

Short Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Jens Groth*

University College London
j.groth@ucl.ac.uk

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Abstract. We show that probabilistically checkable proofs can be used to shorten non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. We obtain publicly verifiable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for circuit satisfiability with adaptive and unconditional soundness where the size grows quasi-linearly in the number of gates. The zero-knowledge property relies on the existence of trapdoor permutations, or it can be based on a specific number theoretic assumption related to factoring to get better efficiency. As an example of the latter, we suggest a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for circuit satisfiability based on the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem consisting of a quasi-linear number of bits. This yields the shortest known non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for circuit satisfiability.

Keywords: Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, adaptive soundness, probabilistically checkable proofs, Naccache-Stern encryption.

1 Introduction

Zero-knowledge proofs introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89] are interactive protocols that enable a prover to convince a verifier about the truth of a statement without leaking any information but the fact that the statement is true. Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88] followed up by introducing non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs where the prover outputs just one message called a proof, which convinces the verifier of the truth of the statement. The central properties of zero-knowledge proofs and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge.

Completeness: If the statement is true, the prover should be able to convince the verifier.

Soundness: A malicious prover should not be able to convince the verifier if the statement is false.

Zero-knowledge: A malicious verifier learns nothing except that the statement is true.

In this paper, we focus on the NP-complete language of circuit satisfiability, which is the most widely studied language in the context of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The statement is a binary circuit C and a claim that there exists an input, a witness w , such that the circuit outputs 1 when evaluated on w . The prover has the witness w as a private input, while the statement C is public and known both to the prover and the verifier.

Only languages in BPP have non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the plain model without any setup [Ore87,GO94,GK96]. Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88] therefore suggested the common reference string model, where the prover and the verifier have access to a trusted bit-string. The common reference string can for instance be generated by a trusted third party or by a set of parties executing a multi-party computation protocol. Groth and Ostrovsky [GO07] has as an alternative suggested NIZK proofs in the multi-string model, where many parties generate a random string and the security of the NIZK proof relies on a majority of the strings

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being honestly generated. In this paper, we work in the common random string model, where the common reference string is a trusted uniformly random bit-string.

NIZK proofs have many applications, ranging from early chosen-ciphertext secure public-key cryptosystems [DDN00,Sah01] to recent advanced signature schemes [BW06,CGS07]. They have therefore been studied carefully in the literature. Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88] proposed an NIZK proof for all of NP based on a number theoretic assumption related to factoring. Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS99] gave an NIZK proof for all of NP based on the existence of trapdoor permutations. While these results established the existence of NIZK proofs based on general assumptions, other works [Dam92,DDP02,KP98] have aimed at reducing the complexity of NIZK proofs. Gentry’s fully homomorphic cryptosystem based on lattices can reduce the complexity of an NIZK to grow linearly in the witness size as opposed to the circuit size [Gen09]. Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06b,GOS06a,Gro06,GS08] have constructed highly efficient NIZK proofs using techniques from pairing-based cryptography.

1.1 Our Contribution

We construct NIZK proofs for circuit satisfiability with a size that grows quasi-linearly in the size of the circuit. Our NIZK proofs have perfect completeness, statistical soundness, and computational zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proofs can be based on trapdoor permutations or for higher efficiency on the semantic security of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem based on higher residues [NS98].

The Naccache-Stern cryptosystem is based on a decisional assumption in RSA-type groups, which predates but is otherwise incomparable to the decisional assumptions used in pairing-based NIZK proofs. Surprisingly, the construction based on the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem has better asymptotic efficiency than the recent pairing-based NIZK proofs for circuit satisfiability [GOS06b,GOS06a,GS08] (although pairing-based NIZK proofs remain more efficient for practical purposes due to the large constants involved in our construction). With pairing group elements of size k_G and a circuit size that is polynomial in the security parameter k we get an asymptotic improvement over pairing-based NIZK proofs of a multiplicative factor $\frac{k_G}{\text{polylog}(k)}$. This brings the NIZK proof size within a $\text{polylog}(k)$ factor of the size of the circuit itself.

In Table 1, we compare our NIZK proofs with the current state of the art NIZK proofs for circuit satisfiability based on respectively trapdoor permutations [KP98] and specific number theoretic assumptions [GOS06b,GOS06a]. All of these NIZK proofs have an efficient (probabilistic polynomial time) prover and they are all publicly verifiable.

	CRS size	Proof size	Assumption
Kilian-Petrank [KP98]	$\omega(C k_T k \log k)$	$\omega(C k_T k \log k)$	trapdoor perm.
This work	$ C k_T \text{polylog}(k) + \text{poly}(k)$	$ C k_T \text{polylog}(k) + \text{poly}(k)$	trapdoor perm.
Gentry [Gen09]	$\text{poly}(k)$	$ w \text{poly}(k)$	lattice-based
GOS [GOS06b,GOS06a]	$\Theta(k_G)$	$\Theta(C k_G)$	pairing-based
This work	$ C \text{polylog}(k) + \text{poly}(k)$	$ C \text{polylog}(k) + \text{poly}(k)$	Naccache-Stern

Table 1. Comparison of NIZK proofs for security parameter k , circuit size $|C| = k^{O(1)}$, witness size $|w|$, trapdoor permutations over $\{0, 1\}^{k_T}$, and pairing group size k_G (usually $k_G \approx k^3$ for 2^{-k} security [GPS08].)

Soundness and zero-knowledge can be adaptive or non-adaptive. In non-adaptive soundness and zero-knowledge, it is assumed that the statement to be proven is independent of the common reference string. Usually, NIZK proofs are used in a context where the common reference

string is publicly available though, and it is therefore unreasonable to assume the statement is independent of the common reference string.¹ Adaptive soundness and adaptive zero-knowledge refers to the more realistic setting, where NIZK proofs need to be sound and zero-knowledge even when the common reference string is publicly available and the statement may depend on the common reference string. Our NIZK proofs are both adaptively sound and adaptively zero-knowledge, and in Table 1 we have compared the schemes in the efficient prover, adaptive soundness setting.

1.2 New Techniques

PCPs IN NIZK PROOFS. Probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) [AS98,ALM⁺98,Din07] are proofs for a statement that can be verified by reading a few bits in the proof instead of reading the whole proof. A PCP for a circuit being satisfiable will be larger than the circuit itself; however, one only needs to read a few bits of the proof to get more than 50% chance of detecting an attempt to prove a false statement. By reading more bits, we can get exponentially small risk of wrongly being convinced by the PCP.

PCPs have been very useful in the context of zero-knowledge arguments. Kilian [Kil92] for instance suggested a sub-linear size zero-knowledge argument, where the prover commits to the bits of a PCP and the verifier asks the prover to reveal the content of a few of these commitments.

We use PCPs in a different way. In our NIZK proofs the prover will prove that all queries to the PCP have satisfactory answers. At first sight this may seem counterintuitive; the PCP will be larger than the statement itself and it is odd that increasing the statement size would help us in shortening the size of the NIZK proofs. Using a PCP for the statement, however, has the advantage that the verifier can grant the malicious prover a non-trivial chance of falsely answering some of the queries, as long as there are other queries where he will detect the attempt to cheat. This stands in contrast to traditional NIZK proofs, where the verifier needs high certainty for every single part of the statement being correct.

To illustrate our technique, consider an NIZK proof such as Kilian-Petrank [KP98]. They first reduce circuit satisfiability to 3SAT₅; where each clause has three variables and each variable appears in at most 5 clauses. By choosing a trapdoor permutation and revealing hard-core bits related to the common reference string, the prover can demonstrate that each clause is satisfied. There is a risk of error though, and the prover therefore needs to repeat the proof many times for each clause to increase the soundness guarantee.

