indistinguishability for satisfiability of a set of equations over a bilinear group where the DLIN problem is hard.

Proof. Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 6. Perfect soundness follows from Theorem 7 since the $p \circ \iota$ maps are identity maps on $\mathbb{Z}_p, G$, and $G^T$. The DLIN assumption gives us that the two types of CRSs are computationally indistinguishable. On a witness-indistinguishability string, the commitments are perfectly hiding, and we get perfect witness-indistinguishability from Theorem 10.

Size. The module we work in is $B = G^3$, so each element in the module consists of three group elements from $G$. In some of the linear equations, we can compute $p(\vec{\phi})$ efficiently and we have $\iota(p(\vec{\phi})) = \vec{\phi}$, which gives us a shorter proof. Table 4 lists the cost of all the different types of equations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption: DLIN</th>
<th>$G$</th>
<th>$\mathbb{Z}_p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p, y \in G$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing product equations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{A} \cdot \vec{Y} = t_T$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiscalar multiplication equations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{a} \cdot \vec{Y} = T$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{x} \cdot \vec{B} = T$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_p$</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: $\vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} = t$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Zero-knowledge. We will now show that in many cases it is possible to make zero-knowledge proofs for satisfiability of quadratic equations. An obvious strategy is to use our NIWI proofs directly; however, one could imagine such proofs might not be zero-knowledge because the zero-knowledge simulator might not be able to compute any witness for satisfiability of the equations. It turns out that the strategy is better than it seems at first; we will often be able to modify the set of quadratic equations into an equivalent set of quadratic equations where a witness can be found and which has the same distribution of proofs.

We will consider the case where $A_1 = R, A_2 = A_T, f(r, y) = ry$. We remark that it is quite common to have $A_1 = R$; in bilinear groups both multiscalar multiplication equations in $G_1, G_2$ and quadratic equations in $\mathbb{Z}_n$ have this structure.

The first stage of the simulator $S_1$ will output a witness-indistinguishability string and a simulation trapdoor $\tau$ that makes it possible to trapdoor open the commitments in $B_1$. More precisely, $\tau = \vec{s} \in \mathbb{R}^3$ so $\iota_1(1) = \iota_1(0) + \vec{s}^T \vec{a}$. Define $c := \iota_1(1)$, which is a commitment to $\delta = 1$ with trivial randomness. The idea in the simulation is that we can rewrite the statement as

$$\vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + f(-\delta, t_i) + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b}_i + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = 0.$$ 

We have introduced a new variable $\delta$, and choosing all variables to be 0 gives a satisfying witness. In the simulation, the simulator $S_2$ will use the trapdoor information $\tau$ to open $c$ to 0, and it can now use the NIWI proof from section 7.

We are now ready to give the NIZK proof for the language $L$ consisting of statements with quadratic equations that are simultaneously satisfiable as defined in section 6. These are statements consisting of one or more equations of the form
\[ \vec{a} \cdot \vec{y} + \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b} + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma \vec{y} = t \] such that there is some choice of \( \vec{x}, \vec{y} \) that satisfies all equations. The witness for membership of \( L \) is \( w = (\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \). The NIZK proof will have perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}} \)-soundness as defined in section 6. When \( L_{\text{guilt}} = L \), this corresponds to standard perfect soundness.

**Setup:** \((gk, sk) = ((R, A_1, A_2, A_T, f), sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^k), \) where \( A_1 = \mathcal{R} \) and \( A_2 = A_T \).

**Soundness string:** \( \sigma = (B_1, B_2, B_T, F, t_1, p_1, t_2, p_2, t_T, p_T, \vec{u}, \vec{v}, H_1, \ldots, H_n) \leftarrow K(gk, sk) \).

**Prover:** This protocol is exactly the same as in the NIWI proof; we do not even need to rewrite the equations. The input consists of \( \vec{a}, \vec{b}, \{ \vec{c}, \vec{d}, \vec{\pi} \} \). We also use \( \vec{u}, \vec{v} \).

\[ \vec{\pi}_i := R^T t_2(\vec{b}_i) + R^T \Gamma t_2(\vec{y}) + R^T \Gamma S \vec{v} - T_i^T \vec{v} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} r_{ij} H_j \vec{v}, \]
\[ \vec{\theta}_i := S^T t_1(\vec{a}_i) + S^T \Gamma t_1(\vec{x}) + T_i \vec{u}. \]

Output the proof \((\vec{c}, \vec{d}, \{ (\vec{\pi}_i, \vec{\theta}_i) \}) \).

**Verifier:** The input is \( gk, \sigma, \{ (\vec{a}_i, \vec{b}_i, \Gamma_i, t_i) \} \), and the proof \((\vec{c}, \vec{d}, \{ (\vec{\pi}_i, \vec{\theta}_i) \}) \).

