Sandboxing Untrusted Code: Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI)

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Motivation: Vulnerabilities in C

• Seen dangers of **vulnerabilities:**
  – injection of arbitrary code
  – return-to-libc (no code injection; malicious invocation of existing code)

• Vulnerabilities are **bugs**—application behavior not intended by programmer

• Bugs in C often because **memory operations not safe**
  – many ways to overwrite stored pointer, cause it to point to arbitrary memory
Motivation: Vulnerabilities in C

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  – injection of arbitrary code
  – return to libc (no code injection; malicious)

Can we constrain behavior of application code to prevent bugs from corrupting memory, and thus allowing exploits?

• Bugs in C often because memory operations not safe
  – many ways to overwrite stored pointer, cause it to point to arbitrary memory
Motivation: Untrusted Extensions

• Users often wish to extend application with new functionality made available as a binary module, e.g.,
  – Flash player plugin for Firefox browser
  – Binary kernel module for new filesystem for Linux

• Key risk: code from untrusted source (e.g., web site), but will run in your application’s address space
  – What if code overwrites your app’s data?
  – Or calls functions in your app’s code with ill intent? (e.g., calls disable_certificate_check())
Motivation: Untrusted Extensions

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**N.B. extension code may be malicious or may merely be buggy**

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- Or calls functions in your app’s code with ill intent? (e.g., calls disable_certificate_check())
Risks of Running Untrusted Code

- Overwrites trusted data or code
- Reads private data from trusted code’s memory
- Executes privileged instruction
- Calls trusted functions with bad arguments
- Jumps to middle of trusted function
- Contains vulnerabilities allowing others to do above
Allowed Operations for Untrusted Code

- Reads/writes own memory
- Executes own code
- Calls explicitly allowed functions in trusted code at correct entry points
Straw Man Solution: Isolation with Processes

- Run original app code in one process, untrusted extension in another; communicate between them by RPC
  - (Recall NFS over RPC, but between distinct hosts)
- Memory protection means extension cannot read/write memory of original app
- Not very transparent for programmer, if app and extension closely coupled
- Performance hit: context switches between processes
  - trap to kernel, copy arguments, save and restore registers, flush processor’s TLB
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Can we do better?

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Today’s Topic: Software-Based Fault Isolation

• Run untrusted binary extension in same process (address space) as trusted app code
• Place extension’s code and data in sandbox:
  – Prevent extension’s code from writing to app’s memory outside sandbox
  – Prevent extension’s code from transferring control to app’s code outside sandbox
• Idea: add instructions before memory writes and jumps to inspect their targets and constrain their behavior
SFI Use Scenario

• Developer runs sandboxer on unsafe extension code, to produce safe, sandboxed version:
  – adds instructions that sandbox unsafe instructions
  – transformation done by compiler or by binary rewriter

• Before running untrusted binary code, user runs verifier on it:
  – checks that safe instructions don’t access memory outside extension code’s data
  – checks that sandboxing instructions in place before all unsafe instructions
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User need not trust sandboxer; only verifier

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SFI Unit of Isolation: Fault Domain

- SFI confines untrusted code within a fault domain, in same address space (process) as trusted code.
- Fault domain consists of:
  - **Unique ID**: (used for access control on syscalls)
  - **Code segment**: virtual address range with same unique high-order bits, used to hold code
  - **Data segment**: virtual address range with same unique high-order bits, used to hold data
- **Segment ID**: unique high-order bits for a segment
Fault Domain Example

- Segment IDs are 12 bits long in example
- Separate segments for code and data allow distinguishing addresses as falling in one or other

Virtual address:
- Code Segment: $0x10000000$ to $0x10000000f$
- Data Segment: $0x10100000$ to $0x10100000f$

Fault domains:
- App memory: $0x10200000$ to $0x10200000f$

Address spaces:
- Stack, heap, static data

Notes:
- Stack and heap overlap in the code segment.
Sandboxing Memory

- Untrusted code should only be able to:
  - jump within its fault domain’s code segment
  - write within its fault domain’s data segment

- Sandboxer must ensure all jump, call, and memory store instructions comply with above

- Two types of memory addresses in instructions:
  - direct: complete address is specified statically in instruction
  - indirect: address is computed from register’s value
Sandboxing Memory (2)

• For directly addressed memory instructions, sandboxer should only emit:
  – directly addressed jumps and calls whose targets fall in fault domain’s code segment
    • e.g., JUMP 0x10030000
  – directly addressed stores whose targets fall in fault domain’s data segment
    • e.g., STORE 0x10120000, R1

• Directly addressed jumps, calls, stores can be made safe statically
Sandboxing Indirectly Addressed Memory

• Indirectly addressed jumps, calls, stores harder to sandbox—full address depends on register whose value is not known statically
  – e.g., STORE R0, R1
  – e.g., JR R3

• These are unsafe instructions that must be made safe at runtime
Sandboxing Indirectly Addressed Memory (2)

• Suppose unsafe instruction is
  
  ```
  STORE R0, R1 ; write R1 to Mem[R0]
  ```

• Sandboxer rewrites code to:

  ```
  MOV Ra, R0 ; copy R0 into Ra
  SHR Rb, Ra, Rc ; Rb = Ra >> Rc, to get segment ID
  CMP Rb, Rd ; Rd holds correct data segment ID
  BNE fault ; wrong data segment ID
  STORE Ra, R1 ; Ra in data segment, so do write
  ```

• Ra, Rc, and Rd are **dedicated**—may not be used by extension code
Sandboxing Indirectly Accessed Memory (3)

• Why does rewritten code use
  STORE Ra, R1

• and not
  STORE R0, R1

• After all, R0 has passed the check!