Our idea is to use a PCP in a pre-processing step before applying the techniques of Kilian and Petrank. The effect of the PCP (see Section 3) is to increase the gap between satisfiable and unsatisfiable statements. In a standard 3SAT₅ statement there are unsatisfiable statements where all but one clause can be satisfied. With the PCP, however, we can ensure that either all clauses can be satisfied or alternatively a constant fraction of the clauses are unsatisfied. The advantage over Kilian and Petrank’s NIZK proof is that now we have resilience towards errors in individual clauses. Even if a malicious prover succeeds in falsely creating NIZK proofs for some of the clauses being satisfied, we still get soundness as long as this only happens for a small constant fraction of clauses. We can therefore avoid the repetition of proofs that Kilian and Petrank needed.

IMPLEMENTING A HIDDEN RANDOM STRING. We construct our NIZK proofs in two steps. We use cryptographic techniques to convert the common reference string into a hidden string of random bits, where the prover may selectively disclose some of the bits and keep other bits

¹ We have a hard time thinking of any applications where non-adaptive soundness suffices, while non-adaptive zero-knowledge sometimes may be useful.

secret. We then construct NIZK proofs that assume the existence of a string of hidden bits, where the prover may keep some of them secret and reveal others to the verifier.

Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS99] suggested the following way of implementing the hidden bits model. When working with trapdoor permutations, we can interpret the common reference string as a string of images of the trapdoor permutation. The hidden random bits are hardcore bits of the pre-images. The prover may with the knowledge of the trapdoor learn all the hidden random bits. By revealing a pre-image to the trapdoor permutation, she can disclose the value of a particular hidden random bit. This is a costly approach, however, since we only get one hidden random bit per trapdoor permutation image. In general, the common reference string has to be a factor k_T larger than the hidden random string, where k_T is the size a trapdoor permutation value.

The second contribution of this paper is using the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem [NS98] to reduce the cost of implementing the hidden bits model. We interpret the common reference string as a series of ciphertexts, but with the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem each ciphertext may hold many hardcore bits. The message space is of the form \mathbb{Z}_P , where $P = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$ is a product of small primes of size $\log k$. We will show that with the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem, it is possible to disclose the plaintext modulo p_i without revealing the rest of the plaintext. This means that we can have $\Omega(\frac{k_G}{\log k})$ hidden random bits in each ciphertext, giving a common reference string that is only a factor $O(\log k)$ larger than the hidden random string.

Combining PCPs and the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem, we get the asymptotically shortest known NIZK proofs for circuit satisfiability consisting of a quasi-linear number of bits.

1.3 Overview

We construct NIZK proofs for circuit satisfiability in three steps. In Section 3 we describe how a PCP can be used to convert the circuit into a Gap-3SAT5 formula, where either all clauses are satisfiable or alternatively there are at least a constant fraction of unsatisfiable formulae. In Section 4 we construct an NIZK proof in the hidden bits model, where it is assumed that the prover has access to a string of uniformly random bits and may reveal an arbitrary subset of these bits and their positions to the verifier. Finally, in Sections 5 and 6 we show how to implement the hidden bits model under the general assumption of the existence of trapdoor permutations and more efficiently under a concrete number theoretic assumption related to factoring. The two main contributions of the paper are the conceptual idea of using PCPs in a preprocessing step as described in Section 3 and the introduction of a new technique for efficiently implementing the hidden random bits model using the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem described in Section 6.

2 Preliminaries

NOTATION. Given two functions $f, g : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ we write $f(k) \approx g(k)$ when $|f(k) - g(k)| = O(k^{-c})$ for every constant $c > 0$. We say that f is *negligible* if $f(k) \approx 0$ and that f is *overwhelming* if $f(k) \approx 1$.

We write $y = A(x; r)$ when the algorithm A on input x and randomness r , outputs y . We write $y \leftarrow A(x)$ for the process of picking randomness r at random and setting $y = A(x; r)$. We also write $y \leftarrow S$ for sampling y uniformly at random from the set S . We will for convenience assume uniform random sampling from various types of sets is possible; there are easy ways to amend our protocols to the case where the sets are only sampleable with a distribution that is statistically close to uniform.

NIZK PROOFS. Let R be a polynomial time computable binary relation. For pairs $(C, w) \in R$ we call C the statement and w the witness. Let L be the NP-language consisting of statements

with witnesses in R . In this paper, we will focus on the case where the statements are circuits and L is the language of satisfiable circuits, i.e., where there exists an input w so $C(w) = 1$. The size of the NIZK proofs will depend on the size of the statement. We will write L_n for the language of satisfiable circuit consisting of n binary gates and write R_n for the corresponding relation.

An efficient-prover non-interactive proof for the relation R consists of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (K, P, V) . K is the common reference string generator that takes the security parameter written in unary 1^k and an intended statement size n as input and outputs a common reference string σ of length $\Omega(k)$. P is the prover algorithm that takes as input the common reference string σ , a statement C and a witness w so $(x, w) \in R$ and outputs a proof π . V is the verifier algorithm that on a common reference string σ , a statement C and a proof π outputs 0 or 1. We interpret a verifier output of 0 as a rejection of the proof and a verifier output of 1 as an acceptance of the proof. We call (K, P, V) a non-interactive proof system for R it is complete and sound as described below.

PERFECT COMPLETENESS. Completeness means that a prover with a witness can convince the verifier. For all adversaries \mathcal{A} and $n = k^{O(1)}$ we have

$$\Pr \left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k, n); (C, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma); \pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, C, w) : V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1 \text{ if } (C, w) \in R_n \right] = 1.$$

STATISTICAL SOUNDNESS. Soundness means that it is impossible to convince the verifier of a false statement. For all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries \mathcal{A} and $n = k^{O(1)}$ we have

$$\Pr \left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k, n); (C, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma) : C \notin L_n \text{ and } V(\sigma, C, \pi) = 1 \right] \approx 0.$$

COMPUTATIONAL ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. A non-interactive argument (K, P, V) is computationally zero-knowledge if it is possible to simulate the proof of a true statement without knowing the witness. Formally, we require the existence of a probabilistic polynomial time simulator $S = (S_1, S_2)$. S_1 outputs a simulated common reference string σ and a simulation trapdoor τ . S_2 takes the simulation trapdoor and a statement as input and produces a simulated proof π . We require for all non-uniform polynomial time stateful interactive adversaries \mathcal{A} and $n = k^{O(1)}$ that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\sigma \leftarrow K(1^k, n); (C, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma); \pi \leftarrow P(\sigma, C, w) : (C, w) \in R_n \text{ and } \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \right] \\ & \approx \Pr \left[(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^k, n); (C, w) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma); \pi \leftarrow S_2(\tau, C) : (C, w) \in R_n \text{ and } \mathcal{A}(\pi) = 1 \right]. \end{aligned}$$

3 Preprocessing with Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

We start by giving a polynomial time reduction f from circuit satisfiability to Gap-3SAT5. The reduction f takes as its input a circuit with n binary gates and outputs a 3SAT formula with $N = n$ polylog n variables and $\frac{5}{3}N$ clauses. The 3SAT formula, will be such that each variable appears exactly 3 times as a positive literal and 2 times as a negative literal. If the input of f is a satisfiable circuit C , it will output a satisfiable 3SAT5 formula $\phi = f(C)$. If the circuit C is unsatisfiable, the reduction f will output a formula $\phi = f(C)$ such that all assignments have at least αN unsatisfied clauses for some constant $\alpha > 0$. We also need a polynomial time witness-reduction f_w , which on input C, w such that $C(w) = 1$ outputs a satisfying assignment $f_w(C, w)$ for the 3SAT5 formula $\phi = f(C)$.