For each equation check that
\[ t_1(\vec{a}_i) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{\pi}_i t_2(\vec{b}_i) + \vec{c} \cdot \Gamma_i \vec{d} + \vec{\theta}_i \cdot \vec{v} = t_2(t_i) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi}_i + \vec{\theta}_i \cdot \vec{v}. \]

Output 1 if all the checks pass; else output 0.

**Simulation string:** \((\sigma, \tau) = ((B_1, B_2, B_T, F, t_1, p_1, t_2, p_2, t_T, p_T, \vec{u}, \vec{v}, H_1, \ldots, H_n), \vec{s}) \leftarrow S_1(gk, sk) \), where \( t_1(1) = t_1(0) + \vec{s}^T \vec{u} \).

**Proof simulator:** The input consists of \( gk, \sigma, \) a list of quadratic equations \( \{ (\vec{a}_i, \vec{b}_i, \Gamma_i, t_i) \} \), and the simulation trapdoor \( \tau = \vec{s} \).

Rewrite each equation as \( \vec{a}_i \cdot \vec{y} = \vec{x} \cdot \vec{b}_i + f(\delta, -t_i) + \vec{x} \cdot \Gamma_i \vec{y} = 0 \). Define \( \vec{x} := \vec{0}, \vec{y} := \vec{0}, \) and \( \delta = 0 \) to get a witness that satisfies all the modified equations.

Pick at random \( R \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{m \times \hat{n}}(\mathcal{R}) \) and \( S \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{n \times \hat{n}}(\mathcal{R}) \), and commit to all the variables as \( \vec{c} := \vec{0} + R \vec{u} \) and \( \vec{d} := \vec{0} + S \vec{v} \). We also use \( c := t_1(1) = t_1(0) + \vec{s}^T \vec{u} \) and append it to \( \vec{c} \).

For each modified equation \( (\vec{a}_i, \vec{b}_i, -t_i, \Gamma_i, 0) \) make a proof as described in section 6. Return the simulated proof \( \{ (\vec{c}, \vec{d}, \vec{\pi}_i, \vec{\theta}_i) \} \).

**Theorem 18.** The protocol described above is a composable NIZK proof for satisfiability of quadratic equations with perfect completeness, perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}} \)-soundness, and composable zero-knowledge.

**Proof.** Perfect completeness on a soundness string follows from the perfect completeness of the NIWI proof: the simulator knows an opening of \( c := t_1(1) \) to \( c = t_1(0) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i t_i \). It therefore knows a witness \( \vec{0}, \vec{0}, \delta = 0 \) for satisfiability of all the modified equations. It therefore outputs a proof \( \{ (\vec{c}, \vec{d}, \vec{\pi}_i, \vec{\theta}_i) \} \) such that for all \( i \) we have
\[ t_1(\vec{a}_i) \cdot \vec{d} + \vec{\pi}_i t_2(\vec{b}_i) + F(t_1(1), -t_2(t_i)) + \vec{c} \cdot \Gamma_i \vec{d} = t_2(t_i) + \vec{u} \cdot \vec{\pi}_i + \vec{\theta}_i \cdot \vec{v}. \]
The commutative property of the maps gives us \( F(\iota_1(1), \iota_2(t_i)) = \nu_T(f(1, t_i)) = \nu_T(t_i) \), so the NIZK proofs satisfy the equations that the verifier checks. Perfect completeness on a simulation string now follows from the perfect completeness of the NIWI proof as well.

Perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}} \)-soundness follows from the perfect \( L_{\text{guilt}} \)-soundness of the NIWI proof.

We will now show that on a simulation string we have perfect zero-knowledge. The commitments \( \widetilde{c}, \widetilde{d}, \) and \( c = \iota_1(1) \) are perfectly hiding and therefore have the same distribution whether we use witness \( \tilde{x}, \tilde{y}, \delta = 1 \) or \( 0, 0, \delta = 0 \). Theorem 8 now tells us that the proofs \( \tilde{\pi}_i, \tilde{\theta}_i \) made with either type of opening of \( \widetilde{c}, \widetilde{d}, c \) are uniformly distributed over all possible choices of \( \{(\tilde{\pi}_i, \tilde{\theta}_i)\}_{i=1}^{N} \) that satisfy the equations \( \iota_1(\tilde{a}_i) \cdot \widetilde{d} + \tilde{c} \cdot \tilde{b}_i + \tilde{c} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{d} = \nu_T(t) \). We therefore have perfect zero-knowledge on a simulation string.