• Extension code may jump directly to
  STORE, bypassing check instructions!

• Because Ra, Rc, Rd are dedicated, Ra will
  always contain safe address inside data segment
Sandboxing Indirectly Accessed Memory (3)

• Why does rewritten code use
  \texttt{STORE Ra, R1}

• and not

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Remember: extension code may not set dedicated registers!}
\end{quote}

• Extension code may jump directly to \texttt{STORE}, \textit{bypassing check instructions}!

• Because Ra, Rc, Rd are dedicated, Ra will always contain safe address inside data segment
Sandboxing Indirectly Accessed Memory (4)

- Costs of first sandboxing scheme for indirectly addressed memory:
  - adds 4 instructions before each indirect store
  - uses 6 registers, 5 of which must be dedicated (never available to extension)
    - example used 3 dedicated registers, but need 2 more for sandboxing unsafe code addresses

- Can we do better, and get away with fewer added instructions?
- Yes, if we give up being able to identify which instruction accessed outside sandbox!
Faster Sandboxing of Indirect Addresses

• Idea: don’t check if target address is in segment; **force it to be in segment**

• So we transform `STORE R0, R1` into:
  
  ```
  AND Ra, R0, Re ; clear segment ID bits in Ra
  OR Ra, Ra, Rf ; set segment ID to correct value
  STORE Ra, R1   ; do write to safe target address
  ```

• Now **segment ID bits in Ra will always be correct**; can write anywhere in segment, but not outside it

• **Cost:** 2 added instructions, 5 dedicated registers
Faster Sandboxing of Indirect Jumps and Calls

- Very similar to data address sandboxing
- Transform \( \text{JR } R0 \) as follows:
  
  ```asm
  AND Rg, R0, Re ; clear segment ID bits in Rg
  OR Rg, Rg, Rh ; set segment ID to correct value
  JR Rg ; do jump to safe target address
  ```

- N.B. use of separate dedicated registers
  Rg for code target address, Rh for code segment ID

- Return from function similar, too (to sandbox return address)
Optimization: Guard Zones

- Some instructions use “register+offset” addressing: they use register as base, and supply offset for CPU to add to it.
- To sandbox such an instruction, SFI would need to do additional ADD to compute base+offset.
- Clever insight: offsets are of limited size, because of instruction encoding (+/- 64K on MIPS).
- So if base in correct segment, offset could stray no more than 64K outside that segment.
Guard Zones (2)

- Surround each segment with 64K guard zone of unmapped pages
- Ignore offsets when sandboxing!
- Accesses to guard zones cause traps
- Saves one ADD for reg+offset instrs
Optimization: Stack Pointer

• Insight: stack pointer is read far more often than it’s written; used as base address for many reg+offset instructions
• SFI doesn’t sandbox uses of stack pointer as base address; instead sandboxes setting of stack pointer, so stack pointer always contains safe value
• Reduces number of instructions that pay sandboxing overhead
Verifier

• Upon receiving (supposedly) sandboxed binary, verifier must ensure all instructions safe

• For instructions that use direct addressing, easy to check statically that segment IDs in addresses are correct

• For those that use indirect addressing, verifier must ensure instruction preceded by full set of sandboxing instructions
Verifier (2)

- Verifier must ensure no privileged instructions in code
- Verifier must ensure PC-relative branches fall in code segment
- If sandboxed code fails any of these checks, verifier rejects it
- Otherwise, code is correctly sandboxed
SFI Limitations on x86

• MIPS instructions fixed-length; x86 instructions variable-length
  – Result: can jump into middle of x86 instruction!
  – e.g., binary for AND eax, 0x80CD is 25 CD 80 00 00
  – If adversary jumps to second byte, he executes the instruction CD 80, which traps to a system call on Linux!
    – Jump to mid-instruction on x86 may even jump out of fault domain into app code!

• x86 has very few registers (4 general-purpose ones), so cannot dedicate registers easily
SFI vs. Exploits

- Simple stack-smashing, injecting code in stack buffer?
  - can’t execute own injected code—can’t jump to data segment
- Return-to-libc?
  - can overwrite return address with one within fault domain’s code segment—so can do return-to-libc within extension
- Format string vulnerabilities?
  - same story as above
SFI vs. Exploits: Lessons

• SFI allows write (including buffer overrun, %n overwrite) to extension’s data
• SFI allows jumps anywhere in extension’s code segment
• ...so attacker can exploit extension’s execution
• ...and on x86, can probably cause jump out of fault domain
SFI vs. Exploits: Lessons

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- So attacker can exploit extension’s execution
- ...and on x86, can probably cause jump out of fault domain

To be fair, SFI wasn’t designed for x86, and wasn’t designed to prevent exploits, but rather to isolate untrusted extension from main application.
SFI Summary

• Confines writes and control transfers in extension’s data and code segments, respectively
• Can support direct calls to allowed functions in trusted (app) code
• Prevents execution of privileged instructions
• Any write or control transfer within extension’s memory is allowed
• Requires dedicated registers
CFI: Control-Flow Integrity

- Follow-on to SFI; works on x86
- Idea: examine control flow graph (CFG) of program, which includes all functions and all transfers of control between them (e.g., calls of named functions, returns from them)
- Doesn’t require dedicated registers like SFI
- Finds all instruction boundaries
- Adds instructions to enforce that all jumps, branches, calls, returns transfer control to valid target found in CFG
CFI (2)

• Prevents return to injected code by overwriting return address:
  – transition to return address of injected code not in CFG

• Prevents return-to-libc attack:
  – enforces that return instruction in function f() can only transfer control to next instruction in some function that calls f()

• Further reading (not examinable): Abadi et al., Control-Flow Integrity, CCS 2005