The first step in our reduction is to map the circuit C to a constraint graph $G(C)$ with the following properties. The vertices of the constraint graph G may be assigned values from a

constant size alphabet Σ , but each edge between two vertices describes a constraint on the values that they may be assigned. When starting with a satisfiable circuit, the output is a satisfiable constraint graph. However, on an unsatisfiable circuit the output is an unsatisfiable constraint graph where any assignment violates at least a α_0 -fraction of the constraints for some constant $\alpha_0 > 0$. The polynomial time assignment tester [DR04] given by Dinur [Din07] in her proof of the PCP theorem has the properties described above. Moreover, given a witness for the satisfiability of the circuit C , we may in polynomial time compute a satisfying assignment for the constraint graph $G(C)$. Dinur's most efficient assignment tester building on work by Ben-Sasson and Sudan [BSS08] outputs a constraint graph $G(C)$ with n polylog n vertices and edges.

Given a constraint graph G over a constant size alphabet Σ , we assign a constant number of binary variables to each vertex such that it is possible to represent any element from the alphabet Σ . Each constraint between two vertices is of constant size Σ^2 and we can therefore write out a constant size 3SAT formula describing the constraint. Taking the conjunction of all these 3SAT formulas, we reduce the constraint graph to a 3SAT formula with n polylog n variables and clauses. A satisfying assignment for the constraint graph gives us a satisfying assignment to the 3SAT formula. Since each vertex has a constant number of variables associated with it, and each constraint has a constant number of clauses associated with it, a constraint graph with a constant fraction α_0 of unsatisfiable constraints reduces to a 3SAT formula with a α_1 fraction of unsatisfiable clauses for some constant $\alpha_1 > 0$.

Finally, we reduce the 3SAT formula to a 3SAT5 formula where each variable appears in the clauses as exactly 5 literals and each clause has exactly 3 literals. First we copy clauses and variables so each clause has exactly 3 literals and each variable appears at least 3 times. Then the ℓ appearances of a variable as a positive literal x_i or a negative literal $\neg x_i$ are replaced with copies $x_{i1}, \dots, x_{i\ell}$. For each copy we add 4 clauses for consistency in the truth value assignment with the predecessor $x_{i,j-1 \bmod \ell}$ and the successor $x_{i,j+1 \bmod \ell}$ according to whether the original variable appeared as a positive or negative literal. In these consistency clauses the copy appears twice as a negative literal and twice as a positive literal, so all copies appear as exactly 3 positive literals and 2 negative literals in the resulting 3SAT5 formula. This is a linear size reduction, so we end up with n polylog n variables and clauses. A satisfying assignment for the 3SAT formula gives us a satisfying assignment for the resulting 3SAT5 formula. A 3SAT formula with a constant fraction α_1 of unsatisfiable clauses, gives a 3SAT5 formula with a α fraction of unsatisfiable clauses for some constant $\alpha > 0$.

In summary, there is a pair of polynomial time algorithms (f, f_w) and a constant $\alpha > 0$ so:

Reduction: f takes input a circuit C with n gates and outputs a 3SAT5 formula $f(C)$ with $N = n \text{ poly log } n$ variables. Each variable appears as 3 positive literals and 2 negative literals, and each clause has exactly 3 literals. If C is satisfiable, then $f(C)$ is satisfiable. If C is unsatisfiable, then all assignments to the variables of $f(C)$ leave at least αN clauses unsatisfied.

Witness-preservation: f_w takes as input a circuit C with n gates and a witness for C being satisfiable and outputs a truth value assignment satisfying the 3SAT5 formula $f(C)$.

4 NIZK Proofs in the Hidden Bits Model

We will now give an NIZK proof in the hidden-bits model for Gap-3SAT5-satisfiability. The ideas in this section are quite similar to Kilian and Petrank [KP98], although our setting allows us to simplify their scheme.

Let L_N be the language of satisfiable 3SAT5 formulae with N variables and $\frac{5}{3}N$ clauses, where each variable appears as 3 positive literals and 2 negative literals. Let R_N be the corresponding

relation of formulae and satisfying assignments. Further, define L_N^α as the language of formulae in L_N that have a truth-value assignment to the variables that leaves at most αN clauses unsatisfied. We will be interested in a hidden-bits NIZK proof $(\ell_H(N), P_H, V_H)$ for R with perfect completeness, $(\alpha, \epsilon_H(N))$ -soundness, and perfect zero-knowledge as described below.

PERFECT COMPLETENESS. For all $N \in 3\mathbb{N}$ and all $(\phi, w) \in R_N$ we have

$$\Pr \left[\rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_H(N)}; (i_1, \dots, i_t) \leftarrow P_H(\rho, \phi, w) : V_H(\phi, i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) = 1 \right] = 1.$$

STATISTICAL SOUNDNESS. For all $N \in 3\mathbb{N}$ and all adversaries \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr \left[\rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_H(N)}; (\phi, i_1, \dots, i_t) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\rho) : \phi \notin L_N^\alpha \text{ and } V_H(\phi, i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) = 1 \right] \leq \epsilon_H(N).$$

PERFECT ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S_H such that for all $N \in 3\mathbb{N}$ and all $(\phi, w) \in R_N$ the distribution

$$\{\rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_H(N)}; (i_1, \dots, i_t) \leftarrow P_H(\rho, \phi, w) : (i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t})\}$$

is identical to the distribution

$$\{(i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) \leftarrow S_H(\phi) : (i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t})\}.$$

4.1 Hidden-bits NIZK proof for Gap-3SAT5

Let ϕ be a 3SAT5 formula with N variables and $\frac{5}{3}N$ clauses, where each variable appears exactly thrice as a positive literal x_i and twice as a negative literal $\neg x_i$ in the clauses. The verifier has the promise that either there is an assignment to the variables so all clauses are satisfied, or all assignments of truth values to the variables lead to more than αN unsatisfied clauses. The prover has a satisfying assignment and wants to give an NIZK proof in the hidden bits model for ϕ being satisfiable.

We first sketch the NIZK proof and then afterwards explain the main ideas in the construction. There is some freedom in the choice of parameters; for concreteness we suggest $a = \lceil \frac{8}{\alpha} \rceil, b = \lceil \log N \rceil, \Delta = \lceil \frac{N}{\log N} \rceil$.

Statement: A 3SAT5 formula $\phi \in L_N$.

Prover's input: A string ρ of $6a2^{6a-1}(bN + \Delta)$ hidden bits. A truth-value assignment to the variables x_1, \dots, x_N so $\phi(x_1, \dots, x_N) = 1$.

Proof:

1. Interpret the hidden bits as $6a2^{6a-1}(bN + \Delta)$ consecutive pairs of bits. Each pair of bits is interpreted as one of three possible characters according to the following scheme

$$00 = 0 \qquad 01 = W \qquad 10 = W \qquad 11 = 1.$$

Later the prover may reveal one of the bits in a character. In a wildcard character W the prover can reveal either 0 or 1, whereas 0 can only be revealed as 0 and 1 can only be revealed as 1.

2. Interpret the characters as $2^{6a-1}(bN + \Delta)$ consecutive $6a$ -character blocks. Call a block good if it has exactly $3a$ W -characters and they are either all in the first half of the block or all in the second half of the block. Otherwise, call the block bad.
3. A block has 2^{1-6a} chance of being good, so we expect on average $(bN + \Delta)$ good blocks. If the number of good blocks is outside the interval $[bN; bN + 2\Delta]$ reveal all hidden bits and halt.

