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"Some of the dynamic price work assumes
that users can choose routes. |
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In fact, in today's internet, routes are pretty
much fixed by ISPs. |
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At each level there exists a highly structured
market of access, transit and core ISPs with rules and so on. |
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Users can select access routes only by dialing
different ISPs, or on a slower timescale (timescale is the critical
question) can pay to have DSL, cable modem or other links installed by
other ISPs. |
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But the choices are still very limited, and are
not available on the TCP session or RTT like times. |
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Recent observations of BGP indicate that a
number of large client sites (typically server farms) are trying to use
"more specific prefixes" as a way tp punch routes through
alternate ISPs. |
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This is wreaking a certain amount of havoc in
the ISP community, mainly due to shortcomings in the BGP routing
architecture. |
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What this talk is about is the design space for
user selection in routing. |
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There are a number of ways of carrying out loose
or strict source routing, |
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classical IPv4 source route options, |
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dynamic NATs, |
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IPv6 hop-by-hop options, |
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application layer relays and so on. |
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Each has its shortcomings, and the time is about
right for offering input to medium routing research in the IETF/IRTF, to
get a solution to efficient selection of "articulation" points to
drive inter-ISP competition. |
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Efficient Route Selection |
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Without Route computation |
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Expose metrics and conditions |
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Not over-complicate packet processing |
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Can ISPs or users cheat? |
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Nope….not for long… |
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Same reasons you can’t cheat for ECN –
incentives aren’t there for ISP or user to cheat – |
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Even easier to detect route hackery than ECN
hackery strategies…as more globally visible |
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Is tricky! |
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See YAM or QoSMIC for receiver leaf selsection
protocols |
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I guess for PIM SM, RP allocation could be part
of scheme – for inter-domain, need to worry about MBGP/MSDP (would be nice if we had BGMP and or
H-bidir-PIM!) |
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GSE? |
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Like multi-homing, but with handover- only
problem might be route update frequency (see forwarding overhead) and
re-computing compressed route prefix/label replace tables… |
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Maybe a problem for convergence… |
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Easy…same as striping I nnormal case –treat as a
bundle of connections at different prices |
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Or maybe just bill average route price? |
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Could be nice solution to some problems of
justifying “protection” Bandwidth that is idle (I.e. we sell it cheapJ |
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Hum – GSE v. NAT? |
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Router already compute ttl– and re-run checksum |
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Incremental longest match, prefix/label swap and
checksum should be similar |
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Problems: traceback? |
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Need to consider enforcement – M3I model is to
do this via money and admission (per packet, per flow, per aggregate) –
maybe other permits could be allowed |
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Need to implement hierarchical monitoring |
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Risks need understanding |
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BGP is being busted |
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IP is being busted |
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Just like IP busted telcos… |
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So lets fight back and fix IP and routing… |
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Just like we fixed TCPJ |
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N==3 ? |
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Can pick ingress, egress AND core – this is
important as it levels the playing field for core (tier 1/0) provicers |
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Egress is important for client and server side
resilience. |
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Use BGP Community Attribute – need #AS^2 worth
of 3 values – diameter of net is 7, so 50*3 – fits in 1 byte…. |
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M3I has a metering/edge admission architecture |
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Need route choice mechanism |
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Addr space hack works with GSE with IPv6 – there
doneJ |
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Need a break… |
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Notes