Since the NIZK proof is exactly the same as the NIWI proof, there is no additional cost associated with getting composable zero-knowledge for full quadratic equations. If we look at linear equations, there are two cases to consider. On a linear equation of the form \( \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{b} = t \), the simulator can rewrite it as \( \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{b} + f(-\delta, t) = 0 \), which is a linear equation of the same form. The shorter NIWI proofs for this type of linear equation can therefore also be perfectly simulated on a simulation string. NIWI proofs for linear equations of the form \( \tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{y} = t \), on the other hand, cannot be simulated as easily, because if the simulator rewrites the equation as \( \tilde{a} \cdot \tilde{y} + (-\delta, t) = 0 \), then it is no longer a linear equation. To get composable zero-knowledge for the latter type of linear equation, the prover can instead use the NIWI proof for the full quadratic equation.

11.1. NIZK proofs for bilinear groups. Let us now consider bilinear groups and the four types of quadratic equations given in Figure 1. If we set up the CRS such that we can trapdoor open, respectively, \( \iota'_1(1) \) and \( \iota'_2(1) \) to 0, then multiscalar multiplication equations and quadratic equations in \( \mathbb{Z}_n \) are of the form for which we can get a perfect simulation.

In the case of pairing product equations we do not know how to get zero-knowledge, since even with the trapdoors we may not be able to compute a witness. We do observe, though, that in the special case where all \( t_T = 1 \) the choice of \( \tilde{X} = \tilde{O}, \tilde{Y} = \tilde{O} \) is a satisfactory witness. Since we also use the witness \( \tilde{X} = \tilde{O}, \tilde{Y} = \tilde{O} \) in the other types of equations, the simulator can use this witness in the simulation. In the special case where all \( t_T = 1 \) we can therefore make NIZK proofs for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations.

In another special case where we have a pairing product equation with \( t_T = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(P_i, Q_i) \) for some known \( P_i, Q_i \) there is another technique that can be useful in getting zero-knowledge. In this case, we can add the equations \( \delta Z_i - \delta Q_i = \tilde{O} \) to the set of multiscalar multiplication equations in \( G_2 \) and rewrite the pairing product equation as \( (\tilde{A} \cdot \tilde{Y})(\tilde{X} \cdot \tilde{B})(P \cdot \tilde{Z})(\tilde{A} \cdot \Gamma \tilde{Y}) = 1 \). This gives us pairing product equations of the type where we can make zero-knowledge proofs. We can therefore also make zero-knowledge proofs for a set of quadratic equations over a bilinear group if all the pairing product equations have \( t_T \) of the form \( t_T = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e(P_i, Q_i) \) for some known \( P_i, Q_i \).

The case of pairing product equations points to a couple of differences between witness-indistinguishable proofs and zero-knowledge proofs using our techniques. NIWI proofs can handle any target \( t_T \), whereas zero-knowledge proofs can handle only special types of target \( t_T \). Furthermore, if \( t_T \neq 1 \), the size of the NIWI proof for this
equation is constant, whereas the NIZK proof for the same equation may be larger.

We conclude our discussion of NIZK proofs with Tables 5 and 6 that give the costs for proving the satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations in the SXDH and DLIN instantiations. For the subgroup decision instantiation, NIZK proofs for sets of quadratic equations where all \( t_T = 1 \) are the same as those given in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption: SXDH</th>
<th>( G_1 )</th>
<th>( G_2 )</th>
<th>( \mathbb{Z}_p )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables ( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p, X \in G_1 )</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables ( y \in \mathbb{Z}_p, Y \in G_2 )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing product equations with ( t_T = 1 )</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{X} \cdot \bar{Y} = 1 )</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{X} \cdot \bar{Z} = 1 )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiscalar multiplication equations in ( G_1 )</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{A} \cdot \bar{Y} = \bar{T}_1 )</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{X} \cdot \bar{b} = \mathcal{O} )</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiscalar multiplication equations in ( G_2 )</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{A} \cdot \bar{Y} = \mathcal{O} )</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{x} \cdot \bar{B} = \bar{T}_2 )</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic equations in ( \mathbb{Z}_p )</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{a} \cdot \bar{Y} = t )</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{x} \cdot \bar{b} = t )</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption: DLIN</th>
<th>( G )</th>
<th>( \mathbb{Z}_p )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables ( x \in \mathbb{Z}_p, Y \in G )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing product equations with ( t_T = 1 )</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{A} \cdot \bar{Y} = 1 )</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiscalar multiplication equations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{a} \cdot \bar{Y} = \mathcal{O} )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{x} \cdot \bar{B} = \mathcal{T} )</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic equations in ( \mathbb{Z}_p )</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Linear equation: ( \bar{x} \cdot \bar{b} = t )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. Conclusion and an open problem. Our main contribution in this paper is the construction of efficient noninteractive cryptographic proofs for use in bilinear groups. Our proofs can be instantiated with many different types of bilinear groups, and the security of our proofs can be based on many different types of intractability assumptions. We have given three concrete examples of instantiations based on, respectively, the subgroup decision assumption, the SXDH assumption, and the DLIN assumption.