4. Reveal to the verifier all the hidden bits associated with bad blocks.
5. Assign the first b good blocks to the first variable, etc., so each variable has b blocks assigned to it. The remaining good blocks will not be used.
6. Interpret each good block as a set of 6 consecutive a -character strings (see examples in Figure 1). Assign in the order of appearance, 5 of these a -character strings to the 5 appearances of their variable x_i in the clauses as follows. If the witness has $x_i = 1$, assign the 3 wildcard strings to the 3 appearances of x_i , and the first 2 0/1-strings to the 2 appearances of $\neg x_i$. If the witness has $x_i = 0$, assign the first 2 wildcard strings to the 2 appearances of $\neg x_i$ and the 3 0/1-strings to the 3 appearances of x_i . Taking all good blocks into account, each appearance of x_i or $\neg x_i$ has b a -character strings assigned to it.
7. Each clause has 3 literals, and each literal has a corresponding tuple of b a -character strings. Pick at random a literal for which the b a -character strings only contain wildcard characters. Such a literal must exist since the clause is satisfied by the truth-value assignment. For the other two literals reveal a random bit in each character's bit pair, thereby revealing two ab -bit strings. In the remaining wildcard literal, reveal in each wildcard character one of the bits, such that the revealed ab -bit string is the exclusive-or of the two other ab -bit strings.
8. The proof consists of the revealed bits. If the number of good blocks is outside the interval $[bN; bN + 2\Delta]$ the proof reveals all hidden bits. Else, the proof reveals the hidden bits of the bad blocks and a $\frac{5}{12}$ -fraction of the hidden bits in the first bN good blocks.

Verification:

1. If the proof reveals all hidden bits, return 1 if the number of good blocks is outside the range $[bN; bN + 2\Delta]$ and else return 0.
2. Verify that there are no good blocks among the blocks where all bits have been revealed.
3. Verify that there are at most $bN + 2\Delta$ blocks where some of the bits remain hidden. Associate the first bN blocks with the variables in the order of appearance.
4. Verify that in each of the bN blocks corresponding to variables, exactly 5 of the 6 a -character strings have one revealed bit in each character. Verify also that in each block either the last a -character string in the first half of the block, or the last a -character string in the second half of the block has no revealed bits. Based on this, each revealed a -bit string can be uniquely associated with a corresponding literal in a clause.
5. For each clause, verify that the exclusive-or of the two first ab -bit strings corresponding to the first 2 literals equals the ab -bit string corresponding to the third literal.
6. Return 1 if all verifications passed, else return 0.

In the first step, note that there is 50% chance that a character is a wildcard and 50% chance that it is a 0 or a 1. Later, the prover will open some of the characters by revealing one of the bits. Wildcards can be opened as 0 or 1, whereas 0 can only be opened as 0 and 1 can only be opened as 1. The prover sets up the strings so wildcards correspond to true literals and non-wildcards correspond to false literals. In satisfied clauses there is a true literal, which can be opened at will. This is what gives the prover with a satisfying assignment the power to convince the verifier. On the other hand, in an unsatisfied clause there will only be non-wildcard characters associated with the false literals, which will reduce the power of the prover and make it hard to convince the verifier of a false statement. Finally, for zero-knowledge we can set more of the characters to be wildcard characters. This will make it possible to simulate a proof without knowing a satisfying truth assignment for the statement.

We interpret the string of characters as blocks of $6a$ characters. There will be an expected number of $bN + \Delta$ good blocks. We can use Chernoff-bounds to see that there is high probability

that most of the hidden blocks that have not been revealed are indeed good blocks. The point of sampling good blocks is that they represent a consistent view of a variable. All true literals are assigned wildcard strings, all false literals are assigned non-wildcard string.

010...101	100...011	010...110	WW...W	WW...W	WW...W
WW...W	WW...W	WW...W	010...110	000...111	100...101

Fig. 1. Two examples of good blocks.

The important thing to note is that with wildcard string, the prover may open the true literals to any a -bit string. For the false literals, however, the prover is bound to a particular a -bit string. We require that in each clause, the prover should open 3 a -bit strings, such that they exclusive-or to 0. In clauses with a true literal this is easy to accomplish, since the prover may open the corresponding wildcard string to any a -bit string. This gives us completeness. In unsatisfied clauses, however, the prover has 3 fixed a -bit strings and the probability of their exclusive-or being 0 is 2^{-a} . For each unsatisfied clause, we therefore get a good chance of catching a cheating prover.

We have now described the main idea in the construction. The prover has some degrees of freedom in choosing the statement, taking advantage of a few bad blocks that may be camouflaged as good blocks, etc. However, by repeating the proof b times in parallel and using the fact that for unsatisfiable statement there is actually a constant fraction of unsatisfied clauses no matter what the truth assignment is, we can ensure that a cheating prover still has very small chance of convincing the verifier on a false statement.

Theorem 1. *For sufficiently large N the protocol given above is a hidden-bits NIZK proof for 3SAT5 with perfect completeness, $(\alpha, 2^{-\frac{N}{6 \log^3 N}})$ -soundness and perfect zero-knowledge with a hidden string of size $\ell_H(N) = O(N \log N)$.*

Proof. Perfect completeness follows by direct verification.

For perfect zero-knowledge, consider the simulator S_H that selects a random string $\rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_H(N)}$ and sorts it into good and bad blocks just as the prover would. If there are less than bN good blocks or more than $bN + 2\Delta$ good blocks, it reveals the entire string just as a real prover would. The probability of falling outside the $[bN; bN + 2\Delta]$ range is the same in both real proofs and in the simulation.

Let us now focus on the case, where the number of good blocks is within the range. The simulator assigns good blocks to variables as the real prover does and for each good block flips a coin as to whether positive or negative literals should be assigned the first or second half of the characters. Next, it replaces the non-wildcards associated with literals in each good block with wildcards by flipping the last bit of each non-wildcard bit-pair. For each clause, the three literals therefore have associated ab -character strings consisting of wildcard characters only. The prover selects at random for each character in the two first strings whether to open the first or second bit of the character, and opens the corresponding bits in the ab -character string for the third literal to the exclusive-or of these two bits. This way, the prover constructs a proof that looks uniformly random under the condition that all clauses must have ab -bit strings that exclusive-or to 0. If we look at a real proof, we get for any given truth-value assignment the same distribution because the hidden bits are uniformly random.

We now proceed to evaluating the soundness of the protocol assuming we have a statement ϕ such that for any assignment there are at least αN unsatisfied clauses. First, let us find Chernoff-bounds for the probability that the number of good blocks falls outside the range $[bN; bN + 2\Delta]$. There are $2^{6a-1}(bN + \Delta)$ candidate blocks each having probability 2^{1-6a} of being a good block. Letting X be the number of good blocks we expect an average of $bN + \Delta$ good blocks, so we get the following Chernoff-bound

$$\Pr[X \leq bN] \leq e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\Delta}{bN+\Delta}\right)^2(bN+\Delta)} = e^{-\frac{1}{2}\frac{\Delta^2}{bN+\Delta}}.$$

We also get the Chernoff-bound

$$\Pr[X \geq bN + 2\Delta] \leq e^{-\frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{\Delta}{bN+\Delta}\right)^2(bN+\Delta)} = e^{-\frac{1}{3}\frac{\Delta^2}{bN+\Delta}}.$$

The combined probability of being outside the $[bN; bN + 2\Delta]$ range is therefore less than

$$e^{-\frac{1}{2}\frac{\Delta^2}{bN+\Delta}} + e^{-\frac{1}{3}\frac{\Delta^2}{bN+\Delta}} < 2^{-\frac{1}{3}\frac{\Delta^2}{bN+\Delta}}$$

Let us now continue the soundness analysis under the assumption that there are between bN and $bN + 2\Delta$ good blocks. The verifier rejects the proof if there are more than $bN + 2\Delta$ blocks where some bits remain hidden. A cheating prover can therefore hide at most 2Δ bad blocks and pretend they are good blocks. Let us make the worst case assumption that the cheating prover hides 2Δ blocks that consist only of wildcard characters, which would enable the prover to prove anything in the clauses involving variables from the bad block. These variables can affect up to 5 clauses each, for a total of up to 10Δ clauses. Again, making the worst case assumption, we will say the prover can select 10Δ arbitrary clauses where it can cheat with the proof. The remaining variables and clauses will be assigned good blocks only.

