# Definability in Boolean bunched logic 

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- Incompleteness manifests as a gap between two key concepts:
- provability in some formal system for the logic (which corresponds to validity in some class of models); and
- validity in a (class of) intended model(s) of the logic.


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1. Is the class $\mathcal{C}$ finitely axiomatisable, a.k.a. definable in $\mathcal{L}$ ?
2. Is there a complete proof system for $\mathcal{L}$ w.r.t. validity in $\mathcal{C}$ ? In the case of BBI, we are often interested in properties of the heap models used in separation logic.

## BBI, proof-theoretically

Recall:
Provability in BBI is given by extending a Hilbert system for propositional classical logic by

$$
\begin{array}{cc}
A * B \vdash B * A & A *(B * C) \vdash(A * B) * C \\
A \vdash A * \mathrm{I} & A * \mathrm{I} \vdash A \\
\frac{A_{1} \vdash B_{1} \quad A_{2} \vdash B_{2}}{A_{1} * A_{2} \vdash B_{1} * B_{2}} & \frac{A * B \vdash C}{A \vdash B-C} \quad \frac{A \vdash B * C}{A * B \vdash C}
\end{array}
$$

## BBI, semantically (1)

Recall:
A BBI-model is given by $\langle W, \circ, E\rangle$, where

- $W$ is a set (of "worlds"),
- $\circ$ is a binary function $W \times W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$; we extend $\circ$ to $\mathcal{P}(W) \times \mathcal{P}(W) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$ by

$$
W_{1} \circ W_{2} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=} \bigcup_{w_{1} \in W_{1}, w_{2} \in W_{2}} w_{1} \circ w_{2}
$$

- ○ is commutative and associative;
- the set of units $E \subseteq W$ satisfies $w \circ E=\{w\}$ for all $w \in W$.

A valuation for BBI-model $M=\langle W, \circ, E\rangle$ is a function $\rho$ from propositional variables to $\mathcal{P}(W)$.

## BBI, semantically (2)

Given $M, \rho$, and $w \in W$, we define the forcing relation $w \not{ }_{\rho} A$ by induction on formula $A$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& w \models_{\rho} P \Leftrightarrow w \in \rho(P) \\
& w \models_{\rho} A \rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow \Leftrightarrow \\
& \vdots \\
& w \models_{\rho} A \text { implies } w \models_{\rho} B \\
& w \models_{\rho} A * B \Leftrightarrow w \in E \\
& w \models_{\rho} A \rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow w_{1} \circ w_{2} \text { and } w_{1} \models_{\rho} A \text { and } w_{2} \models_{\rho} B \\
& \forall w^{\prime}, w^{\prime \prime} \in W . \text { if } w^{\prime \prime} \in w \circ w^{\prime} \text { and } w^{\prime} \models_{\rho} A \\
& \text { then } w^{\prime \prime} \models_{\rho} B
\end{aligned}
$$

$A$ is valid in $M$ iff $w \models_{\rho} A$ for all $\rho$ and $w \in W$.

## Definable properties

A property $\mathcal{P}$ of BBI-models is said to be definable if there exists a formula $A$ such that for all BBI-models $M$,

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A \text { is valid in } M \Longleftrightarrow M \in \mathcal{P} .
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To show a property is definable, just exhibit the defining formula!

To show a property is not definable, we show it is not preserved by some validity-preserving model construction.

## Properties of (some) BBI-models

Partial functionality: $w, w^{\prime} \in w_{1} \circ w_{2}$ implies $w=w^{\prime}$;

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Cross-split property: whenever $(a \circ b) \cap(c \circ d) \neq \emptyset$, there exist $a c, a d, b c, b d$ such that $a \in a c \circ a d, b \in b c \circ b d$, $c \in a c \circ b c$ and $d \in a d \circ b d$.
$\forall a b=\frac{c}{d} \exists \frac{a c \mid b c}{a d \mid b d}$

## Two definable properties

Proposition
The following two properties are BBI-definable:
Indivisible units: $\quad\left(w \circ w^{\prime}\right) \cap E \neq \emptyset$ implies $w \in E$ $\mathrm{I} \wedge(A * B) \vdash A$

Divisibility: $\quad \forall w \notin E . \exists w_{1}, w_{2} \notin E$ such that $w \in w_{1} \circ w_{2}$ $\neg \mathrm{I} \vdash \neg \mathrm{I} * \neg \mathrm{I}$

## Disjoint unions of BBI-models

## Definition

If $M_{1}=\left\langle W_{1}, \circ_{1}, E_{1}\right\rangle$ and $M_{2}=\left\langle W_{2}, \circ_{2}, E_{2}\right\rangle$ are BBI-models and $W_{1}, W_{2}$ are disjoint then their disjoint union is given by

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M_{1} \uplus M_{2} \stackrel{\text { def }}{=}\left\langle W_{1} \cup W_{2}, \circ_{1} \cup o_{2}, E_{1} \cup E_{2}\right\rangle
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Proof. Structural induction on $A$.