Because of their interest for applications, we have focused on bilinear groups in our instantiations. However, our techniques generalize beyond bilinear groups; for instance, we do not require the modules to be cyclic (as is the case for bilinear groups). It is possible that other types of modules with a bilinear map exist, which are not constructed from bilinear groups. The existence of such modules might lead to efficient NIWI and NIZK proofs based on entirely different intractability assumptions. We leave the construction of such modules with a bilinear map as an interesting open problem.
Appendix. Quick reference to notation.

Bilinear groups:
\( G_1, G_2, G_T: \) cyclic groups with bilinear map \( e: G_1 \times G_2 \to G_T. \)
\( p_1, p_2: \) generators of, respectively, \( G_1 \) and \( G_2. \)
Group order: prime order \( p \) or composite order \( n. \)

Modules with bilinear map:
\( R: \) finite commutative ring \((\mathbb{R}, +, \cdot, 0, 1). \)
\( A_1, A_2, A_T, B_1, B_2, B_T: \) \( \mathbb{R} \)-modules.
\( f, F: \) bilinear maps \( f: A_1 \times A_2 \to A_T \) and \( F: B_1 \times B_2 \to B_T. \)

\[ \bar{x} \cdot \bar{y} := \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(x_i, y_i), \quad \bar{x} \cdot \bar{y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} F(x_i, y_i). \]

Properties that follow from bilinearity:
\[ \bar{x} \cdot M \bar{y} = M^\top \bar{x} \cdot \bar{y}, \quad \bar{x} \cdot M \bar{y} = M^\top \bar{x} \cdot \bar{y}. \]

Commutative diagram of maps in setup:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
A_1 \times A_2 & \xrightarrow{f} & A_T \\
\downarrow{\iota_1} & & \downarrow{\iota_T} \\
B_1 \times B_2 & \xrightarrow{F} & B_T
\end{array}
\]

Commutative properties:
\[ F(\iota_1(x), \iota_2(y)) = \iota_T(f(x, y)), \quad f(p_1(x), p_2(y)) = p_T(F(x, y)). \]

Equations:
(Secret) variables: \( \bar{x} \in A_1^n, \bar{y} \in A_2^n. \)
(Public) constants: \( \bar{a} \in A_1^n, \bar{b} \in A_2^n, \Gamma \in \text{Mat}_{m \times n}(\mathbb{R}), t \in A_T. \)
Equations: \( \bar{a} \cdot \bar{y} + \bar{x} \cdot \bar{b} + \bar{x} \cdot \Gamma \bar{y} = t. \)

Commitments:
Commitment keys: \( \bar{u} \in B_1^n, \bar{v} \in B_2^n. \)
Commitments:
\[ \bar{c} := \iota_1(\bar{x}) + R\bar{u} \in B_1^m, \quad \bar{d} := \iota_2(\bar{y}) + S\bar{v} \in B_2^n. \]

NIWI proofs:
Additional setup information: \( H_1, \ldots, H_\eta \) such that \( \bar{u} \cdot H_i \bar{v} = 0. \)
Randomness in proofs: \( T \leftarrow \text{Mat}_{n \times m}(\mathbb{R}), r_1, \ldots, r_\eta \leftarrow \mathbb{R}. \)
Proofs:
\[ \bar{\pi} := R^\top \iota_2(\bar{b}) + R^\top \Gamma \iota_2(\bar{y}) + R^\top \Gamma S\bar{u} - T^\top \bar{u} + \sum_{i=1}^\eta r_i H_i \bar{v}, \]
\[ \bar{\theta} := S^\top \iota_1(\bar{a}) + S^\top \Gamma^\top \iota_1(\bar{x}) + T\bar{u}. \]
Verification: \( \iota_1(\bar{a}) \cdot \bar{d} + \bar{c} \cdot \iota_2(\bar{b}) + \bar{c} \cdot \Gamma \bar{d} = \iota_T(t) + \bar{u} \cdot \bar{\pi} + \bar{\theta} \cdot \bar{v}. \)
Acknowledgments. We gratefully acknowledge Brent Waters for a number of helpful ideas, comments, and conversations related to this work. In particular, our module-based approach can be seen as formalizing part of the intuition expressed by Waters that the decisional linear assumption, subgroup decision assumption in composite order groups, and SXDH can typically be exchanged for one another. (We were inspired by such connections previously made by [27, 34].) We thank Dan Boneh for his encouragement and for suggesting using our techniques to get fair exchange. We also thank Essam Ghadafi, Nigel Smart, and Bogdan Warinschi [20] for their helpful feedback regarding earlier online versions of this paper and for observing and correcting some errors in the instantiations based on the SXDH and DLIN assumptions.

REFERENCES