The cheating prover has some control over which good block each variable is assigned. It may choose to cheat by using a bad block in some spot, which will shift the assignment of the subsequent good blocks to variables. In the worst case, the prover has complete freedom of where it will inject up to 2Δ bad blocks between the good blocks. The prover may therefore choose from up to

$$\binom{bN + 2\Delta}{2\Delta} \leq \left(e \frac{bN + 2\Delta}{2\Delta}\right)^{2\Delta} < 2^{2\Delta \log N}$$

different assignment of good blocks to variables.

Another freedom the prover has is that in each good block, it may assign the wildcard strings to the positive literals or to the negative literals. Since each variable has b blocks, this gives it 2^{bN} possible ways to assign a character strings to the variables.

Finally, the prover is adaptive and may choose the false statement to be proven freely from L_N^α . With $5N$ literals to assign to $\frac{5}{3}N$ clauses there are less than $(\frac{5}{3}N)^{5N} < 2^{6N \log N}$ choices of statement $\phi \in L_N^\alpha$.

We have now described the degrees of freedom available to the prover, but there are constraints as well. Consider a fixed choice of a particular statement, injection of bad blocks, etc. The proof can be considered as b layers of parallel proofs with a single good block associated to each variable. We see that within each layer the choice of associating the positive or the negative literal with the wildcard strings of a good block, indirectly indicates a truth-value assignment to the variables. However, there are at least $\alpha N - 10\Delta$ clauses that will not be satisfied by this truth value assignment. For the unsatisfied clauses, the three literals have three corresponding random non-wildcard a -character strings that can only be opened in one way. The probability

that the exclusive-or of the three a -bit strings is 0 is therefore 2^{-a} . With at least $\alpha N - 10\Delta$ unsatisfied clauses, we get a probability of $2^{-a(\alpha N - 10\Delta)}$ in each layer for convincing the verifier. Totalling over b layers, we get a probability of $2^{-ab(\alpha N - 10\Delta)}$ of convincing the verifier for this particular statement, injection of bad blocks, etc.

Combining everything for the case where the number of good blocks is between bN and $bN + 2\Delta$, we get a soundness error of less than

$$2^{2\Delta \log N} \cdot 2^{bN} \cdot 2^{6N \log N} \cdot 2^{-ab(\alpha N - 10\Delta)} = 2^{2\Delta \log N + bN + 6N \log N - ab(\alpha N - 10\Delta)}.$$

The combined soundness error is therefore

$$\max\left(2^{-\frac{1}{3} \frac{\Delta^2}{bN + \Delta}}, 2^{2\Delta \log N + bN + 6N \log N - ab(\alpha N - 10\Delta)}\right).$$

Choosing $a = \lceil \frac{8}{\alpha} \rceil$, $b = \lceil \log N \rceil$, $\Delta = \lceil \frac{N}{\log N} \rceil$ we get a soundness error smaller than $\epsilon_H(N) = 2^{-\frac{N}{6 \log^3 N}}$. \square

5 Implementing the Hidden Bits Proof with Trapdoor Permutations

TRAPDOOR PERMUTATIONS. We will now implement the hidden bits NIZK proof using trapdoor permutations. A trapdoor permutation is a triple of algorithms (K_T, F, F^{-1}) . K_T generates a public key pk , which we for convenience will assume has k bits, and a secret key sk for the trapdoor permutation. F_{pk} and F_{sk}^{-1} are efficiently computable permutations of k -bit strings, such that $F_{pk}(F_{sk}^{-1}(y)) = y$. We will assume it is hard to compute F_{sk}^{-1} without knowledge of sk . All trapdoor permutations can easily be converted into trapdoor permutations with a hardcore predicate [GL89] so we will assume the existence of a hardcore predicate B for the trapdoor permutation. If $y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ is chosen uniformly at random then $B(F_{sk}^{-1}(y))$ is uniformly random in $\{0, 1\}$ and given only (pk, y) it is computationally hard to decide $B(F_{sk}^{-1}(y))$.

IMPLEMENTING THE HIDDEN BIT STRING. To implement a hidden bit string with N' random bits, we generate a common reference string σ consisting of $k(4N' + 4\Delta')$ uniformly random bits. There is a range of choices of Δ' , for the sake of concreteness let us say $\Delta' = \lceil (N')^{\frac{3}{4}} \rceil$. The prover picks a trapdoor permutation and interprets σ as $4N' + 4\Delta'$ images of the trapdoor permutation. This gives the prover $4N' + 4\Delta'$ secret hardcore bits. The prover can selectively open some of the hardcore bits by computing the corresponding preimages and giving them to the verifier. This idea first described in [FLS99] indicates how we can generate hidden random bits that the prover can see and selectively disclose to the verifier.

Our hidden bits proof has perfect zero-knowledge if the simulator can choose the hidden bits itself. Once a trapdoor permutation has been chosen we cannot alter the preimages though so we have not yet implemented the hidden bits model in the *adaptive* zero-knowledge sense. The problem is that the common reference string is chosen before the adversary picks the statement and therefore the simulator needs to get hidden bits out of the simulated common reference string that can be revealed as both 0 and 1 depending on what is needed in the simulation. Our solution is to interpret pairs of hardcore bits as hidden bits as follows:

$$00 = \mathbf{0} \quad 01 = S \quad 10 = S \quad 11 = \mathbf{1}.$$

The prover reveals a hidden bit by revealing one of the two preimages associated with it. This means it is bound to open $\mathbf{0}$ as 0 and open $\mathbf{1}$ as 1, but it can open a soft bit S as either 0 or 1. In the zero-knowledge simulation, we will set up the common reference string such that all

hidden bits are soft. When all hidden bits are soft, the zero-knowledge simulator can open them as it likes and simulate the hidden bits proof.

When half the hidden bits are soft we have to be careful to preserve soundness though. We therefore require that the prover reveals the preimages corresponding to soft hidden bits. On average the prover should reveal $N' + \Delta'$ soft hidden bits; and the verifier checks that at last N' soft hidden bits are revealed. This leaves the prover with approximately N' hidden bits, which mostly will be hard hidden bits which can only be opened as 0 or only be opened as 1. Soundness will now follow from the fact that most of the remaining hidden bits are uniformly random hard bits.

NIZK PROOF. We will now give the full NIZK proof for circuit satisfiability. The statement will be a circuit C and the prover will have a satisfying witness w so $C(w) = 1$. We have to be careful that the prover chooses a well-formed public key for the trapdoor permutation and will therefore use an NIZK proof $(\ell_{\text{well}}, P_{\text{well}}, V_{\text{well}})$ for well-formedness. This NIZK proof could for instance be Kilian and Petrank's original NIZK proof [KP98], which would have a cost of $\text{poly}(k)$ bits. Alternatively, we could assume the existence of certifiable trapdoor permutations where the well-formedness of the public key is directly verifiable. Or we could use Bellare and Yung's [BY92] method of sampling preimages to show that the public key describes a function close to a trapdoor permutation and then give a more careful probability analysis that deals with the small statistical bias this might introduce in the hidden bits. We will in the following let $N' = O(N \log N) = n \text{ polylog}(n)$ be the number of bits needed in the hidden bits model for circuits with n gates.

Common reference string: $\sigma = (\sigma_{1,1}, \dots, \sigma_{2N'+2\Delta',2}, \sigma_{\text{well}}) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k(4N'+4\Delta')+\ell_{\text{well}}(k)}$.