## Undefinability of single-unit property

## Lemma

Suppose that there exist $\mathrm{BBI}-$ models $M_{1}$ and $M_{2}$ such that $M_{1}, M_{2} \in \mathcal{P}$ but $M_{1} \uplus M_{2} \notin \mathcal{P}$. Then $\mathcal{P}$ is not BBI-definable.

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The single unit property is not BBI-definable.

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## Theorem

The single unit property is not BBI-definable.
Proof. The disjoint union of any two single-unit BBI-models (e.g. two copies of $\mathbb{N}$ under addition) is not a single-unit model, so we are done by the above Lemma.

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3. $f(w) \in w_{1}^{\prime} \circ^{\prime} w_{2}^{\prime}$ implies $\exists w_{1}, w_{2} \in W . w \in w_{1} \circ w_{2}$ and $f\left(w_{1}\right)=w_{1}^{\prime}$ and $f\left(w_{2}\right)=w_{2}^{\prime} ;$

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4. $w_{2}^{\prime} \in f(w) \circ^{\prime} w_{1}^{\prime}$ implies $\exists w_{1}, w_{2} \in W . w_{2} \in w \circ w_{1}$ and $f\left(w_{1}\right)=w_{1}^{\prime}$ and $f\left(w_{2}\right)=w_{2}^{\prime}$.

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## Proposition

Suppose there is a surjective bounded morphism from $M$ to $M^{\prime}$. Then any formula valid in $M$ is also valid in $M^{\prime}$.

## Undefinability via bounded morphisms

## Lemma

Suppose there are BBI-models $M$ and $M^{\prime}$ s.t. there is a surjective bounded morphism from $M$ to $M^{\prime}$, and $M \in \mathcal{P}$ while $M^{\prime} \notin \mathcal{P}$. Then $\mathcal{P}$ is not BBI-definable.

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## Theorem

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Proof. In each case we build models $M$ and $M^{\prime}$ such that there is a bounded morphism from $M$ to $M^{\prime}$, but $M$ has the property while $M^{\prime}$ doesn't.

## Example:partial functionality

Define BBI-models $M=\langle W, \circ, E\rangle$ and $M^{\prime}=\left\langle W^{\prime}, \circ^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right\rangle$ by

$$
\begin{aligned}
& W=\left\{e, v_{1}, v_{2}, x_{1}, x_{2}, y, z\right\} \quad E=\{e\} \\
& w \circ e=e \circ w=\{w\} \text { for all } w \in W \\
& x_{1} \circ v_{1}=v_{1} \circ x_{1}=\{y\} \quad x_{1} \circ v_{2}=v_{2} \circ x_{1}=\{y\} \\
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Easy to check $M, M^{\prime}$ are both BBI-models, and $M$ is partial functional but $M^{\prime}$ is not. Our surjective morphism is:

$$
\begin{gathered}
f\left(v_{1}\right)=f\left(v_{2}\right)=v \quad f\left(x_{1}\right)=f\left(x_{2}\right)=x \\
f(w)=w \quad(w \in\{e, y, z\})
\end{gathered}
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- So, BBI cannot define some natural properties.
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- HyBBI extends the language of BBI by: any nominal $\ell$ is a formula, and so is any formula of the form $@_{\ell} A$.


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Easy to see that HyBBI is a conservative extension of BBI .

## Definable properties in HyBBI

Theorem
The following properties are HyBBI-definable:
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Proof.
Easy verifications!

## A word about cross-split

We have brushed over the cross-split property:

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\begin{aligned}
& (a \circ b) \cap(c \circ d) \neq \emptyset \text {, implies } \exists a c, a d, b c, b d \text { with } \\
& a \in a c \circ a d, b \in b c \circ b d, c \in a c \circ b c, d \in a d \circ b d .
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then cross-split is definable as the pure formula

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\begin{array}{r}
(a * b) \wedge(c * d) \vdash @_{a}\left(\top * \downarrow a c . @_{a}\left(\top * \downarrow a d . @_{a}(a c * a d)\right.\right. \\
\wedge @_{b}\left(\top * \downarrow b c \cdot @ _ { b } \left(\top * \downarrow b d . @_{b}(b c * b d)\right.\right. \\
\left.\left.\left.\left.\wedge @_{c}(a c * b c) \wedge @_{d}(a d * b d)\right)\right)\right)\right)
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Then $A$ is provable in the Hilbert system for HyBBI, extended with $A x$.

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- investigate possible applications to program analysis.


## Further reading

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