Proof:

1. Generate keys for the trapdoor permutation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow K_{\text{T}}(1^k)$.
 2. Compute an NIZK proof π_{well} for pk being a valid public trapdoor permutation key.
 3. Compute the hardcore bits $h_{1,1}, h_{1,2}, \dots, h_{2N'+2\Delta',1}, h_{2N'+2\Delta',2}$ as $h_{i,j} = B(F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{i,j}))$.
 4. If there are less than N' pairs or more than $N' + 2\Delta'$ pairs where $h_{i,1} = h_{i,2}$ return the proof $(pk, \pi_{\text{well}}, F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{1,1}), \dots, F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{2N'+2\Delta',2}))$ and halt.
 5. For each pair $h_{i,1} \neq h_{i,2}$ include preimages $\pi_{i,1} = F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{i,1})$ and $\pi_{i,2} = F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{i,2})$ in the proof.
 6. Let $\rho = (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_{N'})$ be the values of the first N' remaining pairs of hardcore bits.
 7. Run the hidden bit string proof on ρ to get $\pi_H \leftarrow P_H(\rho, f(C), f_w(w))$.
 8. For all revealed bits ρ_i in the hidden bits proof π_H corresponding to hardcore bits $h_{j,1} = h_{j,2}$ choose at random to include either $\pi_{j,1} = F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{j,1})$ or $\pi_{j,2} = F_{sk}^{-1}(\sigma_{j,2})$ in the proof.
- The proof is of the form $(pk, \pi_{\text{well}}, \pi_{i_1, j_1}, \dots, \pi_{i_t, j_t})$.

Verification:

1. Verify the NIZK proof π_{well} for pk being a correctly generated public trapdoor permutation key.
2. Verify the correctness of all the preimages $\sigma_{i,j} = F_{pk}(\pi_{i,j})$.
3. Compute the corresponding hardcore bits $h_{i,j} = B(\pi_{i,j})$.
4. If all hardcore bits have been revealed, verify that there are less than N' or more than $N' + 2\Delta'$ pairs $h_{i,1} = h_{i,2}$ and accept if all verifications have succeeded.
5. Verify that all revealed pairs of hardcore bits have $h_{i,1} \neq h_{i,2}$ and that there are between N' and $N' + 2\Delta'$ pairs left in which at most one hardcore bit has been revealed.
6. Interpret the remaining hardcore bits as indices and revealed bits $(i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t})$ in a hidden bits proof and accept if all verifications have succeeded and $V_H(f(C), i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) = 1$.

Theorem 2. *Assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations on $\{0,1\}^k$ with k -bit keys there is an NIZK proof for circuit satisfiability with perfect completeness, statistical soundness and computational zero-knowledge. The size of the common reference string and the NIZK proof is $|C| \text{ polylog } |C| \cdot k + \text{poly}(k)$ bits.*

Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the perfect completeness of the NIZK proof for well-formedness and the perfect completeness of the hidden bits proof.

Let us now describe the zero-knowledge simulator. The common reference string simulator S_1 chooses a trapdoor permutation $(pk, sk) \leftarrow K_T(1^k)$ and picks $\sigma \in \{0,1\}^{k(4N'+4\Delta')+\ell_{\text{well}}(k)}$ such that all the hidden bits are soft and simulates a proof π_{well} for pk being well-formed. The simulation trapdoor is $\tau = (pk, sk, \pi_{\text{well}})$. The proof simulator S_2 when given a circuit C uses the public key pk and the proof π_{well} in the simulated proof. It flips a coin for all the hidden bits as to whether they should be revealed as soft. With overwhelming probability the remaining number of hidden soft bits will be between N' and $N' + 2\Delta'$ so the simulation does not run into trouble. The simulator then runs $(i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) \leftarrow S_H(f(C))$ to get a hidden bits model proof and opens the soft hidden bits accordingly.

A real common reference string with a real proof is indistinguishable from a real proof where we simulate the proof π_{well} for well-formedness. This makes it computationally indistinguishable from choosing the hardcore bits so all hidden bits are soft. With soft hidden hardcore bits the hidden bits simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from a real hidden bits proof, so we conclude that our NIZK proof for circuit satisfiability has computational zero-knowledge.

It remains to prove that we have statistical soundness. The common reference string is uniformly random, but the adversarial prover has some influence over the hidden bit string: it can choose $pk \in \{0,1\}^k$ and if there are more than N' soft hidden bits it may opt to let some of them go undisclosed and later open them freely as 0 or 1. The NIZK proof for well-formedness gives the adversary negligible probability for using a malformed pk but there may be up to 2^k choices of well-formed public keys each yielding a different set of hardcore bits. Even with 2^k different sets of hardcore bits a Chernoff-bound gives negligible probability of having less than N' hard bits so for each possible public key there can be at most $2\Delta'$ soft hidden bits. Assuming the worst case, where the adversary could place the soft hidden bits anywhere among the hard hidden bits there would for a fixed public key be up to $\binom{N'+2\Delta'}{2\Delta'} < 2^{\frac{1}{2}(N')^{\frac{3}{4}} \log(N')}$ possible choices of hidden bit strings.

Consider now a fixed public key pk and a fixed placement of the up to $2\Delta'$ soft bits among the hard hidden bits. The uniformly random choice of the common reference string induces a uniformly random distribution of hidden hard bits leaving up to $2\Delta'$ soft bits in fixed positions to be chosen as 0s or 1s by the adversary. The hidden bits proof has a soundness error of $\epsilon_H(N)$ leaving the adversary with at most $\epsilon_H(N)2^{2\Delta'}$ chance of being able to cheat. Since there are at most 2^k well-formed public keys and less than $2^{\frac{1}{2}(N')^{\frac{3}{4}} \log(N')}$ possible placements of soft bits for any given public key this means the soundness error is less than $\epsilon_H(N)2^{2\Delta'}2^k2^{\frac{1}{2}(N')^{\frac{3}{4}} \log N'} < \epsilon_H(N)2^{(N')^{\frac{3}{4}} \log N'}$. With $\epsilon_H(N) = 2^{-\frac{N}{6 \log^3 N}}$ and $N' = O(N \log N)$ we therefore get a negligible soundness error. \square

6 Implementing the Hidden Bits Proof with Naccache-Stern Encryption

NACCACHE-STERN ENCRYPTION. The Naccache-Stern cryptosystem based on higher residues [NS98] has message space \mathbb{Z}_P where P is a product of small primes. We will show how to reveal the plaintext modulo a small prime factor p_i without revealing the rest of the plaintext.

Interpreting even numbers as 0, odd numbers as 1, and $p_i - 1$ as “ignore” we get a uniform distribution of hardcore bits modulo p_i assuming the Naccache-Stern encryption is semantically secure. With Naccache-Stern’s cryptosystem having constant expansion rate and each prime factor of the message space being of logarithmic size in the security parameter we can construct a hidden random bits implementation that is quasi-linear in the number of hidden bits.

In the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem the public key is of the form $pk = (M, P, g)$, where M is a k -bit RSA modulus, P is a product of small odd primes p_1, \dots, p_d so $\gcd(8P^2, \varphi(M)) = 4P$, and $g \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ is a group element with $\text{ord}(g) = \frac{\varphi(M)}{4}$. The secret key is $sk = \varphi(M)$. Encrypting a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_P$ with randomness $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ yields the ciphertext

$$c = g^m r^P \pmod{M}.$$

To decrypt a ciphertext c , compute $c^{\frac{\varphi(M)}{P}} = (g^{\frac{\varphi(M)}{P}})^m$ and use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for finding discrete logarithms in groups with a smooth order to compute $m \pmod{P}$.

The cryptographic assumption underlying our NIZK proof is that there is a probabilistic polynomial time key generator K_{NS} for generating Naccache-Stern keys (pk, sk) such that the cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure and the number of small prime factors in P is larger than $\beta \frac{k}{\log k}$ for some constant $\beta > 0$. We refer to Naccache and Stern [NS98] for concrete key generator suggestions and a proof that the resulting cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure under a computational intractability assumption related to higher residues.

OPENING AND SIMULATING OPENINGS OF HARDCORE BITS. In the implementation of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem, the prover will generate Naccache-Stern keys $pk = (M, P, g)$ and $sk = \varphi(M)$. The random string is interpreted as a series of k -bit integers where those outside \mathbb{Z}_M^* are ignored. An integer in \mathbb{Z}_M^* can be interpreted as a ciphertext encrypting some message $m \pmod{P}$ where $P = \prod_{i=1}^t p_i$. Since there are $d = \lceil \frac{\beta k}{\log k} \rceil$ prime factors in P , this gives the prover d residues $\{m \pmod{p_i}\}_{i=1}^d$, each of which is translated into a hardcore bit. The prover will use the first N' hardcore bits as the hidden bit string and since she gets $\Theta(\frac{k}{\log k})$ bits per element in \mathbb{Z}_M^* she only loses a logarithmic factor in implementing the hidden bit string.

The key observation needed for using Naccache-Stern encryption in this way is that the prover may verifiably disclose $m_i = m \pmod{p_i}$ without revealing the other parts of the message. Consider a particular k -bit block $c \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$, which the prover can decrypt to get the plaintext $m \in \mathbb{Z}_P$. All $c \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ are valid ciphertexts but there are P different $r \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ so $c = r^P g^m$ so we will for notational convenience fix an arbitrary such r in the following. To prove $m_i = m \pmod{p_i}$ is indeed part of the plaintext the prover gives a proof π satisfying

$$\pi^P = (cg^{-m_i})^{\frac{P}{p_i}}.$$

Raising both sides to the power $\frac{\phi(M)}{P}$ shows

$$1 = (\pi^P)^{\frac{\phi(M)}{P}} = (r^P g^{m-m_i})^{\frac{P}{p_i} \frac{\phi(M)}{P}} = (g^{\frac{\phi(M)}{p_i}})^{m-m_i}$$

telling the verifier that $m_i = m \pmod{p_i}$ since $P \mid \text{ord}(g)$. The prover with the secret key $\phi(M)$ can compute a random π satisfying the equation by choosing $s \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ at random and setting

$$\pi = (cg^{-m_i})^{(P-1 \bmod \frac{\varphi(M)}{P}) \frac{P}{p_i} s^{\frac{\phi(M)}{P}}}.$$

In the NIZK proof, we will generalize this idea to verifiably disclose $m \pmod{P_I}$ for arbitrary $P_I = \prod_{i \in I} p_i$. This makes it possible for the prover to reveal many values $\{m \pmod{p_i}\}_{i \in I}$ simultaneously.

There is a little variation in how many hardcore bits the prover gets out of a common reference string since not all k -bit integers will belong to \mathbb{Z}_M^* and some hardcore bits are ignored but we can use Chernoff bounds to get a good estimate of how many hardcore bits the prover can extract and tune the proof accordingly. Since the verifier obtains proofs π for the correctness of the opened hardcore bits the soundness of the hidden bit proof system implies soundness of the full NIZK proof for circuit satisfiability.

The zero-knowledge property will come from using a different type of public key. Instead of using g that has order $\frac{\phi(M)}{4}$ the simulator will pick g with order $\frac{\phi(M)}{4P}$. As we shall see in the security proof, the semantic security of the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem implies that the two types of public keys are computationally indistinguishable. With the latter choice of public key $\text{ord}(g) = \frac{\phi(M)}{4P}$ we can write $g = (g')^P$ and now a ciphertext is no longer binding since $c = r^P g^m = r^P (g')^{mP} = (r(g')^{m-m'})^P g^{m'}$ is at the same time an “encryption” of m and m' . The simulator sets up the common reference string so it contains ciphertexts that can be opened to any hardcore bits it chooses thereby allowing it to simulate the hidden bits proof.

NIZK PROOF BASED ON NACCACHE-STERN ENCRYPTION. We will now give the full NIZK proof for circuit satisfiability. The statement is a circuit C and the prover will have a satisfying witness w so $C(w) = 1$. Naccache-Stern keys are not directly verifiable, so we let $(\ell_{\text{well}}, P_{\text{well}}, V_{\text{well}})$ be an NIZK proof system for well-formedness of a Naccache-Stern public key. This NIZK proof could for instance be Kilian and Petrank’s original NIZK proof [KP98], which would have a cost of $\text{poly}(k)$ bits. We will in the following let $N' = O(N \log N) = n \text{ polylog}(n)$ be the number of bits needed in the hidden bits model for circuits with n gates and let $\Delta' = \Theta((N')^{\frac{3}{4}})$. For notational simplicity, we will assume $d|N'$ and $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta} \in \mathbb{Z}$, where $d = \lceil \frac{\beta k}{\log k} \rceil$ for a constant $\beta > 0$ and δ is defined in the protocol.

Common reference string: $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\frac{3N'}{d}}, \sigma_{\text{well}}) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k \frac{3N'}{d} + \ell_{\text{well}}(k)}$.

Proof:

1. Generate Naccache-Stern keys $(pk, sk) = ((M, P, g), \phi(M)) \leftarrow K_{\text{NS}}(1^k)$ with $P = \prod_{i=1}^d p_i$.
2. Compute an NIZK proof π_{well} for the well-formedness of $pk = (M, P, g)$.
3. Define $\delta = d - \sum_{i=1}^d \frac{1}{p_i}$ and let $c_1, \dots, c_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}$ be the first $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ of $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\frac{3N'}{d}} \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$.²

If there are less than $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ of them return the proof $\pi = (pk, sk)$.

4. Decrypt $c_1, \dots, c_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}$ to get plaintexts $m_1, \dots, m_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}$. Define $m_{i,j} = m_j \bmod p_i$.
5. Define $h_{1,1}, \dots, h_{d, \frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}$ as $h_{i,j} = \perp$ if $m_{i,j} = -1$ and otherwise $h_{i,j} = 0$ if $m_{i,j}$ is even and $h_{i,j} = 1$ if $m_{i,j}$ is odd. If there are less than N' or more than $N' + 2\Delta'$ hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$ return the proof $\pi = (pk, sk)$.
6. Define $\rho = (\rho_1, \dots, \rho_{N'})$ as the first N' hardcore bits $h_{i,j}$.
7. Run the hidden bit string proof on ρ to get $\pi_H \leftarrow P_H(\rho, f(C), f_w(w))$.
8. Define $m_{i,j}$ as revealed if the hardcore bit $h_{i,j}$ is revealed in π_H or $h_{i,j} = \perp$.
9. Let for all j the set $I_j \subset \{1, \dots, d\}$ be the indices i for which $m_{i,j}$ is revealed. Define

$m_{I_j} = m_j \bmod P_{I_j}$ where $P_{I_j} = \prod_{i \in I_j} p_i$. Compute $\pi_j = (cg^{-m_{I_j}})^{(P^{-1} \bmod \frac{\phi(M)}{P}) \frac{P}{P_{I_j}} \frac{\phi(M)}{P}} s_j$ for a randomly chosen $s_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_M^*$.

The proof is either $\pi = (pk, sk)$ or $\pi = (pk, \pi_{\text{well}}, I_1, m_{I_1}, \pi_1, \dots, I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}, m_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}}, \pi_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}})$.

Verification:

1. If the proof is of the form $\pi = (pk, sk)$ accept it if and only if the key is well-formed (the secret key can be of a form so this can be verified) and there are less than $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ values in \mathbb{Z}_M^* or the number of valid hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0, 1\}$ is less than N' or higher than $N' + 2\Delta'$.

² We represent elements of \mathbb{Z}_M^* as integers in the range $\{1, \dots, M-1\}$.

2. Verify the NIZK proof π_{well} for $pk = (M, P, g)$ being a correctly generated public Naccache-Stern key with d small odd primes p_1, \dots, p_d .
3. Identify the first $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ values $c_1, \dots, c_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}} \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$. Reject if there are less than $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ of them.
4. Verify the proofs $\pi_j^P = (cg^{-m_{I_j}})^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}} \bmod M$ and compute the hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$ corresponding to $m_{I_1}, \dots, m_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}}$. Reject if the number of unopened hardcore bits plus opened valid hardcore bits $h_{i,j}$ is less than N' or more than $N' + 2\Delta'$.
5. Interpret the $h_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$ as a hidden bits proof $(i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t})$. Accept the proof if and only if all the verifications succeeded and $V_H(f(C), i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) = 1$.

Theorem 3. *Assuming the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure, there is an NIZK proof for circuit satisfiability with perfect completeness, statistical soundness and computational zero-knowledge. The size of the common random string and the proof is $|C|$ polylog $|C| + \text{poly}(k)$ bits.*

Proof. The NIZK proof for well-formedness can be set up with perfect completeness and the hidden bits proof has perfect completeness. Straightforward verification now gives us perfect completeness.

We will now show that the NIZK proof is statistically sound. If (pk, sk) is revealed, we can use the secret key to check that the Naccache-Stern key pk is well-formed. For a well-formed key, Chernoff bounds give negligible probability of having less than $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ values $\sigma_j \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ or having less than N' hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$ or more than $N' + 2\Delta'$ hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$. So there is negligible probability of accepting a proof of the form (pk, sk) .

Consider now a proof of the form $(pk, \pi_{\text{well}}, I_1, m_{I_1}, \pi_1, \dots, I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}, m_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}}, \pi_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}})$. By the statistical soundness of the NIZK proof for well-formedness of the key, we may assume the public key $pk = (M, P, g)$ is well-formed. For each $c_j = r_j^P g^{m_j}$ consider now the verification of the proofs $\pi_j^P = (cg^{-m_{I_j}})^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}}$, which after raising to the power $\frac{\phi(M)}{P}$ gives us

$$1 = (\pi_j^P)^{\frac{\phi(M)}{P}} = ((r_j^P g^{m_j - m_{I_j}})^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}})^{\frac{\phi(M)}{P}} = (g^{\frac{\phi(M)}{P_{I_j}}})^{m_j - m_{I_j}}.$$

The order of $g^{\frac{\phi(M)}{P_{I_j}}}$ is P_{I_j} so $m_{I_j} = m_j \bmod P_{I_j}$ and therefore the partial plaintext m_{I_j} is correct.

There are less than 2^{3k} valid public keys. Using appropriate Chernoff bounds (taking into account the different probabilities $\frac{1}{p_i}$ for a hardcore bit being $h_{i,j} = \perp$) we get negligible probability for there being less than N' or more than $N' + 2\Delta'$ valid hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$ with any of the possible public keys. Assume the worst case scenario with up to $N' + 2\Delta'$ hardcore bits $h_{i,j} \in \{0,1\}$ leaving the prover with the choice of $\binom{N'+2\Delta'}{2\Delta'} < 2^{\Delta' \log N'}$ possible hidden bit strings. The prover then has less than $2^{3k} \cdot 2^{\Delta' \log N'}$ possible hidden bit strings and with a soundness error of $\epsilon_H(N) = 2^{-\frac{N}{6 \log^3 N}}$ and $N' = O(N \log N)$ this path also leaves the prover with negligible soundness error.

Let us now describe the zero-knowledge simulator (S_1, S_2) . The common reference string simulator S_1 chooses $((M, P, g'), \phi(M)) \leftarrow K_{\text{NS}}(1^k)$, sets $g = (g')^P$ and defines $pk = (M, P, g)$. It simulates an NIZK proof for pk being a valid public key. It chooses $c_1, \dots, c_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}$ so $c_j = r_j^P$. It chooses $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{\frac{3N'}{d}} \in \{0,1\}^k$ at random substituting the first $\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}$ values that belongs to \mathbb{Z}_M^* with $c_1, \dots, c_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}$. It returns the simulated common reference string σ together with the trapdoor $\tau = (pk, g', \pi_{\text{well}}, r_1, \dots, r_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}})$.

When S_2 is given a circuit C it simulates an NIZK proof as follows: It selects pk, π_{well} as the public key and the proof of well-formedness. It simulates a hidden bits proof $\pi_H = (i_1, \rho_{i_1}, \dots, i_t, \rho_{i_t}) \leftarrow S_H(f(C))$. It picks $m_{I_1}, \dots, m_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}} \in \mathbb{Z}_P$ conditioned on getting the hidden bits proof π_H and defines the sets and messages $I_1, m_{I_1}, \dots, I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}, m_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}}$ accordingly. It computes the proofs $\pi_{I_j} = (r_j^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}}(g')^{-m_{I_j}})^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}}$ and returns the simulated proof $\pi = (pk, \pi_{\text{well}}, I_1, m_{I_1}, \pi_1, \dots, I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}, m_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}}, \pi_{I_{\frac{N'+\Delta'}{\delta}}})$.

We cannot distinguish a real proof from a hybrid real proof where we simulate the well-formedness proof π_{well} . Given a real public key (M, P, g) we can instead of using the decryption key, set up the system so the relevant c_j 's are of the form $c_j = r_j^P g^{m_j}$ for random r_j, m_j and compute the corresponding proofs as $\pi_j = r_j^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}} g^{\frac{m_j - m_{I_j}}{P_{I_j}}}$. The verification is ok, since $\pi_j^P = (r_j^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}} g^{\frac{m_j - m_{I_j}}{P_{I_j}}})^P = (r^P g^{m_j - m_{I_j}})^{\frac{P}{P_{I_j}}}$. Due to the randomness of r_j this gives a randomly distributed proof π_j satisfying the verification condition just like the proofs computed with the decryption key do. Now we are not using the decryption key at all, so by the IND-CPA security of Naccache-Stern encryption we may choose $g = (g')^P$ of order $\frac{\phi(M)}{4P}$ instead of having g of order $\frac{\phi(M)}{4}$. To see this is implied by the IND-CPA security, observe that $g = (g')^4 = (r^P)^2$ for some r , whereas a random element of order $\frac{\phi(M)}{4}$ can be written as $g = (r^P(g')^m)^2$ for some $m \in \mathbb{Z}_P^*$, i.e., they are the squares of ciphertexts containing 0 and $m \in \mathbb{Z}_P^*$. With $g = (g')^P$ the plaintexts are perfectly hidden and the perfect zero-knowledge property of the hidden bits proof gives us equivalence with a simulated proof. \square

7 Conclusion

We have suggested the shortest known NIZK proofs based on standard intractability assumptions. Based on trapdoor permutations we get an NIZK proof and common reference string of size $|C|k$ polylog k bits (where we use that polylog $|C| = \text{polylog}k$). This is a factor $\frac{k}{\text{polylog}k}$ improvement over Kilian and Petrank's construction [KP98].

Based on a specific number-theoretic assumption related to factoring, we get a very efficient implementation of a hidden bit string and an even shorter NIZK proof with a complexity of $|C|$ polylog k bits. This is asymptotically a factor $\frac{k^3}{\text{polylog}k}$ more efficient than the pairing-based constructions by Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06b, GOS06a] (assuming the group elements have size $\frac{k^3}{\text{polylog}k}$) although it remains an open problem to reduce the polylogarithmic factor to make our construction practical.

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